



Malteser

...weil Nähe zählt.

Facts, Not Feelings

Malteser Migration Report 2019

List of Abbreviations

ALLBUS	General Social Sciences Population Survey
AsylbLG	Asylum-Seekers Benefits Act
Asyl8-Staaten	Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria
BA	German Federal Labor Agency
BAMF	German Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees
EU	European Union
IAB	Institute for Job Market and Career Research
KomBer	Combination of Vocational Language Training
Kommit	Cooperative Model with Career-Eligible Advanced Education
KompAs	Competency Assessment, Early Activation and Language Skill Acquisition
MM17	Malteser Migration Report 2017
PerF	Perspectives for Refugees
PKS	Police Crime Statistics Issued by the German Federal Police
PMK	Politically Motivated Crimes
REAG/GARP	Reintegration and Emigration Program for Asylum-Seekers in Germany / Government Assisted Repatriation Program
SGB	German Social Security Act
SVR Migration	Experts Council of German Foundations for Integration and Migration
SVR Wirtschaft	Experts Council for the Assessment of the Overall Economic Developments
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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Foreword

The first Malteser Migration Report was published in 2017 with the aim of taking a stance against the emotionally charged attitude towards migration in our country by presenting facts. Did the report attain this goal? We will never know for certain. How would the public debate have progressed in the absence of such a report? These days, the migration debate in Germany is no longer front and center as it was two years ago, but the discourse is still highly emotionalized. Some of those involved are keenly interested in impacting the mood. At the same time, it is encouraging that merely emotionalizing the subject matter does not pay off. The surveys depicted in the Chapter on Societal Participation indicate a high level of willingness to differentiate. People want fact-based solutions. They reject the idea of the unrestricted opening of our borders just as much as hermetic protectionism. This means that there is a vast interest in the facts. This is evident from the many positive responses the Malteser organization received in 2017. Moreover, the fact that the Malteser Migration Report 2017 is frequently quoted, also demonstrates that the former was used as a reference source for migration related fact-finding.

Our special thanks go to the team at the Walter Eucken Institute under the direction of Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Lars P. Feld. Without this support, a politically neutral scientific study of the topic, as we are publishing it now, would not have been possible. As far as the relevant

aspects are concerned, the scope of issues is so comprehensive that it makes a fact-based debate possible.

The now completed Report makes it safe to conclude that immigration - not limited only to refugees, but in particular with regard to their needs - is manageable for Germany. This applies in particular to the financial aspects. Social and cultural integration are major challenges. Do migrants consider themselves part of our society? The answer hinges primarily on their ability to find jobs. Work provides diverse social contacts. Moreover, earning a living gives immigrants a sense of dignity. However, personal interactions are of significant importance also. Currently, refugees who arrived here in 2015/16 still feel well accepted. Whether they will continue to feel this way depends on their residency perspectives and the concrete acceptance by the German people in everyday situations. Consequently, the focus of the public debate is too one-sided as it pertains primarily to the question of border control. The priority will have to be on integration issues. The Malteser's positive experiences with the Integration Mentor model open up promising options.

The Chapter on ethics, written by Prof. Dr. Franziskus Heereman, including provocative ideas on what is ultimately the core of Germany's Constitution, adds a unique touch to this Report. Dr. Peter Frey, editor-in-chief of TV



broadcaster ZDF, presents the objective of the Report - Facts, not Emotions - from the perspective of Germany's public media in his article "Let's All Take a Deep Breath" and the three-prong approach Heart-Crafts-Attitude.

This Report is not all about dry, scientific analysis. Once again, the facts and figures are accompanied by real world reports about communal and work life situations with immigrants. These snapshots show that for integration to be successful, it must be approached with a positive attitude from both sides. Altena is one of these positive models. The Integration Mentors, i.e. volunteer advocates guided by professionals and funded by the German federal government, should evolve from sporadic support to a statutory model. It is encouraging to see refugees assume direct responsibility and get involved as volunteers. The Post Script written by the Great Chancellor of the Sovereign Order of Malta, Albrecht Freiherr von Boeselager, underscores that we must not ignore the dramatic events that occur on the refugee routes. The situation, especially on the Mediterranean, is untenable. It is absolutely essential that options are created that allow refugees to seek asylum with the German government before they leave their countries of origin. Moreover, we must make it possible for them to qualify in their home countries for employment in Germany. This is a question of intelligent reasonability for us to actively initiate this selection.

Our gratitude goes to the many volunteers and employees who humbly and regularly work as advocates for the acceptance and integration of asylum-seekers. If the integration of these immigrants is progressing better than anticipated, this can certainly also be attributed to their commitment and hard work.

KARL PRINZ ZU LÖWENSTEIN,
Commissioner for the
Malteser Migration Report

Content Prologue

Measuring how much attention it receives in the media, migration as a topic has been pushed into the background. Hardly anyone talks about a migration crisis these days. The hysterics of 2015 and 2016 have been replaced with a somewhat level-headed attitude. The focus today is on other issues.

There are, however, two exceptions: SOS rescues on the Mediterranean and the link between migration and crimes. These two issues regularly appear in the headlines. Crimes committed by individuals with migration backgrounds in Germany continue to trigger far more debates than comparable transgressions by locals. This is evident in the perception of citizens, who quite often view the actions the government took in 2015 and 2016 as failures of the former. Hence, the refugee crisis continues to fester in all societal circles under the radar of the general public. There is a real risk that it might evolve into a legitimacy crisis for government institutions. The related disputes between the parties contribute further to the frustrations among the population.

Amid this scenario, we are presenting the Second Malteser Migration Report in partnership with the Malteser organization. Just like two years ago, the aim is to take an actual look at the cold hard facts relevant to the issue of migration. Germany is an immigration nation. This has finally made it into all heads and the

legislation of the German Bundestag. Considerably more people continue to arrive in Germany than leave the country during the same period of time. People in Germany still associate fears, concerns but also hopes with the immigrants.

We attempt to provide information: 1. On the immigration structure; i.e. who is coming to Germany and for what reasons; 2. On the legal aspects; i.e. what rights do immigrants have, for instance with regard to family reunification and what are Germany's international obligations; 3. About job market integration; i.e. the ultimately amazing progress made; 4. On the fiscal aspects of asylum-driven migration, which still appear to be manageable; 5. About migration and crimes, which is the most difficult issue given the limited data status; 6. On the societal participation of refugees in Germany, which goes beyond economic issues.

We base our assessment on a wide scope of data and systematic scientific analyses. This will not eliminate all fears and concerns. But it should clarify that many claims made in Germany are not based on empiric facts or corroborated by data. Integration is not an easy feat. It will remain a challenge since people will continue to come to Germany. In recent years, integration of refugees has been more successful than initially anticipated. We can and will have to build on that. Yet, significant deficits in the societal participation of refugees in Germany do exist. Job market integration isn't everything.



For job and societal integration, the importance of language acquisition is equally evident. Language, starting conversations, talking with others, are the best integrators. Isolation, on the other hand, intensifies the problems that feed the fears of locals.

I would like to thank the Maltesers for their once again helpful cooperation in the creation of this now Second Migration Report. Our gratitude also goes to Prof. Dr. Franziskus Heereman (Philosophical-Theological University Vallendar) for his guest article. However, I owe the most gratitude to the team at the Walter Eucken Institute, Mrs. Lilith Burgstaller, Mrs. Franziska Dinter, M.A., Mr. Patrick Hirsch, M.Sc., and Mrs. Katharina Pfeil, M.A.

PROF. DR. DR. H. C. LARS P. FELD,
Director of the Walter Eucken
Institute

Migration Developments – An Updated Overview





Migration Developments – An Updated Overview

Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Lars P. Feld, Patrick Hirsch, Katharina Pfeil

Migration remains a central issue in Germany in 2019. The focus is still on the immigration and acceptance of asylum-seekers from war and crisis regions in the Near and Middle East as well as Africa. Migration, as a result of job searches, conflicts or other political developments is closely linked to Germany's history and has had a strong impact on our society. Southern European migrants who came here as so-called guest workers made a significant contribution to the country's economic success in the 1950s and 60s. In conjunction with political crises in the 1980s in Iran and Turkey as well as wars, especially in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, many refugees came to Germany to apply for asylum. The implementation of a border-free European Union (EU) resulted in an of intra-EU migration between the individual member states. Many of the migrants who came to Germany for different reasons have become permanent residents. The first Malteser Migration Report 2017 (MM17) provided comprehensive insights into the contributions migration made to Germany's development, in particular post World War II.¹

Besides the latest migration data, the first Chapter of the Malteser Migration Report 2019, profiles in more detail the population that has a migration background. Taking into account the political events of recent years, the Report focuses on the individuals seeking asylum, concentrating on the demographic composition and the European context of refugee migration.

Migration from and to Germany

In 2017, the net migration totaled 416,000, which means that once again, more people immigrated to Germany than emigrated from the country.² Hence, the net immigration rate, i.e. the difference between 1.55 million immigrations and 1.13 million emigrants has now been positive in Germany for eight years in a row. Since 2010, the net total is 3.8 million immigrants (see Figure 1). The fact that this level of immigration has not resulted in a more significant growth in population can be attributed to the current demographic situation, i.e. an aging population and a thereby associated decline in the population of German ethnicity. As a result of inbound migration, the overall population grew by one million in 2010. Since the end of 2017, 82.8 million people live in Germany. Without the immigrants, Germany's population would have declined by 2.8 million since 2010. In the medium term, especially the working age population (aged 15 to 65) would drop by 300,000 a year, which would pose a challenge for the labor market and social security.³ Experts do not expect the increased immigration of asylum-seekers to be able to compensate for the decline in potentially available workers. This is based on various factors, such as language and professional skills, which will be addressed in more detail in the following Chapters. Consequently, the targeted labor migration will be assessed separately from the acceptance of asylum-seekers.⁴


1 Malteser Migration Report 2017.
<https://www.malteser.de/migrationsbericht>.

2 By the editorial deadline the migration statistics figures published by the German Federal Statistics Office for 2018 were not yet available, while those for asylum-seekers published by the Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees were.

