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October 1, 2026

President Jens Frederiksen
Office of the President
University of New Haven
300 Boston Post Road
West Haven, CT 06516

Dear President Frederiksen,

I write to express my concerns regarding the University of New Haven (UNH) Tagliatela College of Engineering's partnership with Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications (XUPT) in the People's Republic of China (PRC) through the UNH-XUPT School of Information Engineering. Considering the facts outlined below, I urge UNH to terminate its joint cooperative program with XUPT.¹

The UNH-XUPT School of Information Engineering was established in May 2025 with the approval of the Chinese Ministry of Education and is co-located on XUPT's campus in Xi'an, China.² The joint school is housed within XUPT's College of Communications and Information Engineering. The joint school offers three undergraduate majors in strategically significant technology fields: communications engineering, data science and big data technology, and intelligence science and technology. Approximately one-third of the courses within each major are drawn from UNH's curriculum and taught by UNH faculty.³ By operating in China, the UNH-XUPT joint school exists under PRC law and jurisdiction and within China's regulatory and political environment. Like other joint education institutions of this nature, it is subject to PRC oversight and governance requirements and operates within a system that requires foreign educational partnerships to conform to China's national education policies and broader strategic priorities.⁴ Accordingly, despite UNH's participation, the joint school operates on Chinese soil,

¹ Website, University of New Haven, Tagliatela College of Engineering, From the Dean, Winter 2026, https://www.newhaven.edu/_resources/documents/_email/engineering/tcoe-trends/2026-winter/index.html

² Website, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications, Entered the New Haven Institute of Information Engineering “进入纽黑文信息工程学院,” <https://xupt.edu.cn/jgsz/jxdw/nhw.htm?>

³ Website, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications, Entered the New Haven Institute of Information Engineering “进入纽黑文信息工程学院,” <https://xupt.edu.cn/jgsz/jxdw/nhw.htm?>

⁴ Investigative Report, Select Committee on China and the Committee on Education and Workforce, Joint Institutes, Divided Loyalties: How the Chinese Communist Party Exploits U.S. University Partnerships to Empower China's Military and Repression, September 2025, <https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/media/reports/joint-institutes-divided-loyalties>

under Chinese law and regulatory authority, and within an institutional framework ultimately subject to PRC government oversight and regulatory authority.

Figure 1: XUPT-UNH College of Information Engineering Building at Xi'an, Shaanxi Province, China



XUPT's own announcement places the partnership within the context of the PRC's broader national development objectives. The university describes the joint school against the backdrop of the "deep implementation" of China's "Belt and Road Initiative" and states that XUPT has aligned itself with national strategies and local economic and social development needs by leveraging its disciplinary strengths in the information and communications technology field.⁵ Accordingly, UNH is not merely participating in a traditional student-exchange arrangement. It is providing American university curriculum and faculty instruction in advanced technology disciplines through a jointly operated school located on the campus of a PRC university that publicly describes its activities as serving Chinese national strategies and development priorities.^{6,7}

⁵ Website, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications, College Overview/College Introduction, <https://nhie.xupt.edu.cn/xygk/xyjj.htm>

⁶ Website, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications, College Overview/College Introduction, <https://nhie.xupt.edu.cn/xygk/xyjj.htm>

⁷ Website, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications, New Haven School of Information Engineering, <https://zhaosheng.xupt.edu.cn/xyzy2/nhwxxgcxy.htm>

XUPT's College of Communications and Information Engineering, where the UNH-XUPT joint school resides, openly promotes its support for China's "military-civil fusion" (军民融合) strategy, with related innovations showcased at national conferences.^{8,9} The College also promotes its relationship with the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) National University of Defense Technology (NUDT) and the BeiDou Open Laboratory Xi'an Branch. At one jointly organized event, BeiDou Open Laboratory provided XUPT with RMB 300,000 worth of satellite-navigation simulation software and open-source receiver code to support research by XUPT faculty and students. XUPT's own description makes the purpose of these activities clear: the College seeks to "vigorously promote the military-civilian integration development strategy" through BeiDou research while building a platform for talent cultivation, application development, technology transfer, and incubation.¹⁰ XUPT thus describes an institutional framework that connects its faculty, students, and laboratories with PLA expertise, technology, and industry in furtherance of China's military-civil fusion strategy.¹¹

