

STATE OF INDIANA)
)
COUNTY OF MARION)

IN THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

CAUSE NO. 49D01-2209-PL-031056

ANONYMOUS PLAINTIFF 1, *et al.*,)
)
 Plaintiffs,)
)
 v.)
)
THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE)
MEDICAL LICENSING BOARD OF)
INDIANA, *et al.*,)
)
 Defendants.)

ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs are two anonymous women, the advocacy organization Hoosier Jews for Choice, and a certified class. They allege that a statute, Indiana Code § 16-34-2-1, known as the “Abortion Law,” cannot be enforced consistent with Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), Ind. Code § 34-13-9-0.7. Plaintiffs and Defendants (“the State”) have both moved for summary judgment. Having considered the parties’ written submissions and heard oral argument, **the Court DENIES the State’s motion and GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion.**

Relevant Portions of Statutes at Issue

A. Indiana Code § 16-34-2-1: “Abortion Law”

(1) if a physician determines that the fetus has a “lethal fetal anomaly,” before the earlier of viability or twenty (20) weeks of postfertilization age, Ind. Code § 16-34-2-1(a)(1)(A)(ii), where “lethal fatal anomaly” is defined as “a fetal condition diagnosed before birth that, if the pregnancy results in a live birth, will with reasonable certainty result in the death of the child not more than three (3) months after the child’s birth,” Ind. Code § 16-25-4.5-2;

(2) “during the first ten (10) weeks of postfertilization age of the fetus” if the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest, Ind. Code § 16-34-2-1(a)(2); or

(3) if a physician determines that an “abortion is necessary when reasonable medical judgment dictates that performing the abortion is necessary to prevent any serious health risk to the pregnant woman or to save the pregnant woman’s life.” Ind. Code § 16-34-3-1(1)(A)(i), (3)(A) “Serious health risk” means “a condition exists that has complicated the mother’s medical condition and necessitates an abortion to prevent death or a serious risk of substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function,” and expressly excludes “psychological or emotional conditions.” Ind. Code § 16-18-2-327.9.

Physicians who violate the prohibitions in the Abortion Law face criminal penalties, Indiana Code § 16-34-2-7, and potential revocation of their medical licenses, Indiana Code § 25-22.5-8-6(b)(2).

B. Ind. Code § 34-13-9-8 : Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)

- (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a governmental entity may not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.
- (b) A governmental entity may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if the governmental entity demonstrates that application of the burden to the person:
 - (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
 - (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

RFRA “applies to all governmental entity statutes, ordinances, resolutions, executive or administrative orders, regulations, customs, and usages, including the implementation or application thereof.” Ind. Code § 34-13-9-1.

The “exercise of religion” that falls within RFRA’s ambit “includes any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” Ind.

Code § 34-13-9-5. If a violation is found, Indiana’s RFRA allows for injunctive and declaratory relief as well as damages and attorneys’ fees. Ind. Code § 34-13-9-10.

RELEVANT FACTS

1. Anonymous Plaintiff 1 (“Anon. 1”) is a Jewish woman whose religious beliefs inform her life, including her lifestyle, moral and ethical decision-making, family life, observance of holidays, and many other practices. (Supplemental Declaration of Anon. 1 ¶¶ 1-4, Ex. 1 to Submissions). Her religious beliefs include that life begins when a person takes their first breath after being born. (*Id.* ¶ 9). She also believes, according to Jewish law and teachings, that the health of a pregnant woman, both physical and mental, must take precedence over the potential for life embodied in a zygote, blastocyst, embryo, or fetus. (*Id.* ¶ 10). Therefore, according to her Jewish beliefs, if her health or wellbeing—physical, mental, or emotional—were endangered by a pregnancy, a pregnancy-related condition, or a fetal anomaly, she must terminate the pregnancy. (*Id.*). She has already been required to engage in this exercise, having terminated a prior pregnancy in accordance with her religious belief that the abortion was required to protect her physical and mental health. (*Id.* ¶¶ 27-28).
2. Anon. 1 would like to attempt to have another child. (Supplemental Declaration of Anon. 1 ¶ 31, Ex. 1 to Submissions; 2025 Deposition of Anon. 1, p. 12, Exhibit 26 to State’s Submissions). Anon. 1 is aware that a pregnancy might seriously endanger her health, without necessarily causing death or a serious risk of substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function. (*Id.* ¶¶ 12, 32). There are many circumstances in which Anon. 1’s religious beliefs would direct her to terminate a