3 Fuchs et al. (2018). IAB Forecast for 2018/2019: Growth will continue, but slow down.


4 SVR Wirtschaft (2018). Annual Evaluation 2018/19.

Figure 1:
In- and outbound cross German border migration



Source: German Federal Statistics Office 2018a.

Figure 2:
Net immigration based on migrant groups



Note: In 2015 through 2017, Romania and Syria were the primary countries of origin in the respective groups.

Source: German Federal Statistics Office 2018a; in-house report.

Migrants who come to Germany can be divided into two groups: Intra-EU immigrants and immigrants from non-EU countries. Individuals who are EU citizens have the privilege of being able to freely cross intra-EU borders, while citizens of other countries almost always need a visa to immigrate and stay in Germany.

Since 2010, intra-EU migration has made up a significant percentage of the extreme immigration boost (see Figure 2). This trend was driven by the expansion of the EU and an increasing number of EU citizens moving to Germany for its favorable economy paired with a high demand for workers plus the rising popularity of German metropolises like Berlin, Munich or Frankfurt bedingt.⁵ In 2017, 156,000 new immigrants from EU member states made up more than a third of the net total immigration; the largest contingent came from Eastern European member states, primarily Romania (+73,000), Poland (+34,000) and Croatia (+33,000). Given the liberal right to work policies within the EU, they were the main contributors to the fact that the number of working people in Germany has reached a new record (see Job Market Chapter). In 2016 and 2017, the net migration from EU states dropped significantly compared to the years prior. The increasing wealth and the development of jobs in their countries of origin will likely further increase the competition for qualified workers in the EU.⁶

The net immigration numbers from non-EU countries have outpaced those of EU citizens since 2014. In the past few years, migration from non-EU countries was dominated by asylum-seeker migration. While in 2015, which saw the strongest migration numbers, net immigration statistics from Syria equalled the numbers of all EU member states combined, EU member state Romania produced the highest origin country figures in 2017.

Population with Migration Backgrounds and Sociodemographics of Asylum-Seekers

Given the sustained immigration levels, the population with migration backgrounds grew in 2017 - by 3.7 percent compared to the year prior. Overall, 19.3 million inhabitants, i.e. every fourth person living in Germany has a migration background (see Figure 3). Hence, either they or at least one parent were not German citizens at birth. Slightly more than half of the population with a migration background held German citizenship, the other half were foreign nationals. People with migration experience (16.1 percent of the total population) outnumbered those without any migration experience (7.4 percent).

In recent years, the share of young people below the age of 35 with migration backgrounds has expanded significantly compared to the overall population - as a result of both, direct immigration and through second generation additions. The five-year-comparison shows an increase from 22.2 to 32.5 percent in 2017.

Among the population consisting of foreign nationals residing in Germany, 1.7 million were asylum-seekers at the end of 2017 (2.1 percent of the total population). Asylum-seekers are individuals who cite humanitarian grounds for staying in Germany. This number includes those whose applications for asylum have been approved and those who as of the cut-off date December 31 are in active asylum procedures or stay in Germany after their application for asylum was denied (see Chapter Asylum Application Process). More than half of them were first registered in Germany during the strong migration years 2015/16.⁷

5 The Statistics Office of Berlin-Brandenburg, e.g. calculated that the population growth in Berlin in 2017 was based almost exclusively on foreigners who moved there.

6 SVR Wirtschaft (2018). Annual Evaluation 2018/19.

7 German Federal Statistics Office (2018d). Increase of registered asylum seekers in 2017 by 5% compared to the year prior.

3.8 mn

NET IMMIGRATION 2010 BIS 2017.

73,000

INBOUND MIGRANTS FROM ROMANIA, AN EU NATION ONCE AGAIN TOPPED THE COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN IN 2017.

3.7 %

INCREASE OF POPULATION WITH A MIGRATION BACKGROUND IN 2017.


32.5 %

OF THE GERMAN POPULATION UNDER THE AGE OF 35 HAVE A MIGRATION BACKGROUND. THE POPULATION WITH A MIGRATION BACKGROUND IS VERY YOUNG.

19.3 mn

PEOPLE WHO LIVE IN GERMANY HAVE A MIGRATION BACKGROUND. OF THIS GROUP, 2.8 MILLION HAVE TURKISH ROOTS (14%), 2.1 MILLION ARE FROM POLAND (11%), 1.4 MILLION FROM RUSSIA (7%), 1.2 MILLION (6%) FROM KAZAKHSTAN AND 0.9 MILLION (4%) FROM ROMANIA.

Figure 3:
Population groups with and without migration backgrounds in 2017



Note: A person is considered to have a migration background if he or she or at least one parent did not have German citizenship from birth. A person has migration experience if he or she was born abroad and migrated to Germany. The micro census population total of 81.7 million deviates slightly from other statistics.


Source: German Federal Statistics Office 2018b.

Although growth wasn't as extreme as the year before, the number of asylum-seekers in Germany rose once again over the course of 2017 - by a total of 83,000 or well over 5 percent. The total of Asylum-8-state immigrants also rose considerably by approx. 100,000 to 1.1 million (+10.0 percent; see Figure 4). Asylum-8-states include non-European asylum-seeker origin states Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia and Syria. By year's end 2017, two of three asylum-seekers came from these countries. The total of asylum-seekers from all other countries sank by around 17,000 (-2.7 percent) in 2017. This development can in particular be attributed to the decline by 24,500 asylum seekers (-14.3 percent) from the West Balkans. The term West Balkans used in this Report includes Albania,

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia, Kosovo and Serbia. The number of asylum-seekers from Albania alone dropped by about 8,200 (-32.6 percent).

From the sociodemographic perspective, the group of asylum-seekers is very different from the native German population. Figure 5 compares the age and gender structure of asylum-seekers among the foreign population and Germany's population as a whole. It is obvious that most of the asylum seekers were male (64 percent) and on average significantly younger. The median age, which divides the population into exactly half belonging to the younger and the other half to the older group among the population, shows that among the asylum seekers

Figure 4:
Evolution of asylum-seekers in Germany



Note: The numbers of asylum-seekers from Asylum-8-States are shown separately, closing date: December 31, 2017.

Source: German Federal Statistics Office 2018c; in-house assessment.


this age is 28 and among the entire population it is 48. As a result of the high immigration level, in 2015, the average age of the overall German population dropped for the first time since the Reunification.⁸

Evolution of Asylum Applications

According to the Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), a total of 162,000 initial asylum applications were received in 2018, which represents a decline by 18 percent over 2017 and a decline by 72 percent in 2016 (see Figure 6). The extraordinarily high number of applications in 2016 must be attributed to asylum-seekers who had arrived in Germany in 2015. Due to capacity bottlenecks at the competent agencies, many of them could not file asylum applications until months later (see MM17). Since 2017, the number of filed applications for asylum is back to approximately the same level as in 2014. Among other things, the changed overall asylum policies in Germany and Europe drove this significant decline of migrants.⁹ These policies included, for instance, the listing of additional safe countries of origin on the national level (see text box on safe countries of origin), border closing alongside the so-called Balkan Route or EU compacts with non-EU countries, including Turkey and Libya.

Since the end of 2016, the number of asylum applications has remained at a relatively low level of less than 20,000 a month (see Figure 7). In 2018, an average of 11,600 first time applications were received each month. In 2019, through April, around 48,000 asylum applications have been filed. Compared to the year prior, they have once again slightly increased by around 2,500 (+5.5 percent).

Figure 5:
Age structure of asylum seekers in Germany in 2017




Note: For optimum comparability, the number of individuals in each group refers to 1,000 people each. The number of asylum-seekers is based on the statistics closing date of December 31, 2017.

Sources: German Federal Statistics Office 2018c; German Federal Statistics Office 2018b; in-house calculations; in-house assessment.

⁸ Average population age. Website of the Federal Institute for Population Research. <https://www.bib.bund.de/Permalink.html?id=10208850>, accessed on 4th June 2019.

⁹ SVR Migration (2019a). Asylum Policy Facts.


Figure 6:
Number of first time asylum applications based on continents



Note: Category -Others- includes asylum applications from individuals from other continents as well as those whose nationality is unknown.

Source: Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees 2019a.


Figure 7:
Monthly applications for asylum from January 2015 through April 2019



Note: Subsequent applications are filed if an asylum-seeker refiles after an earlier asylum application was retracted or denied.

Source: Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees 2019a.

Figure 8:
First time asylum applications based on primary countries of origin in 2015 through 2017 and 2018
(percentage of all applications)



Sources: Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees 2019a; Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees 2019b; in-house calculations; in-house assessment.

Totalling 96,000 first-time applications, asylum-seekers from Asian countries of origin - i.e. also the Asylum-8-countries Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan in the Near and Middle East – submitted the highest number of applications in 2018, totaling 59.2 percent (see Figure 6). Migrants from African countries of origin - including Nigeria, Somalia and Eritrea, made up 23.1 percent of all applicants in 2018. Compared to the high immigration years 2015/16, when they each made up around 10 percent of all asylum-seekers, this group has seen the strongest relative growth. However, the number of asylum applications from African migrants is also on a downward spiral from the absolute perspective. In all of 2018, 37,000 applications were filed compared to 49,000 in 2017 and 80,000 in 2016. The absolute number of asylum applications for geographic Europe, mainly the West Balkans, has

been diminishing steadily since 2015. In 2018, it still totaled 23,000 applications or 13.9 of all applications.