XUPT's College of Communications and Information Engineering maintains a longstanding institutional partnership with ZTE Corporation that integrates university and company research, laboratories, technical resources, faculty development, and student training. Beginning in 2015, XUPT and ZTE jointly established an ICT Innovation Practice Center on XUPT's campus that supported internships, practical training, and graduation projects for communications engineering students. The relationship expanded through a 2020 cooperation agreement, and, in 2021, the parties agreed to further integrate their laboratory and educational resources in 5G, artificial intelligence, IoT, cloud computing, and big data. Among other activities, XUPT and ZTE agreed to jointly develop laboratories and courses, share 5G-related laboratory resources, conduct regular joint teaching and research activities, provide technical training to XUPT faculty, and establish what XUPT described as a "stable, win-win long-term mechanism" for university-enterprise cooperation.¹²

- ZTE has previously been subject to significant U.S. export control and sanctions enforcement. In 2017, ZTE agreed to a combined \$1.19 billion settlement with the Departments of Justice, Commerce, and Treasury after admitting to illegally shipping U.S.-origin goods to Iran in violation of U.S. sanctions and export control laws. Treasury separately assessed more than \$100 million for 251 apparent sanctions violations involving a multiyear scheme to use third-party companies to surreptitiously supply Iran with U.S.-

⁸ Website, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications, Faculty from the School of Communication and Information Engineering..., November 17, 2025, <https://tg.xupt.edu.cn/info/1173/5300.htm>

⁹ Website, Data Abyss, Mil-Civ Fusion Intelligence, <https://app.dataabyss.ai/capabilities/mil-civ-fusion?search=%E8%A5%BF%E5%AE%89%E9%82%AE%E7%94%B5%E5%A4%A7%E5%AD%A6%E9%80%9A%E4%BF%A1%E4%B8%8E%E4%BF%A1%E6%81%AF%E5%B7%A5%E7%A8%8B%E5%AD%A6%E9%9%A2>

¹⁰ Website, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications, BeiDou Open Laboratory "Micro-Project" Campus Tour, <https://zhaosheng.xupt.edu.cn/info/1058/2336.htm?>

¹¹ Website, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications, BeiDou Open Laboratory "Micro-Project" Campus Tour, <https://zhaosheng.xupt.edu.cn/info/1058/2336.htm?>

¹² Website, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications, Focusing on New Engineering Disciplines and Deepening University-Industry Collaboration: XUPT and ZTE Hold Seminar on Expanding University-Industry Cooperation "面向新工科、打通教学基层对接机制、深化校企专业共建, 中兴-西邮通院召开深化校企合作研讨会," January 8, 2021, <https://tg.xupt.edu.cn/info/1088/1483.htm>

origin goods, including controlled items. ZTE had been placed on the Commerce Department's Entity List in 2016 and was removed in March 2017 following the enforcement resolution and imposition of compliance requirements.¹³

A review of publication data from XUPT's College of Communications and Information Engineering identified numerous faculty members who have published extensively with entities within China's defense research and industrial base.¹⁴ Research conducted with the entities identified below spans a range of sensitive and dual-use technologies, including communications jamming and anti-jamming; unmanned aerial vehicle targeting; secure aerial communications; eavesdropping and covert communications; algorithms for missile and target tracking; power grid security; Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing; and malware traffic classification for detecting network intrusions.¹⁵ These collaborations include entities appearing on various U.S. government restricted lists for national security reasons, as well as PRC military universities, defense research institutes, and defense-affiliated universities, including:

- The PLA's National University of Defense Technology (NUDT);
- PLA Rocket Force Engineering University;
- PLA Air Force Engineering University;
- PLA Air Force Aviation University;
- PLA Army Engineering University;
- Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.;
- ZTE Corporation;
- Peng Cheng Laboratory;
- Xidian University's National Defense Key Laboratory of Radar Signal Processing;
- Aerospace Information Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Sciences;
- China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC);
- China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), 54th Research Institute;
- Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), 618th Research Institute;
- All seven of China's "Seven Sons of National Defense" universities; and
- Numerous universities co-administered by the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND).

¹³ Website, U.S. Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control and Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Corporation, March 7, 2017, <https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20170307>

¹⁴ Publication Data, Digital Science Dimensions AI Platform, https://app.dimensions.ai/discover/publication?search_mode=content&search_text=%22Xi%E2%80%99an%20University%20of%20Posts%20and%20Telecommunications%22%20and%20%22communications%20and%20information%20engineering%22&search_type=kws&search_field=full_search

¹⁵ *ibid*

Furthermore, a review of faculty biographies from XUPT's College of Communications and Information Engineering identifies multiple faculty members^{16,17,18} who have participated in classified or defense-related research and weapons and equipment development projects. Faculty biographies identify projects with titles partially redacted as "XXXX," a convention used in Chinese scientific and technical disclosures to obscure identifying information about sensitive research projects, equipment, or sponsoring organizations, including those associated with classified national defense and military weapons development programs. These projects include.