pregnancy, but where such a termination would not be permitted by the limited exceptions to Indiana's abortion ban. (*Id.* ¶ 33). Anon. 1 is also aware that in Indiana and in other states where abortion bans are in effect, women have experienced extreme and emergent risks to their physical health because physicians delayed providing necessary medical care, for fear of violating these statutes. (*Id.* ¶ 34). Anon. 1's understanding is that, until very recently, despite the existence of the preliminary injunction in this case, there were no medical providers in Indiana performing abortions outside of those allowed by the exceptions provided by the statute itself. (*Id.* ¶ 37).

3. Anon. 1 believes that her religion instructs her that she cannot imperil her life in that way given that Jewish law instructs her that a fetus is not a life. (*Id.* ¶¶ 34-35). She has recently learned that at least one healthcare entity in the State will now perform abortions necessitated by religious belief, and she is therefore considering attempting to have another child. (*Id.* ¶ 38). She still has many reservations, however, because of the uncertainties that come with the possibility of continued appeals in this case. (*Id.*). She would be much more likely to try to get pregnant if she had certainty regarding her ability to continue to access abortion care. (*Id.*).
4. Anonymous Plaintiff 2 ("Anon. 2") does not belong to a specific religious tradition but has personal religious and spiritual beliefs that guide her life, including her moral and ethical practices. (Supplemental Declaration of Anon. 2, ¶¶ 1-4, Ex. 3 to Submissions). She does not believe in a single, theistic god, but believes that there is within the universe a supernatural force or power that connects all humans and is larger than any individual person. (*Id.* ¶¶ 5-6). She believes this could be described as a universal consciousness, and because of this connectedness through a supernatural force, she

believes all humans are directed to act in a manner that promotes and does not harm other humans or this community of humanity. (*Id.* ¶ 7). One of her central spiritual beliefs is that people are endowed with bodily autonomy that should not be infringed upon. (*Id.* ¶ 9). To do so constitutes a spiritual and moral wrong and inhibits the full expression of a person's humanity. (*Id.* ¶ 9).

5. Anon. 2 does not believe that life begins at conception, and she believes that, at least prior to viability, a fetus is a part of the body of the mother. (*Id.* ¶¶ 10-11). Because of her religious belief in spiritual and physical autonomy over her own body, including a fetus, she believes it is her spiritual obligation to determine whether to remain pregnant. (*Id.* ¶ 12). As a matter of her religious beliefs, she believes that if a pregnancy or the birth of another child would not allow her to fully realize her humanity and inherent dignity, she should terminate that pregnancy, and this is so in circumstances that would not be permitted by the statute. (*Id.* ¶ 13). Anon. 2 has terminated a pregnancy for precisely this reason in the past. (*Id.* ¶ 14).
6. Anon. 2 does not wish to have another child. (2025 Deposition of Anonymous Plaintiff 2 at 6-7, Exhibit 27 to State's Submissions).¹ Because of this, if she were in the future to become pregnant, her religious beliefs would require her to terminate a pregnancy. (Supplemental Declaration of Anon. 2, ¶ 15, Ex. 3 to Submissions). But such termination would not be allowed by the statute. The statute has caused Anon. 2 significant anxiety about the possibility of an unintended pregnancy and her inability to terminate such a pregnancy. (*Id.* ¶ 16). This anxiety has resulted in a reduction in physical intimacy between Anon. 2 and her husband, which is causing her harm. (*Id.* ¶¶

¹ The pages in this exhibit are not numbered. As cited herein, the first page of the exhibit— the title page—is counted as page 1.