In 2018, applications from the Asylum-8-States contributed about 64 percent (104,300) of the first-time asylum applications; from 2015 to 2017 they represented close to 70 percent. The highest percentage of asylum-seekers once again came from Syria. In 2018, first time applications from Syrian immigrants made up 27.3 percent (44,200) of all applications, while more than a third of all asylum applicants hailed from Syria in the years prior (see Figure 8). 10.1 percent (16,300) of the asylum applicants came from Iraq

ABOUT
162,000
 IMMIGRANTS FILED A FIRST TIME
 ASYLUM APPLICATION IN 2018.

ABOUT **64 %**
OF FIRST TIME ASYLUM APPLICATIONS WERE SUBMITTED
BY ASYLUM-8-STATE IMMIGRANTS.

ABOUT **1.7 mn**
ASYLUM-SEEKERS LIVED IN GERMANY BY THE END OF
2017. OF THEM 1.3 MILLION DID NOT ARRIVE IN GERMANY
UNTIL 2010.

Safe Countries of Origin

Safe countries of origin are defined by federal law and aim to accelerate the asylum application process. Legislators base these definitions on the general political status in the respective country. Among the criteria: No government persecution imminent in the nation and the government is able to protect individuals against non-government persecution. Individuals from safe countries of origin are still able to apply for asylum in Germany. However, the so-called standard presumption that a danger of persecution does not exist, is applied. Consequently, an asylum application filed by someone from a safe country of origin is considered without merit if no evidence of persecution is presented. In October 2015, the Asylum Process Acceleration Act expanded, among other things, the list of safe countries of origin by adding the West Balkans. Ghana and Senegal and safe third party countries comprising the EU member states, Norway and Switzerland, were already considered safe. In January 2019, the Bundestag also rated Algeria, Georgia, Morocco and Tunisia safe countries. However, this measure still has to be approved by the Bundesrat. In March 2017, this proposal was rejected.¹⁰

¹⁰ Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees. Safe Countries of Origin. <http://www.bamf.de/DE/Fluechtlingsschutz/Sonderverfahren/Sichere-Herkunftsstaaten/sichere-herkunftsstaaten-node.html>, accessed on 4th June 2019.

and 6.7 percent (10,900) from Iran. Totalling 6.1 percent (9,900), applications from Afghanistan dropped well below earlier year levels. Among applicants from Africa, the percentage of Nigerians rose from 1.9 to 6.3 percent (10,200), which translates into a significant increase. The evolution of the asylum applications from Turkey requires special attention. After the attempt to overthrow the government in the summer of 2016, first time applications from Turkish citizens have increased considerably. In 2018, they also took 6.3 percent (10,200). A reverse trend is evident in the application numbers received from immigrants from the West Balkans. They dropped from 9.3 percent in 2015 through 2017 to 3.0 percent (4,800). This may be directly linked to the adding of safe countries of origin, the closing of the Balkan Route, a considerably lower asylum quota for these countries and the newly executed labor migration compact (see Chapter on the Job Market).¹¹

¹¹ Bither and Ziebarth (2018). Provide legal access routes to reduce irregular migration? What we can learn from the West Balkans Regulation.

Sociodemographics of Asylum-Seekers in 2018

The acceptance of immigrants, in particular asylum-seekers, poses several challenges for Germany. Among them are, first and foremost, integration into the job market and schools as well as the provision of social benefits. Consequently, the demographic and socioeconomic composition of the asylum-seekers is of particular importance and interest. The data collected in 2018 from applications submitted show that - similar to the asylum-seeking population in 2017 - are primarily male (56.7 percent) (see Figure 9). However, compared to the previous years, the percentage of male applicants dropped consistently from close to 70 percent in 2015.

Compared to the age structure of the overall population, applicants filing for asylum in 2018 in Germany were again significantly younger (see Figure 10). More than 80 percent of the applicants were younger than 35. Of them, 30,000 or 18 percent were school age at the time their applications were filed, i.e. 6 - 17 years old. The number of work age applicants totaled about 90,000, which represents more than 50 percent of all asylum ap-


plicants. On the other hand, less than one percent of those who filed an asylum application in 2018 were 65 or older.

Asylum-Seekers in Europe

Compared to other European countries, Germany still received the highest number of monthly applications for asylum; including subsequent applications, the number in 2018 totaled close to 180,000.¹² France was ranked second with around 120,000 and Greece third with approximately 54,000 applications. In terms of population size, Germany ranked fifth behind Cyprus, Greece, Malta and Luxembourg (see Figure 11). While Germany registered a total of 15 asylum applications per 1,000 inhabitants in 2015/2016, the number dropped to just under 5 applications per 1,000 inhabitants by 2017/18. Comparing all of Europe, this country still receives an above average number of asylum applications per capita.


¹² Given that various countries do not differentiate between first time and subsequent applications, this section focuses on the total number of asylum applications.

Figure 9:
First time asylum applicants in 2018
based on gender




Source: Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees 2019b.

Figure 10:
First time asylum applicants in 2018 based on age groups compared
to the overall population



Sources: Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees 2019b and German Federal Statistics Office 2018b; in-house calculations; in-house assessment.

Figure 11:
Asylum applications submitted per 1,000 inhabitants in the European comparison



Note: The above represents a selection of European nations. The application data include first time and subsequent applications. The bars pertain to the aggregated application numbers in 2015/16 and 2017/18.

Sources: Eurostat 2019; in-house calculations; in-house assessment.

However, given the disparity of stances concerning the acceptance of asylum-seekers and the sharing of responsibilities between the EU member states, there has not been much change to the status quo when it comes to more thorough joint asylum policies.¹³ Once an agreement on the smallest joint issue had been reached, which was to reduce the number of asylum seekers arriving in Europe, some measures were implemented. This is also the aim of the National Masterplan Migration of the German Minister of the Interior of July 2018, which calls for the optimized protection of the country's exterior borders and the reduction of causes of flight. On the international level, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration was passed in Morocco, which was ratified by 164 nations in December 2018. It focuses on strengthening the multi-lateral cooperation in refugee and asylum matters. The objective is to implement worldwide standards, which also guarantee the protection of human rights. However, the UN Migrations Package, as the compact is called, is not binding for the nations that signed it. They retain full sovereignty in migration matters.

According to the European border protection agency Frontex's data, the number of arriving refugees has declined and the escape routes of refugees have been relocated (see Figure 12). For instance, the registered number of border crossings between Morocco and Spain has significantly increased in recent years. In 2018 it doubled to more than 57,000 compared to 2017. Hence, the route via the western Mediterranean to Spain was the most utilized route to Europe. The enclaves Ceuta and Melilla also were destinations on the African Continent. The frequenting of other routes declined significantly in 2015, including the utilization of the route via the eastern Mediterranean, from Turkey to Greece. This can be linked to the Compact between Turkey and the EU, which, in exchange for monetary aid and a resettlement program aims to make illegal border crossings more difficult and to offer refugees

¹³ European Council. Timeline – Reactions to the Pressures of Migration. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/de/policies/migratory-pressures/history-migratory-pressures/>, accessed on 4th June 2019.

perspectives in Turkey.¹⁴ The refugee support organization of the United Nations - UNHCR - has stated that at the end of April 2019, around four million refugees remained in Turkey, of which more than 3.6 million were of Syrian origin. Hence, Turkey accepted the highest number of refugees in the world. However, they continue to live under frightful conditions according to the EU Accounting Office that tracks the use of the funds.¹⁵ Border closings, the erection of fences and the temporary implementation of interior border checks in the Schengen Area has pro-

duced a decline alongside the western Balkan Route. A cooperation with the Libyan Coast Guard has reduced the number of refugees traveling across the central Mediterranean.¹⁶

14 SVR Migration (2017a). Annual Evaluation 2017.

15 European Accounting Office (2018). The facilities for refugees in Turkey: The subventions are helpful, but an optimum use of the resources can only be attained through optimization.


16 Valenta et al. (2019). European Asylum Policies and the Stranded Asylum Seekers in Southeastern Europe.

Figure 12:
Evolution of refugee routes to Europe from 2015 through 2018

Determined illegal border crossings
on the exterior borders of the EU

Total

2016	551,046
2018	150,114



Note: The tracking of illegal border crossings on Europe's exterior borders shows the refugee routes chosen by migrants in Europe.

Source: Frontex 2019a; in-house assessment.

Let's All Take a Deep Breath

Fighting the Trigger Culture with Heart, Craftsmanship and Attitude

By Dr. Peter Frey, ZDF Editor-in-Chief

What was once a flood of information has turned into a tsunami. Personal social media accounts are now influencer accounts, ignored blogs have become powerful loudspeakers. News can be found everywhere and everyone has a platform to publicly spread ire about the content. The state of being triggered all the time much too often controls the discourse. There are consequences - for every single person, for our societal interactions and for the role of the media. Who can still be trusted? What's true, what's made up? What does who do with my data? In these troubled times, when emotions all too frequently override the facts, we all, once again, have to learn to take a deep breath. Journalism should focus on its most basic good qualities - now more than ever.

Heart ...