- "XXXXXXXXX Communication Technology Research and Simulation Verification," commissioned project, Principal Investigator, January 2026 to August 2026;
- "Research on XXXXXXXX Technology," longitudinal project, Principal Investigator, June 2023 to May 2025;
- "Research on XXXXXX Transmission Technology," National Defense Science and Technology Innovation Special Zone project, key member, June 2023 to May 2025;
- "XXXX Project," satellite simulation source, 2020;
- "XXXX Project," development of RF switch matrix and control software, 2021;
- "XXXX Project," development of a XXX frequency-hopping radio, 2020;
- "XXXX Project," online computing module for unmanned FPGA platforms, 2020;
- "XXXX Project," development of a camera receiver controller, 2019;
- "XXXX Project," development of a DRM-based digital medium-wave exciter system, 2018;
- "XXXX Project," 225–512 MHz high-speed broadband data transmission, 2017;
- "XXXX Project," research on high-speed broadband 5M technology, 2015;
- "XXXX Project," intelligent station monitoring based on Zigbee, 2015; and
- "Wireless Sound and Vibration Integrated Border Defense Seal Control System," Heilongjiang Province military-civil fusion industrial transfer project.

These faculty disclosures further demonstrate that defense-related research is not peripheral to XUPT but is conducted by faculty within the very XUPT College of Communications and Information Engineering where the UNH-XUPT joint program resides.

XUPT's own internal documents demonstrate that its connections to China's defense research apparatus extend to the institutional level. XUPT maintains procedures governing the use of its Level II Confidentiality Qualification for Weapons and Equipment Scientific Research and Production Units and Weapons and Equipment Quality Management System Certificate, specialized credentials associated with participation in China's weapons and equipment research and production system.¹⁹ XUPT also maintains an institutional framework for conducting

¹⁶ Faculty Page, XUPT, School of Communications and Information Engineering, Bai Jisheng's Personal Page (白吉生个人主页), <https://tg.xupt.edu.cn/info/1151/5366.htm>

¹⁷ Faculty Page, XUPT, School of Communications and Information Engineering, Liu Chaowen "刘超文," <https://gr.xupt.edu.cn/info/1204/7510.htm>

¹⁸ Faculty Page, XUPT, School of Communications and Information Engineering, Li Bo's Personal Homepage (李波个人主页), <https://tg.xupt.edu.cn/info/1151/4432.htm>

¹⁹ Website, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications, Download Center, Military-Civil Integration, Confidentiality Management, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications Semi-Annual Confidentiality Supervision and Inspection Form "西安邮电大学半年保密监督检查表," <https://kjc.xupt.edu.cn/info/1103/3885.htm>

classified research involving Chinese state secrets, including procedures requiring the identification of project classification levels, verification of outside collaborators' confidentiality qualifications, approval by XUPT's Confidentiality Office, and execution of security agreements specifically protecting "state secrets."²⁰ XUPT further conducts security inspections of outside research partners covering classified project data and drawings, information systems, personnel, and experimental and production facilities.²¹ Together, these documents show that XUPT possesses formal university-level qualifications, procedures, and security infrastructure for conducting and supporting classified defense-related research, many of which identified within XUPT's College of Communications and Information Engineering.

Figure 2: XUPT's Form for Use of Weapons and Equipment Research and Production Qualification Certificates

西安邮电大学国防科研资质证书使用申请表			
申请人		申请时间	
联系方式		所在单位	
申请内容（填写借用证书名称、用途）			
本人（单位）因 _____ 需要，特申请借用 _____。本人（单位）已阅知并保证严格遵守《西安邮电大学国防科研资质证书管理规定》。 申请人签字：			
单位负责人意见		保密办意见	
签 章： 年 月 日		签 章： 年 月 日	
申请资质种类（此栏由保密办经办人填写）			
☐ 武器装备科研生产单位二级保密资质证书（复印件） 编号：_____			
☐ 武器装备质量管理体系证书（复印件） 编号：_____			
备 注：			

²⁰ Website, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications, Download Center, Military-Civil Integration, Confidentiality Management, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications collaborates with supporting confidential attachments "西安邮电大学协作配套保密附件," <https://kjc.xupt.edu.cn/info/1103/3774.htm>

²¹ Website, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications, Download Center, Military-Civil Integration, Confidentiality Management, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications collaborates with supporting confidential attachments "西安邮电大学协作配套保密附件," <https://kjc.xupt.edu.cn/info/1103/3774.htm>