16-17). After the injunction was issued in this case, she remained extremely concerned about becoming unintentionally pregnant, because she was not aware of any doctor who would be willing to perform a religiously mandated abortion that did not otherwise meet the exceptions contained within the law. (*Id.* ¶ 18). As a result, her physical intimacy with her husband remains reduced from the time prior to the passage of the statute. (*Id.*) If the plaintiffs were ultimately successful in this case, her fears would significantly decrease. (*Id.*)

7. Plaintiff Hoosier Jews for Choice membership, its purpose and the organization's members include Jewish persons of reproductive age whose religious beliefs direct and influence the circumstances under which they, and Jewish people throughout Indiana, must be permitted to access abortion care consistently with their religion. (Supplemental Declaration of Hoosier Jews for Choice ¶¶ 1-5, 8, Ex. 2 to Submissions). Individuals are not required to identify as Jewish to become members, but most members are Jewish. (Hoosier Jews for Choice Membership Questionnaire Responses, Exhibit 36 to State's Submissions). The organization and its members believe that under Jewish law, an abortion is directed to occur if it is necessary to prevent physical, mental, or emotional harm to a pregnant person, even if there is not a physical health risk that is likely to cause substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function. (Supplemental Declaration of Hoosier Jews for Choice ¶ 7, Ex. 2 to Submissions).
8. The deponent representative of Hoosier Jews for Choice, Amalia Shifriss, identified herself as one of the impacted members. In 2025, she testified that she knew of several members who were changing their sexual and reproductive practices because of the law, including herself. She testified:

I know of at least three people, including myself, who got an IUD. And I myself really want to have a baby with my new husband, but I am not because I'm over 40 and I'm scared of having an unhealthy pregnancy and not being able to have the health care that I need in the State that I live in. And I don't want to die and leave my other kids with no mom.

(2025 30(b)(6) Deposition of Hoosier Jews for Choice, p. 64, Exhibit 28 to State's Submissions).

9. Like Ms. Shifriss, some members of the organization, Hoosier Jews for Choice, can become pregnant, and if they became pregnant, could require an abortion that would be prohibited by the statute (Supplemental Declaration of Hoosier Jews for Choice ¶ 8, Ex. 2 to Submissions). Under those circumstances, they would not be permitted to act as directed by their religious beliefs. (*Id.*). Members are currently altering their sexual practices, birth control practices, and family planning as a result of the law and their fear of becoming pregnant. (*Id.*).
10. Adherents from a variety of religious traditions and faiths hold beliefs regarding abortion that, similarly to the anonymous plaintiffs and the members of Hoosier Jews for Choice, direct abortions to occur in circumstances not permitted by the statute. (See Plaintiffs' Brief at 12-15 [describing these beliefs in the context of Islam, Unitarian Universalism, Paganism, and Episcopalianism]).

LEGAL STANDARD

“Generally, the trial court considers four factors when determining whether to grant permanent injunctive relief:

(1) whether plaintiff[s] remedies at law are inadequate; (2) whether the plaintiffs [have succeeded on the merits]; (3) whether the threatened injury to the plaintiff[s] outweighs the threatened harm a grant of relief would occasion upon the defendant; and (4) whether the public interest would be disserved by granting relief.

Ferrell v. Dunescape Beach Club Condos., 751 N.E.2d 702, 712-13 (Ind. Ct. App.

2001). The party seeking the injunction carries the burden of demonstrating an irreparable injury. *Id.* at 713. A permanent injunction is limited to prohibiting injurious interference with rights and must be narrowly tailored so that its scope is not more extensive than is reasonably necessary to protect the interests of the party in whose favor it is granted. *Id.*

“Summary judgment is appropriate if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” *Pennington v. Mem'l Hosp. of S. Bend, Inc.*, 223 N.E.3d 1086, 1092 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)).

ANALYSIS

Standing and Ripeness

The State argues that the named plaintiffs and the class lack standing and that their claims are unripe. This court, relying heavily on the thoughtful consideration of these issues by the Court of Appeals, respectfully disagrees. Although discovery has been done in an effort to discredit the finding of standing and ripeness by the named plaintiffs and associational standing of Hoosier Jews for Choice, this court does not find that any new facts presented necessitate a different finding.