We journalists have to be totally honest and take a critical look at ourselves. Not only does economic pressure, too much speed or tough competition produce dangers. There is also an increasing trend towards populism in journalism. In recent months, it has become evident that the media, too, fires up political movements. They stand for their own political agendas and escalate in a manner that doesn't always do justice to the cause - be that because of their own convictions, to get more clicks, Likes and sell more newspapers. I think that especially right now we have to remain critical and keep our distance. We should not make a societal scenario that is already in upheaval even more difficult through escalation. It's a dangerous situation for journalism.

After all, public broadcasters are being maligned by the AfD. This party dreams of the end of public radio and television - specifically because we are independent and allow ourselves to be critical. We must not be silenced by this criticism and must confront this situation with assertiveness, competency and also a bit of humility.

Craftsmanship ...

Quality media must do its job: We must be critical, informative and unrelenting. To that end, it is important that journalists explain and define their approach to work and editorial decision-making processes. Moreover, journalists must admit mistakes and correct them in a publicly verifiable manner. On heute.de, the ZDF, based on the New York Times model, has published its -Corrections- segment. On this page, we point out errors in our reporting and correct them. We are taking transparency one step further: In the ZDF news, documentaries and magazine broadcasts, a number of experts will appear over the course of the year to talk about a wide variety of issues. With a list of experts, which can also be found on heute.de, we now have a resource to provide viewers with more information about these experts.


Especially compared to the United States, with extremely polarizing media, which in turn leads to a polarization of the public, Germany boasts an extremely diverse, regionally different and, at the latest since the refugee crisis, also a politically highly heterogeneous press and broadcasting landscape. We have to deploy it and create a counter balance to fake news, rumors and hate-inciting messages with our thoroughly researched facts and well-founded background information – on television, online



and on social networks. We prioritize our own, secure ZDF platforms, but we must not leave the shaping of opinions on social networks in the hands of populists. We have to take a stand on them also and, again and again feed fact-based background information into the discourse. Viewers appreciate this approach.

Attitude ...

Especially in populist eras, going out among them and listening become increasingly important tools. We must further deepen our reporting on the emotional states and diverse lifestyles of people in different milieus. Nevertheless, one thing must be clear: Understanding is not the same thing as having compassion. Compassion signals empathy and it has to have its limits. We do not have to have compassions for those who threaten murder, attacks on refugee homes or militant threats made by high-caliber political personnel or even journalists. We have to restrict our compassion in places where violence is acceptable and a change of the system is demanded in lieu of reforms. In these cases, we must call out extremism clearly as what it is. I am convinced that the times were never better for professional, forthright journalism. It is needed today more than it was in recent decades.



Keyword Asylum – Processes, Decisions, Perspectives



Keyword Asylum – Processes, Decisions, Perspectives

Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Lars P. Feld, Patrick Hirsch, Katharina Pfeil

Although it is just one of different migration forms, the focus was clearly on refugee migration in recent years. The term refugee, in this context, is frequently used as a synonym for people who had to flee in general. However, there are different groups of immigrants and asylum law based protection in Germany, in which refugees represent merely a sub-category. To not deploy language that prematurely defines the decision on the concrete status in the asylum process, this Report uses terms such as asylum-seekers, individuals seeking protection or refugees.

The following Chapter is dedicated to the asylum application process and depicts the different protection forms available under asylum legislation. To that end, it provides more details about asylum decisions, processing times for asylum applications and job market access depending on the status and country of origin. It also sheds a light on family reunification and transfers as well as returns and termination of temporary residencies.

Procedure of the Asylum Process and Asylum Legislation Based Forms of Protection

Asylum-seekers who arrive in Germany must promptly report to and register with government authorities at the border or immediately after they arrive in the country. They receive a temporary immigration document and are assigned to different German states based on the Königstein Key. They receive services and accommodations at the arrival acceptance facilities. The facility notifies the competent authority at the Federal Agency for Migration and Refu-

gees (BAMF). This is where the asylum application must be filed in person. The applicants receive a temporary residency permit, which confirms that they have filed an asylum application. It is not possible to file asylum applications from abroad. Prior to processing the application, the Agency verifies whether a different EU member state is responsible for the asylum process (Dublin Protocol). If Germany is the competent nation, a decision on the asylum application is made based on a face-to-face hearing and the review of the documents submitted to establish grounds for fleeing. Depending on the outcome of the asylum process, asylum-seekers are given permanent residency permits or are ordered to leave the country. There are four types of protection (eligibility for asylum, refugee protection, subsidiary protection and deportation prohibition) that can be awarded if the asylum application outcome is positive.

Different provision levels work together in German asylum legislation. The different types of asylum legislation based protection are legally founded in the national Constitution, in Human Rights legislation and in the laws of the European Union. Hence, a distinction between international and national asylum legislation based protection can be made. International protection applies to refugees based on the Geneva Refugee Convention governing refugee rights and the rights of individuals eligible for subsidiary protection.¹⁷ Both options have been integrated into Germany's Asylum Act. National protection comprises the Constitution-based protection for individuals who are eligible for asylum and protection against deportation in the residency legislation. The factors determining the approval of

¹⁷ In the following, only refugees as defined in the Geneva Refugee Convention will be referred to as refugees.

a protection form are the reasons that prevent asylum seekers from returning to their home countries.¹⁸

People subjected to political persecution and people whose human rights have been gravely violated in their countries of origin on the basis of race (in this context, the term -race- is being used based on the contractual wording of the Geneva Convention on Refugees), nationality, political conviction, religious affiliation or affiliation with a certain social group, will be given the status of a *person eligible for asylum* based on the German Constitution. This is contingent upon the fact that an alternative option for refuge is not available in the country of origin and that there are no other protection options against persecution. Moreover, the violation of human rights must be committed by government or quasi-government institutions. This does not cover emergency situations resulting from natural disasters, civil war, poverty or lack of perspectives.

There is only a minor difference between *refugees accepted pursuant to the Geneva Refugee Convention* and individuals eligible for asylum pursuant to the German Constitution. Refugee status according to the Geneva Refugee Convention also include persecution by non-government actors, while the German Constitution provides protection against persecution by the government in the home country.

Individuals are eligible for *subsidiary protection* if they can neither be granted refugee status nor eligibility for asylum, while they are facing serious consequences in their home countries, such as the death penalty, torture and a threat to their life as a result of random acts of violence.

A *deportation ban* is issued if the three above-mentioned forms of protection do not work, while deportation could lead to significant and concrete risks to a person's life, body or freedom (e.g. in the event of health risks) or result in a

violation of the European Human Rights Convention. If a person is not physically able to travel or not in possession of a valid passport, the situation is not covered by a deportation ban. In these cases, the authorities will investigate whether the obligation to leave can be suspended and whether the person will be tolerated.

While a residency permit for individuals who are eligible for asylum and refugees remains in effect for three years, individuals who receive subsidiary protection or those who are subject to a deportation ban, are issued a residency permit for one year with an extension option if the situation in their home country does not improve. Once the protection status has expired, a permanent residency permit may be requested. This is contingent upon adequate command of the German language and proof of income to cover the applicant's own living expenses.

Table 1 shows the different forms of protection available under Germany's asylum legislation. It principally excludes individuals who have committed war crimes, have violated the principles of the United Nations, pose a security risk in Germany or who have been sentenced to incarceration for particularly grievous crimes.

Asylum Decisions and Protection Quotas

From January 2015 through April 2019, more than 940,000 asylum-seekers have been awarded a protected status in Germany. In 2018, close to 217,000 decisions on asylum applications were made, while this number reached 603,000 in 2017. Compared to 2017, the number of decisions dropped by around 64 percent in 2018.

The number of applications filed started to decline considerably in the summer of 2016 (see Figure 13). In the second half of 2017, the delayed effect resulted in a significant drop in pertinent decisions. This 2017 reduction of decisions made was likely also amplified by the temporary decision-making suspension for asylum applications


¹⁸ Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees (2016). The German asylum process procedure. An overview of the individual procedural steps and the legal grounds.

Table 1:
Forms of Protection Under German Asylum Legislation

	Prerequisites	Temporary Residency Permit (in years)	Access to the Job Market	Family Reunion
Eligible for Asylum Art. 16a Sect. 1 GG	Evidence that return to the home country means the threat of grave human rights violations by government institutions	3	✓	✓
Refugee § 3 Sect. 1 AsylG pursuant to the Geneva Refugee Convention	Legitimate fears of persecution by government or non-government institutions/players (for instance because of ethnic background, religion, political convictions)	3	✓	✓
Subsidiary protection § 4 Sect. 1 AsylG	Evidence of threats of serious damages in the country of origin (e.g. death penalty or torture)	1	✓	Special conditions
Deportation ban pursuant to § 60 Sect. 5 and 7 AufenthG (German Residency act)	If the return would pose a concrete risk of resulting in bodily harm, death or loss of liberty or to a violation of the European Human Rights Convention	1	Consent obtained	✗

Source: Figure based on Reese and Vogt 2015.

Figure 13:
Evolution of Asylum Applications and Asylum Decisions (First Time and Subsequent Applications) from January 2015 through April 2019



Source: Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees 2019a.

filed by Afghan asylum-seekers, which was the result of multiple terror attacks in Afghanistan, that required a reevaluation in consideration of the security scenario.¹⁹

The total protection quota defines the percentage of approved asylum applications for the four protection categories as they pertain to all countries of origin. In the months of January through April 2019, it totaled 37.2 percent. In 2018, it hovered around 35.0 percent (approx. 76,000 positive decisions), which, compared to 2017, constitutes a drop by 8.4 percentage points. The total protection quota includes cases for which the BAMF does not review the content of the asylum application. If the application is retracted or if a different EU member state is responsible for the asylum process (Dublin Protocol), a formal decision is made and the BAMF stops processing the case. If these formal decisions are not factored into the equation, the net protection quota is 71.4, 53.0 and 50.2 percent for 2016, 2017 and 2018 as well as 54.4 percent for the months of January through April 2019.