These are not standard research credentials held by all Chinese universities. Rather, they are specialized qualifications associated with institutions participating in China's weapons and equipment research and production system. XUPT's maintenance of a Level II Confidentiality Qualification for Weapons and Equipment Scientific Research and Production Units, together with a Weapons and Equipment Quality Management System Certificate, demonstrates an institutional capability to support defense-related research subject to specialized confidentiality and quality-management requirements.²² XUPT's own procedures further require its Confidentiality Office to control the use of these credentials, underscoring that these qualifications are distinct from ordinary university research administration.²³

The UNH-XUPT joint school is particularly concerning given UNH's role in supporting U.S. cybersecurity education and workforce development. UNH has been designated a National Security Agency (NSA) Center of Academic Excellence in Cyber Operations since 2019, and its Tagliatela College of Engineering received an NSA National Centers of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity grant to lead a coalition of five U.S. colleges and universities in preparing individuals for careers in artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and cyber threat analysis.^{24,25} **Against the backdrop of XUPT's College of Communications and Information Engineering's documented relationships with the PLA, China's defense research and industrial base, and military-civil fusion initiatives, the joint school creates a potential pathway for U.S.-supported human and intellectual capital, expertise, and technical knowledge to benefit PRC strategic and technological priorities.** This risk is particularly significant because XUPT itself has publicly framed the UNH partnership in the context of advancing its strategic priorities and implementing China's Belt and Road Initiative and supporting military-civil fusion strategy.²⁶

The overlap in research areas further heightens these concerns. As detailed earlier in this letter, XUPT faculty conducts research in areas including malware and cyberattack detection, communications jamming and anti-jamming, eavesdropping and covert communications, network intrusion detection, GNSS spoofing, and secure communications, including research conducted with PRC military and defense entities. These research areas overlap with cybersecurity and cyber operations disciplines encompassed by UNH's NSA designation and federally supported cybersecurity programs. The result is a joint academic program connecting an NSA-designated U.S. cybersecurity institution with a PRC university's subordinate College of Communications and Information Engineering whose faculty conduct research in extremely sensitive technical fields alongside PLA and defense-affiliated entities. This convergence raises serious questions

²² Website, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications, Download Center, Military-Civil Integration, Confidentiality Management, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications collaborates with supporting confidential attachments "西安邮电大学协作配套保密附件," <https://kjc.xupt.edu.cn/info/1103/3774.htm>

²³ Website, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications, Download Center, Military-Civil Integration, Confidentiality Management, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications collaborates with supporting confidential attachments "西安邮电大学协作配套保密附件," <https://kjc.xupt.edu.cn/info/1103/3774.htm>

²⁴ Website, University of New Haven, Tagliatela College of Engineering, The NSA/NCAE-C Immersive Cybersecurity Workforce Development Program, <https://www.newhaven.edu/engineering/connecticut-institute-of-technology/cybersecurity-workforce-development-program.php>

²⁵ Website, University of New Haven, National Security Agency Names University of New Haven a Center of Academic Excellence, May 21, 2019, <https://www.newhaven.edu/news/releases/2019/nsa-designation.php>

²⁶ Website, Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications, Faculty from the School of Communication and Information Engineering..., November 17, 2025, <https://tg.xupt.edu.cn/info/1173/5300.htm>

about whether U.S.-developed expertise, training, research methods, and human capital could ultimately be transferred or diverted into or benefit the same PRC defense research ecosystem that U.S. research security policies are intended to protect against.

The specific institution UNH has chosen as its partner presents too great a risk for the exploitation and diversion of American human and intellectual capital. U.S. universities should not support, conduct research with, or use federal research dollars to sustain institutional partnerships with foreign universities that maintain extensive relationships with Chinese military and defense entities.

This concern is especially acute here. A U.S. university whose engineering college is an NSA-designated Center of Academic Excellence in Cyber Operations should not maintain a joint academic program with a Chinese institution whose College of Communications and Information Engineering, the very college where the UNH-XUPT joint program resides, has faculty conducting extensive research in areas such as malware, cyberattack and network-intrusion detection, communications jamming and anti-jamming, eavesdropping, covert communications, and GNSS spoofing, including research with PLA and defense-affiliated entities. Such a partnership creates an unnecessary risk that American taxpayer-supported human and intellectual capital could be diverted to China's defense research ecosystem.

This partnership puts the national security interests of the United States at risk. I therefore urge you to shut down UNH's joint program with XUPT expeditiously.

Sincerely,



John Moolenaar
Chairman