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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHINA

March 5, 2026

The Honorable Howard Lutnick
Secretary of Commerce
U.S. Department of Commerce
1401 Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20230

The Honorable Pete Hegseth
Secretary of Defense
Office of the Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

The Honorable Brendan Carr
Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
45 L Street NE
Washington, DC 20554

The Honorable Scott Bessent
Secretary of the Treasury
U.S. Department of the Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20220

Dear Secretaries Lutnick, Hegseth, and Bessent, and Chairman Carr:

We write to urge immediate action to ensure that Futurewei Technologies, Inc. (Futurewei) is presumptively treated the same as Huawei under appropriate United States national security laws and regulations. In response to a bipartisan oversight request from the U.S. House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (Select Committee), Futurewei produced documents demonstrating that Huawei exercises ultimate ownership and control over Futurewei’s finances, operations, and personnel—allowing Huawei to maintain an active U.S. presence despite the federal actions taken against it.¹

As you all know, the U.S. Government has taken a series of coordinated actions against Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. based on national security and foreign policy concerns. In May 2019, the Department of Commerce added Huawei to the BIS Entity List for activities “contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.”² Section 889 of the FY2019 NDAA bars federal agencies from contracting with entities that use Huawei equipment, citing espionage and supply-chain risks.³ In 2020, Huawei “and four official and unofficial subsidiaries” (including Futurewei) were indicted by the Department of Justice for various violations of U.S. national security laws, including conspiring to violate the Racketeer


¹ Letter from Rep. John Moolenaar, Chairman, and Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi, Ranking Member, H. Select Comm. on the Strategic Competition Between the U.S. and the Chinese Communist Party, to Jason Chao, Vice President, Futurewei Techs. (Sept. 14, 2025), <https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/2025-09-24-letter-to-futurewei.pdf>.

² 84 Fed. Reg. 22961 (May 21, 2019)

³ Pub. L. 115-232, § 889, 132 Stat. 1917 (2018)

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act in connection with a scheme to misappropriate U.S. intellectual property.⁴ The Department of Defense later designated Huawei as a “Chinese Military Company” under the FY2021 NDAA and, under Executive Orders 13959 and 14032, added it to the Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List, prohibiting U.S. persons from trading its securities.⁵ OFAC, DoD, and the FCC have each identified Huawei as tied to China’s defense and surveillance sectors, with the FCC finding its operations pose “an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.”⁶ In 2022, the FCC further adopted rules prohibiting Huawei equipment from being authorized for use in the United States.⁷ Despite these and other prohibitions, it appears as though Huawei is continuing to operate in the United States through Futurewei.⁸

First, Huawei exercises financial control and ownership over Futurewei. Futurewei states that it “does not generate revenues from the provision of any products or services to the public” and instead “obtains its operating revenue and funding from Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. and Huawei Device Co., Ltd. to perform mainly contract research and development (‘R&D’) services.”⁹ It further reports that it is “100% owned by Huawei Technologies Coöperatief U.A., which in turn is 100% owned by Huawei,” and confirms that Huawei funds the salaries of “shared” personnel.¹⁰ Futurewei’s budget, funding, and ultimate beneficial ownership are dependent on Huawei.



Corporate ownership chain of Futurewei Technologies, Inc.¹¹

Second, Huawei directs Futurewei’s operations. Futurewei states that it “is the U.S. R&D subsidiary of Huawei” and exists to “provide R&D services to Huawei” across “fundamental research, open-source development, ecosystem development, [and] industry and standards development.”¹² Although it claims that “operations, staffing, and research activities are

⁴ <https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/chinese-telecommunications-conglomerate-huawei-and-subsidiaries-charged-racketeering>

⁵ Pub. L. 116-283, § 1260H (2021); Exec. Order 13959, 85 Fed. Reg. 73185 (Nov. 17, 2020); amended by Exec. Order 14032, 86 Fed. Reg. 30145 (June 7, 2021); 86 Fed. Reg. 3015 (Jan. 14, 2021).

⁶ FCC DA 20-1264 (Nov. 10, 2020)

⁷ <https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-389524A1.pdf>

⁸ Although Futurewei purports to have taken “proactive steps to ensure compliance with applicable export control regulations and Entity List restrictions . . . [including by] focus[ing] on open-source community and standard setting,” the key focus of the Committee’s inquiry is addressing the national security risks of Futurewei’s operations, rather than assessing their legality.


⁹ Documents on file with the Select Committee.

¹⁰ Documents on file with the Select Committee.

¹¹ Documents on file with the Select Committee.

¹² Documents on file with the Select Committee.

generally made internally,” Futurewei concedes that its sole shareholder may “influence or exercise control” through board appointments and confirms that its directors “were appointed by Futurewei’s sole shareholder, Huawei Coöperatief.”¹³ These disclosures show that Huawei sets Futurewei’s objectives and directs its activities.