The granting of refugee status was the most commonly awarded form of protection in 2018 and totaled 17.8 percent. Subsidiary protection totaled 11.6 percent and came in second (see Figure 14). Only few cases were deportation bans (4.4 percent) and asylum eligibility cases as defined in the German Constitution (1.3 percent). Formal decisions without content reviews of the applications were made in 30.2 of all cases. In 2018, 34.8 percent of the applications were denied.

Asylum-seekers from Syria and Eritrea (see Figure 15) were granted the highest levels of protection. Their total protection quota of 83.5 and 72.1 percent, as well as the net protection quota of 99.8 and 94.1 percent confirm that virtually all Syrian and Eritrean asylum-seekers were granted a protection status in 2018. Most Syrian asylum-seekers were granted subsidiary protection (41.3 per-

cent) or refugee status (40.3 percent). Immigrants from Eritrea saw similar results - subsidiary protection was granted in 38.6 of the cases and refugee status in 27.8 percent of the decisions. Deportation bans were most frequently issued for asylum-seekers from Afghanistan (21.8 percent).

After attempts to overthrow the Turkish government in 2016, the protection quota for Turkish asylum-seekers rose significantly, although a majority of the asylum applications were denied (about 55 percent in 2017; 47.5 percent in 2018). In 2016, the total protection quota was around 8 percent and in 2017 28 percent. It rose to 43.3 percent in 2018. That same year, 7.9 percent of the Turkish asylum-seekers were granted eligibility for asylum in accordance with the German Constitution, while 34.4 received refugee protection.

35.0 %
TOTAL 2018 PROTECTION QUOTA.

Pending Procedures and Processing Time

Given that government agencies made decisions on a much higher volume of asylum applications than were filed in 2017 through 2019, only around 53,000 procedures were still pending by April 2019. At the end of 2018 that number totaled approximately 58,000 and 68,000 at the end of 2017, while about 434,000 were pending by the end of 2016.²⁰ The average application processing time in 2016 was around seven months and it took even longer in 2017. Staff expansions and process modifications at the BAMF made it possible to reduce the average processing times from around eleven months in 2017 to around six months by the third quarter of 2018. For Nigerian asylum-seekers the 2017 processing times exceeded 14 months. Somalia, Pakistan and Afghanistan

19 Decisions made on asylum applications filed by Afghans suspended in: Zeit Online of 1st July 2017. <https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2017-07/bamf-afghanistan-abschiebung-entscheidung-bundesregierung>, accessed on 28th June 2019.

20 Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees (2019c). Up-to-date Figures. Issue April 2019; Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees (2019d). Asylum Report Statistics for the Month of December 2018; Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees (2017a). Asylum Report Statistics for the Month of December.

took more than ten months. During the third quarter of 2018, applications from Pakistani immigrants took about nine and from Somali applications around eight months. During that same time period, asylum-seekers from Afghanistan waited about 7.5 months and those from Nigeria close to seven months. These times are extended by a waiting period between the first asylum application and the formal application, which took on average six months in 2016, four months in 2017 and 3.8 months in the third quarter of 2018.²¹ Attaining quick clarity about the outcome of the asylum processes reduces the uncertainty for asylum applicants, offers greater legal assurance and fosters the integration of refugees into society.²²

Job Market Access and Residency Perspective

Asylum-seekers who hail from countries of origin with an overall protection quota of more than 50 percent are categorized as immigrants with a good residency perspective by the BAMF. In 2019, these countries, which are defined every six months, are Eritrea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Somalia.

Asylum-seekers with a good residency perspective have a residence mandate for the first three months after their arrival in Germany. This means that they must remain in a specific area. After these three months they are permitted to stay anywhere in the Federal Republic of Germany and work subject to a permit issued by the competent foreigners' administration and the local labor agency. Job market access was facilitated in 133 of 156 agency districts in August 2016: While the employment conditions are still reviewed to determine whether asylum-seekers are hired under less favorable con-

ditions than domestic applicants, the priority check to verify whether applicants with higher ranking priority are available for the job (Germans, EU citizens, individuals holding temporary or permanent residency status) is not conducted for a period of three years.²³

Asylum-seekers with low residency perspectives must reside in an acceptance facility until a decision on their asylum application has been made. During this period they are also not at all or only temporarily permitted to leave the region and subject to a specific permit. They are not allowed to work.²⁴ Among others, this affects individuals from safe countries of origin, such as Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro (see Chapter Evolution of Migration).

Once a positive decision on an asylum application has been made, those accepted as eligible for asylum, refugees according to the Geneva Refugee Convention and individuals who have been granted subsidiary protection have unrestricted access to the job market. For individuals subject to a deportation ban, the foreigners administration makes decisions on work permits on a case-by-case basis.²⁵

There is no clear legal definition for the term >good residency perspective<, which leaves room for interpretation and legal uncertainty. It is difficult to project whether a residency will become permanent based on the residency perspective. Not having a good residency perspective does not mean that the person will have to leave Germany on the fast track. Likewise, a protection quota exceeding 50 percent does not automatically result in the acceptance of an application for asylum. It is an enormous chal-

21 Printed Publications of the German Bundestag 19/7552 of 6th February 2019, 19/1631 of 13th April 2018 and 18/11262 of 21st February 2017.


22 SVR Migration (2018a). Many Questions, Too Many Answers? The Transparency of the Asylum and Acceptance System for Refugees.

23 German Labor and Social Affairs Minister's Office (2016). Easier Job Market Access for Refugees.

24 Filing a Personal Application for Asylum. Website of the Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees. <http://www.bamf.de/DE/Fluechtlingsschutz/AblaufAsylv/PersoennlicheAntragstellung/persoennliche-antragstellung-node.html>, accessed on June 28, 2019.

25 Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees (2017b). Job Market Access for Refugees; German Labor and Social Affairs Minister's Office (2018a). A Guideline to Job Market Access and Promotion.

Figure 14:
Asylum Application Decisions 2010 Through 2019



Note: Formal decisions are proceedings in the absence of a content verification of the asylum application, if applicants withdraw their applications or if another EU member state has jurisdiction (Dublin-III-Regulation).

Source: Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees 2019a.

THE HIGHEST TOTAL PROTECTION QUOTAS WERE GRANTED TO ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM SYRIA AND ERITREA IN 2018 - 83.5% AND 72.1%.

THE AVERAGE PROCESSING TIME FOR ASYLUM APPLICATIONS WAS REDUCED FROM 11 MONTHS IN 2017 TO 6 MONTHS IN THE THIRD QUARTER OF 2018.


34.4%

OF THE TURKISH ASYLUM-SEEKERS WERE GRANTED REFUGEE PROTECTION IN 2018.

lenge to do justice to the heterogeneity of grounds of flight and emigration hurdles by randomly assigning residency perspectives linked to the protection quota. Nevertheless, the residency perspective impacts the applicants' access to integration policy based fostering measures. Asylum applicants from countries with a good residency perspectives are given privileged access to training assistance and integration seminars, while there is a time delay in the participation and integration of asylum-seekers from other countries.²⁶

26 Dahmen et al. (2017). Good, Bad, Unclear – The Residency Perspective and its Consequences for Refugee Integration.

Figure 15:
Decision on Asylum Applications from Asylum-8-Countries and Turkey 2018



Note: Formal decisions are proceedings in the absence of a content verification of the asylum application, if applicants withdraw their applications or if another EU member state has jurisdiction (Dublin-III-Regulation).

Source: Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees 2019a.



Malteser Aid Workers are sorting through donated clothing at the Malteser Store in Geseke.

Committed and Individualized: Malteser Integration Mentors Help With Initial Societal Integration

By Daniel Boss

Joe Cocker is screaming from the loudspeakers of the small radio on one of the shelves. Preschool age boys and girls are running between their parents' legs. They are not bold enough to go to the play corner yet, but as experience has shown, this won't go on much longer. On the edge of the small café area a sign on a counter where visitors drop off glasses and plates says: Used dishes in German and Arabic. Well over a dozen of adult shoppers browse through the clothing racks of second hand garments. Besides clothing, the Malteser Store in Geseke (County of Soest)

offers dishes, decorative items and toys. A few school backpacks are among the choices. A large book shelf is loaded with popular fiction and cook books as well as the Brother Grimm's collection of fairy tales. There are comic strips like Donald Duck or Maya the Bee. All of the items have been donated, for instance in conjunction with moves and estates. Once someone has found what they are looking for, they go to the check-out line. The cashier is Navid Arzpaïma from Iran, a 47-year-old who is part of the Malteser Store's core team. In the past, he worked here every day. Now he

participates in a language course and only comes in two afternoons a week.

Support, Knowledge, Confidence

This father of three children holds more than just one volunteer position. This refugee has completed a training program as an Integration Mentor with the Malteser organization. In this role, he provides support to immigrants who have gone through a similar fate and who are facing an uncertain future. He is able to assist especially others with the same ethnic background: There is no language barrier when he explains how everyday life in Germany works. “Malteser Integration Mentors work all over Germany with the objective to make it easier for refugees to assimilate in our culture,” explains Ute Teltschik. She is the Integration Services Coordinator and Housing Manager of the Malteser organization in Geseke. On site, she facilitates one-day seminars for future Integration Mentors. The assignment of the volunteers is to provide individual support to refugees. The task is to give support and communicate knowledge, courage and confidence.