Standing

The plaintiffs need not establish each class member’s specific injury for this Court to determine that they have standing. It is perfectly appropriate for the class to include future members—that is, those who will in the future need religiously mandated

abortions. See, e.g., *Olson v. Brown*, 284 F.R.D. 398, 407 (N.D. Ind. 2012); *Indiana Prot. & Advoc. Servs. Comm'n v. Comm'r, Indiana Dep't of Correction*, 2010 WL 1737821, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 27, 2010); 3 *Newberg and Rubenstein on Class Actions* § 3:15 (6th ed. 2022) (footnote omitted).

Hoosier Jews for Choice also has associational standing to bring its claims, based on having satisfied the factors set out in *Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n*, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977), as already recognized by the Court of Appeals, *Anonymous Plaintiff 1*, 233 N.E.3d at 434-38:

- a. The members of Hoosier Jews for Choice have standing to sue in their own right, as, at a minimum, some members of the organization may become pregnant, and if they did, could require an abortion that would be prohibited by the statute. (Supplemental Declaration of Hoosier Jews for Choice, ¶ 3). Some members are also changing their reproductive practices as a result of the Abortion Law. (2025 30(b)(6) Deposition of Hoosier Jews for Choice, pp. 64-67).
- b. The interests the organization seeks to protect are germane to its purpose. The Court of Appeals has already concluded that “Hoosier Jews for Choice’s stated purpose is ‘to take action within the Jewish community and beyond to advance reproductive justice, support abortion access, and promote bodily autonomy for all people across the state of Indiana.’ In this litigation, Hoosier Jews for Choice is asserting its members’ rights under RFRA by seeking to halt the Abortion Law’s restrictions on reproductive choices that conflict with its members’ exercise of their sincerely held religious beliefs. This conduct

falls within the organization's stated goals.” *Anonymous Plaintiff 1*, 233 N.E.3d at 434.

- c. Neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Again, as the Court of Appeals has already concluded, despite individualized and personal assessments regarding precisely *when* an abortion would be religiously directed, Hoosier Jews for Choice has attested that “its members believe that under Jewish law an abortion is directed to occur if it is necessary to prevent physical or emotional harm to a pregnant person.” *Id.* at 435.

“As the Abortion Law restricts abortions necessary to prevent physical or emotional harm to a pregnant person, an understanding of the coercive effect of the Abortion Law as it operates against the individual members of Hoosier Jews for Choice in their exercise of religion is not dependent on their individual participation in this lawsuit.” *Id.*

“The relief sought in this case is injunctive relief, not damages. Where only injunctive relief is sought, associational standing is more easily established, partly because the relief is uniform.” *Id.* at 438. Hoosier Jews for Choice have associational standing.

Ripeness

The Court of Appeals in *Anonymous Plaintiff 1*, 233 N.E.3d at 441 found that:

“Through evidence of their sexual and reproductive changes compelled by the Abortion Law, [the plaintiffs] have established an actual controversy that is ripe. As the trial court found, the undisputed evidence shows why the Plaintiffs have taken these restricted intimacy or restricted family

growth measures because their only alternative is the unacceptable risk of needing a termination of a pregnancy that would be required by their religious beliefs but prohibited by the Abortion Law. “

The Court stressed that “RFRA specifies that “[a] person whose exercise of religion has been substantially burdened, or *is likely to be substantially burdened, by a violation of this chapter may assert the violation or impending violation as a claim.*” Id. (quoting Ind. Code § 34-13-9-9) (emphasis by the Court). Even aside from the measures being taken to restrict pregnancy or intimacy, the Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiffs had “established ‘the ripening seeds’” of a controversy through the impending application of RFRA should they become pregnant.” Id. (citing *Holcomb v. Bray*, 187 N.E.3d 1268, 1287 (Ind. 2022)).