Futurewei’s internal organizational structure.¹⁴

Third, Huawei’s leadership and personnel overlap with Futurewei. Futurewei identifies at least ten “shared” personnel who “provide legal advice, representation, and services to Huawei,” including its Head of the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Department, multiple in-house IPR counsel, a registered patent agent, and legal support staff.¹⁵ Even Futurewei acknowledges that one of its key functions is “prosecut[ing] certain U.S. patent applications on behalf of Huawei that Huawei originates on its behalf and those of other Huawei entities.”¹⁶ This shared legal and patent infrastructure shows that Huawei, not Futurewei, almost certainly oversees the disposition of research, intellectual property, and compliance functions—allowing Huawei to direct how U.S.-based research is captured, protected, and transferred. In fact, it appears likely that a Futurewei director previously held a senior role at a Huawei R&D facility in the PRC that is at the forefront of the company’s efforts to out-innovate the U.S. in key emerging technologies.¹⁷ Futurewei also confirms that its directors “each have voting rights in their capacity as directors, but not as stockholders,” and that they were appointed by Huawei’s sole shareholder.¹⁸ These

¹³ Documents on file with the Select Committee.

¹⁴ Documents on file with the Select Committee.

¹⁵ Documents on file with the Select Committee.

¹⁶ Documents on file with the Select Committee.

¹⁷ Documents on file with the Select Committee.

¹⁸ Documents on file with the Select Committee.

admissions demonstrate that Huawei—not any independent U.S. management—directs Futurewei’s key mission, personnel, and strategic decisions.

Taken together, these facts alone confirm the core national security concern that prompted the Select Committee’s inquiry: Futurewei functions as Huawei’s U.S. arm in both purpose and practice.¹⁹ Although Futurewei calls itself a “U.S. company,” the record shows that it advances People’s Republic of China (PRC)-aligned technology goals and maintains access to key functions in the U.S. despite federal restrictions on Huawei. Under U.S. national security and export control law, risk is determined by foreign ownership, direction, and control—not by incorporation location or corporate statements.²⁰ While not all of Futurewei’s activities are necessarily concerning, because Huawei ultimately controls Futurewei’s financing, governance, and personnel, Futurewei presents the same national-security risks as Huawei and appears to fall under many of the same legal authorities designed to mitigate those risks.

Accordingly, we urge the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Treasury, and the Federal Communications Commission to take immediate action to ensure that Futurewei is presumptively subject to the below restrictions currently applied to Huawei. These authorities—including export controls, military company designations, financial and securities-related restrictions, and covered communications equipment prohibitions—may be appropriate to prevent Huawei from maintaining a U.S.-based proxy. In particular, we request that your departments evaluate Futurewei for:

- Inclusion on the BIS Entity List;
- Designation under Section 1260H of the FY2021 NDAA (Pub. L. 116-283; 10 U.S.C. § 113 note) (the “Chinese Military Companies” List);
- Addition to the Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List;
- Inclusion on the FCC’s Covered List under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1609); and
- Review for action under Executive Order 13873 (Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain) and its implementing regulations, including the ICTS Supply Chain Rules (15 C.F.R. Part 791).

In furtherance of the Select Committee’s inquiry, we respectfully request a staff-level briefing regarding the status of your assessments and anticipated next steps by **March 19, 2026**. We further welcome the opportunity to engage with relevant personnel on whether additional legislative authorities or measures are needed to address threats associated with PRC-controlled technology proxies operating opaquely in the United States.

House Resolution 5 delegates to the U.S. House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party broad authority to

¹⁹ Letter from Rep. John Moolenaar, Chairman, and Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi, Ranking Member, H. Select Comm. on the Strategic Competition Between the U.S. and the Chinese Communist Party, to Jason Chao, Vice President, Futurewei Techs. (Sept. 14, 2025), <https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/2025-09-24-letter-to-futurewei.pdf>.

²⁰ International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706 (2018), as applied through Addition of Entities to the Entity List, 84 Fed. Reg. 22,961 (May 21, 2019) (adding Huawei and sixty-eight non-U.S. affiliates based on activities “contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States”). See also 15 C.F.R. § 744 Supp. No. 4 (2024) (applying Entity List restrictions to entities acting as agents or subsidiaries of listed persons regardless of place of incorporation); 32 C.F.R. § 117.11 (defining foreign ownership, control, or influence as the basis for assessing national-security risk to classified programs).

investigate and submit policy recommendations on countering the economic, technological, security, and ideological threats of the Chinese Communist Party to the United States and allies and partners of the United States.²¹ Upon receipt of this letter, please maintain and preserve all hard copy and electronic documents, including electronic communications, related to the subject matter of this letter.

Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



John Moolenaar
Chairman



Ro Khanna
Ranking Member

²¹ H. Res. 5, § 4(a), 119th Cong. (2025).