In 2018, two years after the launch of the Malteser program, 2,470 volunteer Integration Mentors worked at 93 locations all over Germany. More than 360 of them were refugees. On average, they reached 9,399 refugees each month through around 890 different projects. About 40 Mentors work in Geseke, among them nine refugees like Navid Arzpaïma. They provide services in the Malteser Store, which is also a meeting spot and point of contact. They offer language, computer and sports classes or accompany their mentees in so-called “tandems,” during joint visits to doctors’ offices, school registration processes

and appointments with government agencies. The age range is vast. “We have even trained level 7 and 9 students as Integration Mentors,” reports Ute Teltschik. “They literally take their new cohorts by the hand and show them where the school cafeteria or the secretary’s office is located.” Given that these unpaid positions obviously take quite a bit of time, many of the Geseke volunteers are already of retirement age.

Self-help Support and Surrogate Families

Maria Benkel is already in her mid sixties; however, she still runs a laundry service as an entrepreneur. She’s been a Malteser member for 40 years. She says that it was a given for her to attend the seminar to become an Integration Mentor. As a result, she and Navid Arzpaïma became tandem partners. For instance, she saw to it that he got the assignment at the Malteser Store, where long-time and new residents mingle. “I had heard of an Iranian who lived by himself at a shelter and was devastatingly unhappy,” she remembers looking back on how it all began. Hence, she asked her husband whether it would be possible to house this refugee in their vacant basement apartment of their home. “He instantly agreed.” Maria Benkel is completely committed to the assistance with self-help concept. An example: “I told Navid which agencies he would have to see and how to get there,” she says. “But he always drove there by himself and handled all of his own affairs.”

As part of the family reunification program, Navid Arzpaïma’s wife and three children eventually followed him to Germany. His son is now ten, the daughters are twelve and seventeen. The family still lives with the Benkels; however, they now share a larger



apartment. The relationship is close. The couple is particularly fond of the children. Navid Arzpaïma gave Maria Benkel a Mothers Day present. "It's wonderful when such friendships emerge," says Ute Teltschik. However, she also concedes that there are potential problems: "People might get deported or move away. Some also turn out differently than they presented themselves to the tandem partners. It's no different than with any other intra-human relationships."

Professionals Cushion the Concerns of Volunteers

Hence, it is important not to leave the volunteers in the lurch. Within the scope of the Integration Mentor program, continuous interactions with the Coordinator and a reli-

gious counseling program ensure that this does not happen. "As full-time professionals, it is also our duty to cushion the occasional frustrations of our Integration Mentors," comments Ute Teltschik. "To achieve this, we engage in face-to-face conversations with the individual Mentors and periodically ask them how they are doing." Maria Benkel also has concerns and fears every now and then. There is no guarantee that the Arzpaïma Family will be permitted to stay in Germany. "That's very disconcerting," says the Integration Mentor. That's why the Benkels are enjoying every moment of their time with their "second family" in the here and now.

Family Reunification

Individuals who have been granted asylum eligibility or refugee status are entitled to family reunification privileges. The legal status of family members of asylum eligible immigrants and refugees depends on the protection status of their authorized lineage. Authorized lineage members are family members with whom the other members of the family will be reunited. If they do not file an application within three months after being granted protection status, evidence of an income to fund the living expenses or sufficient residential space does not have to be provided. Members of the core family, such as spouses, or minor children as well as parents or custodians of individuals eligible for asylum and refugees who are minors are permitted to follow the immigrants to Germany. In exceptional cases, other family members may also follow; however, the family ties must have already existed in the country of origin. For instance, a couple must not have gotten married while they were fleeing. Other grounds for exclusion are serious crimes or lack of a residency perspective.

Asylum-seekers who have been placed under a deportation ban, are not entitled to family reunification. Those under subsidiary protection are subject to special rules: In May 2016, the right to family reunification was suspended for two years. A contingent solution has been in effect since August 2018, which restricts the monthly number to 1,000 persons.²⁷ However, subsidiary protection recipients still do not have a legal right to family reunification. Humanitarian grounds must be in place for successful applications. The criteria: Duration of the separation, the age of any children, health, concrete hazards and integration aspects. At the end of 2017, about 192,000 immigrants under subsidiary protection lived in Germany.²⁸ The largest groups were

from Syria and Iraq, who were affected by restricted family reunification rules.

The suspension of family reunification for those under subsidiary protection was the reason why the scope of the family reunification potential was examined in more detail. The figures of three to four family members eligible to follow each asylum-seeker that traveled through the public rumor mills turned out to be exaggerated, as the actual survey data was significantly lower - about 0.3 persons per applicant.²⁹ The age and family structure reveals that many asylum-seekers are single, do not yet have children or that the majority of spouses and minor children are already in Germany. At the end of 2017, the German Institute for Job Market and Career Research (IAB) estimated that of those who could claim family reunification rights, ranges from 150,000 to 180,000, of whom 50,000 to 60,000 are family members of immigrants under subsidiary protection.³⁰

Visa applications for family reunification purposes are submitted to the competent German consulates. In Syria's neighboring countries (Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq) those granted subsidiary protection had the option to register appointment requests to be assigned an appointment number during the reunification suspension. While the waiting period for an appointment exceeded a year in 2016 and 2017 depending on the country, this period has been significantly reduced and is now less than four weeks.³¹ Since June 2016, the German Department of State has been cooperating with the International Organization for Migration to accelerate the granting of visas.

To date, systematic records of the status of the lineage member eligible for asylum were not

27 Printed Publication of the German Bundesrat 31/18 of 2nd March 2018.; Printed Publication of the German Bundestag 19/1631 of 13th April 2018 and 18/11262 of 21st February 2017.


28 Federal Statistics Office (2018b). Population and Employment. Asylum-seekers - Results from the Central Register for Foreigners 2017.

29 Brücker (2017). Family Reunification: 150,000 to 180,000 spouses and children of refugees with protection status live abroad.

30 Brücker (2017). Family Reunification: 150,000 to 180,000 spouses and children of refugees with protection status live abroad..

31 Minutes of Meeting of the German Bundestag 19/28 of 25th April 2018.


Figure 16:
Issued Family Reunification Visas for Family Members from
Select Nations from 2015 through 2018



Note: The statistics are updated manually, consequently, they may not be absolutely concise.

Sources: Printed Publications of the German Bundestag 19/7267 and 19/9418 (preliminary versions).

Figure 17:
Tolerance Grounds



Note: The inside ring represents 2016. The data are based on closing date December 31 of any given year. Grounds that made up less than one percent such as “temporary presence for participation in criminal proceedings” or “parents of minor children” have been consolidated into “other grounds” in the interest of clarity.

Sources: Federal Statistics Office 2018b and Printed Publications of the German Bundestag 19/633 and 19/8258; in-house calculations, in-house assessments.

kept with regard to family reunification (eligible for asylum, refugee, subsidiary protection). This means that the analysis of family reunification visas from the visa statistics does not only comprise individuals under a protection status, but also family reunification visas for those following Germans and other immigrants. As of 2019, it is accordingly going to be possible to conduct an analysis on the basis of the individual forms of protection.

In 2017, around 118,000 family reunification visas were awarded worldwide. Since 2015, Syria has been the country that has seen the strongest family reunification activities. Syrians granted family

reunification visas made up 34.4 percent of the total in 2017.

About 40,700 Syrian and 10,000 Iraqi family members were issued visas. From 2015 to 2017, the number of visas issued to Syrians has almost doubled. For Iraqis, the same number has close to quadrupled (see Figure 16). A significant decline is evident for both countries in 2018: About 21,000

family reunification visas were issued to Syrians and 6,400 to family members from Iraq. Of those, 2,600 visas were issued for family members of immigrants from both countries under subsidiary protection from August through December 2018.³² One key factor of the structure of family reunification from Syria and Iraq is the large number of children following these immigrants.

Transfers, Returns and Termination of Residency

Upon filing of the application in Germany, the first step is to verify as part of the EU-Dublin-Regulation whether a different EU or Schengen member state is in charge of the asylum process. If this is the case, a transfer request is submitted. If the other country approves this re-

quest, the immigrant must be transferred to the competent state within six months. If this deadline is not met, Germany is automatically required to assume responsibility for the asylum process. The objective of the Dublin Protocol is to prevent multiple applications. Each asylum application should only be reviewed by one country while migration within the EU is controlled at the same time.

In 2017, Germany filed around 64,300 transfer requests and 55,000 in 2018. However, only 7,100 immigrants were transferred in 2017 and 9,200 in 2018 (which means in 15 resp. 24 percent of the approved cases). The reason for the low transfer rate is that certain states accept only a limited number of transfers per Dublin state and day and that immigrants subject to an imminent transfer end up on the lam.³³

Asylum-seekers who have not been awarded any of the four protection forms or whose residency permits have expired are under a latent obligation to leave the country. Latent means that the decision is not yet legally effective and that an objection can be filed. Rejected asylum-seekers are in an executable status of deportability if the grounds for the order to leave the country have been found legally effective by a court of law and no further legal remedies are available. After an application for asylum has been denied, the immigrant receives a written order to leave the country in the denial notice. The time permitted for departure ranges from one week to 30 days. During this period of time, rejected asylum applicants are expected to return to their home countries by their own means. If an immigrant subject to an order to leave does not leave voluntarily, he or she may be deported.