Exercise of Religion and Substantial Burden

To state a claim under RFRA, plaintiffs must establish the conduct at issue constitutes a sincere “exercise of religion” and is “substantially burden[ed].” Ind. Code § 34-13-9-8(a). The State contends that the plaintiffs must demonstrate that any abortions covered by a permanent injunction would in fact constitute “exercise[s] of religion” that are “substantially burdened” by the Abortion Law, Ind. Code § 34-13-9-8(a). Court finds that a narrowly tailored Permanent Injunction in this case alleviates the State’s concerns under the Abortion Law while maintaining the integrity of RFRA.

Exercise of Religion

Here, plaintiffs allege that abortion is their religious exercise. Compl. ¶¶ 143–144. At the preliminary injunction stage, the Court of Appeals held plaintiffs had a likelihood

of showing that an abortion may be “rooted” in “sincere religious beliefs.” *Anonymous*, 233 N.E.3d at 449–51. But it did not rule whether any specific abortions would qualify as sincere religious exercises, *id.* at 449 n.16, or address whether the Abortion Law would substantially burden the individual plaintiffs’ claimed religious exercises, *id.* at 451 n.17. The State has contested both of those issues on summary judgment. For the purpose of this injunction, however, the court, having already found standing for the named Plaintiffs, associational standing for the organization and certified the class, is not being asked to consider any *specific* abortion, only those potentially sought as a religious exercise.

Substantial Burden

Although Indiana courts have not articulated what a “substantial burden” is, the term “substantial” conveys that a plaintiff must face something like “serious disciplinary action,” or that the government must place “substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” *New Doe Child #1 v. Congress of U.S.*, 891 F.3d 578, 589 (6th Cir. 2018); see *Barr*, 295 S.W.3d at 301–02. Whether a burden is substantial “is a question of law” that must “be functional and factually driven.” *Doe Child #1*, 891 F.3d at 590. Courts, however, agree that a burden is not substantial where a person has “feasible alternative[s]” consistent with his or her religious beliefs. See *id.* (no substantial burden because non-cash payment methods were available); *Warner v. City of Boca Raton*, 887 So.2d 1023, 1035 (Fla. 2004) (alternative means to display religious symbols on graves).

State focuses much of their argument on the premise that the Abortion Law does not penalize the person seeking the abortion but instead the abortion provider, but this

is a false flag. Penalizing providers to avoid the violation of RFRA is an untenable end-run around the conflict in these laws. The “substantial burden” is the inability to receive an abortion in an exercise of religion which necessarily effects the person who is challenging it. The fact that a third party is likewise burdened (by serious disciplinary action) does not alleviate the burden to the individual seeking the abortion for religious purposes.

The State then argues that Plaintiffs must show that an individual seeking an abortion as a religious exercise have no “alternative means” of following their religious beliefs. They point to provisions already in the Abortion Law that provide exceptions for certain reasons that might be applied to plaintiffs if they were faced with having to seek an abortion. Once again, however, this assumes a request the Plaintiffs have not made, i.e.. for the right to abortion access under *all* circumstances. This Permanent Injunction is meant simply to capture those rare instances where an abortion does not fall within the enumerated exceptions but is likewise a necessary religious exercise. Although advances in medicine are extraordinary, neither party to this action have provided this court with an alternative mean to the very binary proposition of carrying a fetus to term or not.

Compelling State Interest

Under RFRA, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by demonstrating that the “disputed governmental action substantially burdens a sincerely held religious belief . . . the burden shifts to the government to establish that a compelling governmental interest is ‘satisfied through the application of the challenged law “to the

person”—the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.” *Blatter v. State*, 190 N.E.2d 417, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting *Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal*, 546 U.S. 418, 420 (2006)). RFRA demands that there be “consideration of religious exemptions to generally applicable rules.” *O Centro*, 546 U.S. at 436.

The State’s articulated interest is in “protecting prenatal life.” (State’s Br. at 57). In light of Indiana’s inconsistent approach to “prenatal life,” however, the State has not met its burden to establish that this purported interest is compelling from the moment of fertilization or conception and under all circumstances. *See Anonymous Plaintiff 1*, 233 N.E.3d at 452.