If departure obstacles should exist, deportation will be temporarily suspended and the continued stay in Germany will be tolerated. As of December 31, 2018 there were about 180,000 immigrants in the country whose stays were based on this tolerance arrangement (which equals 76


2,600

VISAS WERE ISSUED FROM AUGUST THROUGH DECEMBER 2018 ON THE GROUNDS OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION TO IMMIGRANTS GRANTED SUBSIDIARY PROTECTION.

³² Printed Publication of the German Bundestag 19/7267 of 23rd January 2019.

³³ Printed Publications of the German Bundestag 19/8021 of 26th February 2019 and 19/8340 of 13th March 2019.

Figure 18:
Deportations Based on Nationality



Sources: Printed Publications of the German Bundestag 18/4025, 18/7588, 18/11112, 19/800, 19/8021.

AROUND

23,600

**IMMIGRANTS WERE
DEPORTED IN 2018;
INCLUDING APPLICANTS
FROM THE WEST BAL-
KANS, AFGHANISTAN
OR NIGERIA.**

41.2 %

**TOLERATED STAYS WERE
ISSUED DUE TO LACK OF
TRAVEL DOCUMENTS.**

percent of all individuals who had received departure orders).³⁴ At the end of 2017 this number totaled 166,000.³⁵ Most of those affected came from Serbia, Afghanistan and Kosovo. Departure hindrances comprise anything from resistance or refusal of the immigrants ordered to depart, lack of cooperation from the target country, e.g. refusal to accept the person's return or lack of travel documents (see Figure 17). Lack of travel documents is the reason that tops the list of tolerance grounds and it has grown from 24.9 percent in 2016 to 41.2 percent in 2018. Of the tolerance grounds in 2018, 40.8 percent were granted for other reasons. This applies to follow-up asylum applications, to give the immigrant a chance to receive training or if members of the core family are subject to a deportation ban. Discretionary tolerance was granted to individuals to complete school or training or if they were taking care of sick family members to 6.4 percent in 2018. Furthermore, the right to maintain a married and family life is also a deportation hindrance – family ties with tolerated immigrants were the cause for non-deportation in 6.2 percent of all cases. Since March 2016, health issues impairing the ability to travel have been acceptable grounds for tolerance only in the event of life-threatening or grave illnesses.

A tolerance order remains in effect until the grounds preventing deportation no longer exist; the immigrant still has the obligation to leave the country. If no further grounds for tolerance exist and, as a consequence, hindrances for deportation no longer apply, the deportation process is reactivated. Tolerance does not provide a legal right to remain and thus makes it more difficult for the person to be integrated into German society.³⁶ Individuals who are being tolerated receive benefits on the basis of the Asylum Applicant Act and, in order to be able to work, must obtain a permit from the Agency for Foreign Nationals. If

tolerated immigrants are the ones who prevent their deportation, their benefits are reduced. Since the fall of 2015, the exact deportation date is no longer communicated.

While the tolerance period is limited, it is possible to get it renewed once it has expired. Recurring subsequent tolerance periods are referred to as "chain tolerance periods."³⁷ This status makes the integration process very hard because of the lack of a residency perspective, especially if the reasons for the tolerance do not change. Consequently, a right to remain was introduced in the summer of 2015 for well-integrated tolerated immigrants who have been in Germany for many years. If they have good language skills, are funding their own cost of living and stay out of trouble with the law, these immigrants have the opportunity to obtain a residency permit after eight years. For families with minor children this option is available after just six and for adolescents attending school or completing an apprenticeship, after just four years. A residency permit is also granted if a departure date is not foreseeable, if a departure has already been suspended for 18 months and the tolerated immigrant is not responsible for it.

Regardless of their possession of a residency permit, it is possible for immigrants to voluntarily return to their countries of origin. In such cases, they may receive financial return and start-up program support. This option is available while an asylum process is ongoing or upon its completion. If they fail to meet the deadline for their voluntary emigration, the immigrants have to pay their own return expenses. The financial support provided under the so-called voluntary return program offered in conjunction with the federal-state program "REAG/GARP" and the federal "Starthilfe-Plus" option targets primarily those whose asylum applications have been denied and those required to leave the country. These programs provided assistance with travel arrangements, absorb the travel expenses, addi-

34 Printed Publication of the German Bundestag 19/8021 of 26th February 2019.

35 Federal Statistics Office (2018b). Population and Employment. Asylum-seekers - Results of the Central Register for Foreigners 2017.

36 Giesing and Rhode (2017). Asylum Application Denied. What Now? Deportation and Voluntary Return.

37 Tolerated Immigrants. Migration Glossary – Integration – Flight & Asylum. Website of the German Center for Political Education. <http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/lexika/270362/duldung>, accessed on 28th June 2019.

tional medical costs and, depending on the person's nationality, a one-time start-up grant. Based on preliminary statistics, around 16,000 individuals voluntarily left the country through the REAG/GARP program; 9,800 of them had received orders to emigrate. In particular individuals from the West Balkans and Russia took advantage of the subventions.

Those who have received executable emigration orders but do not leave on their own are deported and are subject to a re-entry ban with limited immigration and stay bans. In 2016, out of 746,000 individuals who filed asylum applications, around 25,000 were deported (see Figure 18). Despite declining asylum application filings,

around 24,000 individuals were deported in 2017, mostly from the West Balkans including Albania, Kosovo, Northern Macedonia and Serbia. The number went down by about 400 in 2018. The highest numbers of asylum-seekers that were deported came from the West Balkans; followed by applicants from Afghanistan and Nigeria.³⁸

The migration package introduced new job market access and return regulations (see text box in ref. to the migration package).

38 Printed Publications of the German Bundestag 18/13218 of 1st August 2017, 19/117 of 22nd November 2017, 19/800 of 20th February 2018, 19/3702 of 6th August 2018 and 19/8021 of 26th February 2019.

Migration Package

A regulation called the Migration Package was passed by the German Bundestag in the spring of 2019. The aim is to make it easier for all professionally qualified foreigners to access the German job market in the future within the parameters of the Qualified Worker Immigration Act. Upon presentation of an employment contract, they are now given the opportunity to come to Germany for work without having to go through any further processes. In addition, the country issues six-month-visas to those looking for jobs.³⁹ The Employment Act for Foreigners facilitates the job search for refugees. Regardless of their residency perspectives, asylum-seekers are now slated to get access to integration and language courses after nine months. Tolerated immigrants gain access to vocation-related German language courses after six months.⁴⁰ The law governing the tolerance of immigrants in training and employment calls for a 30-month employment tolerance period if they have been in Germany for 12 months and have been in an employment relationship for which they make contributions to social security for 18 months.⁴¹ The Second Improved Execution of Mandatory Emigration Act

contains various measures aiming at the deportation of those with emigration orders. Henceforth, all asylum-seekers will be required to stay in the initial immigrant housing facilities until their asylum processes are complete. If they do not cooperate sufficiently in their identification proceedings, this period may be extended. Within the scope of restricted tolerance, undetermined identity or lack of travel documents may also lead for benefit reductions as well as restrictions to the right to choose their own residence municipality. Furthermore, individuals under emigration orders may be placed into "emigration detention" for up to ten days regardless of whether they are a flight risk or not.⁴² The Third Modified Asylum-Applicant Benefits Act ensures that the benefits are aligned with the latest price levels; moreover, it improves the financial situation of asylum-seekers and tolerated immigrants who are starting an apprenticeship or a study program. Benefits for adults living in shared housing facilities are reduced.⁴³ The Integration Law Deadline Elimination Act and the Second Data Sharing Act provide new regulations for the improved collection of data in the Central Register for Foreigners.⁴⁴

39 Printed Publication of the German Bundestag 19/8285 of 13th March 2019.

40 Printed Publication of the German Bundestag 19/10053 of 10th May 2019.

41 Printed Publication of the German Bundestag 19/8286 of 13th March 2019.

42 Printed Publication of the German Bundestag 19/10047 of 10th May 2019.

43 Printed Publication of the Germany Bundestag 19/10052 of 10th May 2019.

44 Printed Publications of the German Bundestag 19/8692 of 25th May 2019 and 19/8752 of 25th March 2019.

Making it Possible: Malteser Return Consultants in Mainz

By Dr. Georg Wiest



What happens if Germany is not supposed to be or cannot be someone's permanent home? At the Cityhall in Mainz, anyone who is willing to return to their home country or just wants to find out more about it without having to make a commitment, is welcome to visit the Malteser Return Consultants. Behrouz Asadi and staff member Lili Kopeva will listen to their visitors' concerns and search for options for returns, if an immigrant chooses to take that route.

The Malteser Consultation Program has been a part of the voluntary return initiative since its launch by the state of Rhineland-Palatinate in 2005. "It is important to us that we are perceived as a fair and open consulting agency with a high level of expertise," emphasizes Behrouz Asadi. The goal is to approach every consultation with an open mind as far as the outcome is concerned, being independent and unbiased and not to be used as a tool by anyone when it comes to this politically sensitive subject. Asadi says that these are the key factors to being able to build trust with those who come for advice. At the same time, it is critical to - as a partner - see eye to eye with politicians and administrators. In 2017, he handled 200 cases; 110 last year: Every consultation is different; just like the destinies of the people seeking his advice. Most of them have given up hope that their asylum applications will be approved and consider their voluntary return a better alternative to deportation. Yet some have different issues: Like the Iraqi woman who has been granted unlimited residency rights but is sick and wants to go

Behrouz Asadi is at the helm of the Malteser Return Consultants in Mainz.

home to die there; or the Iranian dentist who has been approved for asylum who didn't see a professional perspective in Germany and received funding for the establishment of a dental practice in Baghdad.