The Abortion Law would allow a plaintiff to seek an abortion if her pregnancy were the result of rape, but not if it were mandated by her religious beliefs. The State has not justified this differential treatment by establishing that its interest in the same prenatal life changes based upon the reason for terminating a pregnancy. The fact that the Abortion Law expressly allows for abortion in other circumstances, in at least one circumstance at any gestational age, demonstrates the lack of a compelling interest in “protecting life” under all circumstances and from fertilization. *Id.*

Moreover, “the [Indiana] General Assembly has declined to explicitly define human beings to include zygotes, embryos, or all fetuses.” *Id.* (code citations omitted). The Abortion Law specifically exempts from its coverage in vitro fertilization procedures—a process that results in post-fertilization embryos, even though “there is the potential for life that might be destroyed in the process of this procedure.” *Id.* (citing

Ind. Code § 16-34-1-0.5). “That broad exemption suggests any compelling interest by the State is absent at fertilization.” *Id.*

The State has not satisfied its burden under RFRA to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest in enforcing the Abortion Law against sincere religious practice, either in general or as to the plaintiffs.

This finding, however, may be subject ultimately to some limitations. The State contends that (as written) the Abortion Law is “the least restrictive means of furthering” the State’s compelling interest. Ind. Code § 34-13-9-8(b). The least-restrictive-means standard requires laying the State’s “preferred means side by side with other potential options.” *Blattert v. State*, 190 N.E.3d 417, 423 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). As noted by the Court of Appeals, the already stringent least-restrictive-means standard “is heightened further when, as here, the contested law already provides an exception for a particular group.” *Anonymous Plaintiff 1*, 233 N.E.3d at 455 (citation omitted). “In determining whether the State has met this heavy burden, we must ‘look beyond broadly formulated interests’ and ‘scrutinize the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants.’” *Id.* (quoting *O Centro*, 546 U.S. at 431) (cleaned up).

The Court of Appeals has already evaluated and rejected the State’s only rationale: “that granting a religious exemption to Plaintiffs will cause loss of potential life”. *Anonymous Plaintiff 1*, 233 N.E.3d at 455. The State may prefer the statute’s existing “secular” exceptions to religious ones, but it cannot escape the fact that the law is underinclusive. *Anonymous Plaintiff 1*, 233 N.E.3d at 455. Given that the statute is underinclusive, the State bears the burden of “adequately explain[ing] its differential treatment.” *Id.* It has not.

The court would suggest that the State has already found ways to accommodate competing interests by putting parameters on the exceptions. There is no reason that the same accommodations could not be made with the conflict with RFRA. An outright ban is simply not the least-restrictive mean.

FINDINGS FOR A PERMANENT INJUNCTION

Having already found that the Abortion Law and RFRA are in conflict, and that the State has not met its burden of showing a compelling state interest in prohibiting abortions for religious exercise, the court now finds that the Plaintiff's remedies at law are inadequate and the outright ban of abortions for religious exercise causes irreparable harm. The court finds that the threatened injury to Plaintiffs outweighs harm to the Defendants because the Abortion Law already has exceptions and there has been no showing that this limited exception for religious exercise would somehow explode the number of abortions sought in contradiction of their stated interest. The court finds that there is significant public interest in ensuring the religious freedom of all citizens and the State's position that religious freedom is somehow less important than other exceptions in the Abortion Law puts the court in an untenable position and finds a permanent injunction the only proper relief.

ORDER

The Court GRANTS the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINS the Defendants and their officers from enforcing the

provisions of Indiana Code § 16-34-2 (S.E.A. 1) against Plaintiffs to the extent that prohibiting them from receiving abortions would substantially burden their religious exercise as permitted by Indiana's Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), Ind. Code § 34-13-9-8 and this permanent injunction applies only to the certified class and named plaintiffs.

Having resolved all issues in this case, this is a final appealable order.

SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED this 5th of March, 2026.



Hon. Christina R. Klineman
Judge, Marion Superior Court 1
Indiana Commercial Court

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