The decision as to whether financial support for a new start in an immigrant's old home can be provided is made in two stages: If the Malteser organization approves a certain project aiming at the establishment of a new professional existence in the home country after the initial review, the case is presented to a commission under the direction of Andreas Drubba, the Head of the Mainz Citizens' Office. The town's Integration Commissioner and several officials as well as the Malteser representatives are members of this commission. If a ruling in favor is made, a contract is made with the applicant, which also governs the terms for the repayment of the subsidy. If necessary, the Return Consultants also assist with the organization of the trip home, for instance with the procurement of documents or tickets. In the past two years, more than 80 families and individuals returned with the support of the Malteser organization. Most of them hailed from the Balkans, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. "For us in the Malteser organization, protecting the dignity of those who come to us is priority one," observes Behrouz Asadi. "It is our mission to pave the way to opportunities that make the reintegration back home a success."





Job Market – The Impact of Migration



Job Market – The Impact of Migration

Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Lars P. Feld, Patrick Hirsch, Katharina Pfeil

Albeit the current economic downturn already has its first effects on the German job market, it is still in good condition. The developments in terms of employment and paid work subject to mandatory social security contribution are still positive; unemployment and insufficient employment rates have declined since 2017. The developments on the job market are increasingly impacted by migration, which contributes to an increase in the number of available candidates for hire.

This Chapter sums up the employment and unemployment scenario developments in Germany since the compilation of the Malteser Migration Report 2017 (MM17) for different groups of migrants. A more detailed evaluation of the job market policy tools, including third party funding of integration seminars and professional integration as well as the apprenticeship market, is also provided herein.

“Without immigration the extreme increase in employment in Germany would have been impossible. Most recently, an amazing more than half of the employment additions can be attributed to foreign workers.”

SVR Annual Economic Evaluation 18/19, Page 139

Job Market Developments

Free Movement of Workers in the EU, the regional proximity and the existing income disparities have driven the income migration of individuals from countries that are part of the eastern expansion of the EU and the West Balkans (see Chapter Migration Evolution). These immigrant groups have made major contributions to the expansion of the workforce in Germany. Contrary to the income migration, it has to be anticipated that the job market integration of refugees will take longer, given the frequent lack of language skills and formal qualifications.⁴⁵ Unemployment rates among immigrants from the asylum-8-countries are significantly higher than those of other groups; however, positive employment effects are now on the horizon. Compared to other groups of immigrants asylum-8-country nationals have made dynamic contributions to the workforce growth throughout 2018.

Based on estimates of the Federal Labor Agency, more than 33 million people are employed in Germany and pay social security contributions (status April 2019). This figure has grown by 595,000 employees or 1.8 percent compared to the same month in the year prior. Since April 2017, i.e. the status of the MM17, the number of foreigners holding jobs with social security contributions rose by around 723,000 to now 4.1 million employees.

Despite the lack of academic degrees, the stressful experiences of refugee life and diverse qualification demands on the German job market,

⁴⁵ Federal Labor Agency (2019a). Compact Job Market Overview. Refugee Migration, status April 2019.


the job market integration of individuals from Asylum-8-Countries is progressing more expeditiously than expected.⁴⁶ Compared to April 2017, the number of social security payers among this immigrant group has more than doubled. In April 2019, a total of around 312,000 (+83,000 compared to the year before). In recent years and compared to the other relevant groups of immigrants, they made a large contribution to the growth of the workforce. In April 2019, the number of employees required to pay social security insurance contributions from the West Balkans totaled around 325,000 (+35,000 compared to the previous year), while about 1.39 million workers from the Eastern European EU member states paid social security insurance contributions (+116,000 compared to the previous year).

The unemployment and employment quota factor changes in the available workforce and the population into the equation and are thus central indicators of the progress of integration. The employment quota is derived from the percentage of working age employed individuals (ages 15 to 65) among the overall population within this age range. The unemployment quota reflects the percentage of registered unemployed individuals among the overall working age population, i.e. the total of working and unemployed individuals. From January 2010 through April 2019, both indices are shown for German and foreign working age people and the key groups of immigrants (see Figures 19 and 20).

In April 2017, the employment quota of all foreign population groups was 46.7 percent and has further increased since. In April 2018 it totaled 48.8 percent, and was up to 51.5 percent in April 2019. German nationals reached an employment quota of 68.9 percent in April 2019.

46 Brücker et al. (2019). Second Wave of the IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Survey: Refugees are Making Linguistic and Employment Progress.

Figure 19:
Change of employment quotas of social security payers compared to the same month in the previous year



Note: Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain as well as the non-EU states Ukraine and Russia are consolidated in category Other Countries. The stacked areas represent the employment share changes of the total foreign nationals required to make contributions to social security.

Source: Federal Labor Agency 2019b; Depiction based on SVR Wirtschaft 2018.

In an analysis distinguishing between countries of origin, the employment quota of immigrants from Eastern European member states was 61.2 percent in April 2019 and thus higher than the quota of the entire foreign population. Significant fluctuations are also in evidence; the quota of Romanian nationals, for instance, fluctuated by close to 10 percent between the summer and winter months, which is indicative of seasonal employment.⁴⁷

The employment quota of individuals from the West Balkans was also positive. In April 2019, it was 58.8 percent, although the West Balkans were designated as safe countries of origin in October 2015 and are thus subject to an employment ban. This rise of the employment rate can be attributed to the West Balkans Regulation: Since the end of 2015, workers from the Balkans are permitted to apply for a work permit if they can present a valid employment contract in Germany (see text box on the West Balkans Regulation).

The employment quota among nationals hailing from the Asylum-8-Countries was considerably lower in April 2019 - 32.9 percent. This relatively modest quota underscores that the job market integration takes longer for this group than any other immigrant group. Nevertheless, the development is positive. Compared to April 2017, the employment rate among this group increased significantly by 14.8 percentage points. While at the time the MM17 was compiled, every fifth person was employed, today almost every third person from the Asylum-8-Countries holds a job. The employment quotas of virtually all asylum countries of origin has increased. In particular the quota of immigrants from Eritrea almost tripled compared to April 2017, while the quota of Syrians more than doubled.

The interpretation of the employment quotas of immigrants from Asylum-8-Countries must take into account that job market access for asylum-seekers and tolerated immigrants is initially restricted (see Chapter Asylum Process). Depending on the residency status and protection form, the waiting period ranges from three to six months or is based on individual permits. Immi-

grants from safe countries of origin are principally not allowed to accept employment while the asylum process is ongoing.⁴⁸ This means that the level and change of the number of asylum-seekers and tolerated immigrants from the same population group can have a strong impact on the employment quota. The quota drops whenever new applications, who are initially not permitted to work, boost the population by more than the number of employed individuals who have been granted asylum. Consequently, a decline of this quota cannot be directly linked to a less advantageous job market integration.⁴⁹ The low employment quota for individuals from the Asylum-8-Countries in the period from November 2015 through June 2017 can be attributed to the strong growth of this population, while employment starts with a delay due to the ban.


The generally positive development on the job market is not only evident in the rising employment quotas, but also in continuously declining unemployment rates (see Figure 19). In April 2019, the unemployment rate of Germans hovered around 4.8 percent and had thus dropped by 0.4 percent compared to the year prior. The employment quota of foreigners of working age totaled 12.3 percent and thus declined by 2.7 percentage points compared to the MM17 status. For the group of immigrants from Eastern European EU member states, it totaled 7.1 percent, for those from the West Balkans, 10.9 percent. The unemployment quota of immigrants from the Asylum-8-Countries came in at 34.5 percent, i.e. significantly higher. The quota of this group of immigrants has gone down significantly since it peaked in August 2016 (53.4 percent). In April 2019 it was 5.6 percentage points lower than in April 2018. Hence, it dropped by 15.5 percent compared to April 2017.

47 SVR Migration (2019b). Annual Evaluation 2019.

48 Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees (2017b). Access to the Job Market for Refugees.

49 Federal Labor Agency (2016). Supplementary Unemployment, Employment and Support Quotas for Foreigners in Migration Reporting.


Figure 20:
Employment quota German and foreign population aged 15 to 65 (mandatory social security contribution jobs and mini jobs)



Note: Includes the employment quotas for Germans as of January 2012.

Source: Federal Labor Agency 2019b.

Figure 21:
Unemployment rates among Germans and foreign workers



Source: Federal Labor Agency 2019b.

Thus far, this Report has evaluated important job market indices for different groups of immigrants based on consolidated nationalities. As the strongest non-European group of immigrants, the group from the Asylum-8-Countries is reaching the statistics of the refugee group; however, it includes all nationals of a country regardless of their residency status. Since mid 2016, job market statistics have been tracking refugees. The group of “refugee migration context individuals” includes asylum-seekers whose asylum process is ongoing, approved asylum applications and tolerated immigrants.⁵⁰ The volume and structure developments of individuals in the refugee context who are looking for work or are unemployed will be assessed below.

Job seekers are unemployed individuals and those who are not unemployed but are looking for work and have reported with the Federal Labor Agency or a Job Center for assistance with their searches. In April 2017, approximately 411,000 Asylum-8-Country immigrants in the refugee migration context had reported as individuals looking for work. Of the former, 149,000 were unemployed, which is equivalent to 5.8 percent of all unemployed working age people in Germany

(see Figure 20). By comparison, this number had dropped to 388,000 from the Asylum-8-Countries by April 2019 (-23,000), among them 158,000 unemployed individuals (+9,400). Hence, they made up 7.1 percent of all of the unemployed in Germany. This slight increase could be attributed to search unemployment, which is the result of the fact that many asylum-seekers have completed their integration courses.⁵¹

In April 2017 as well as April 2019, especially refugees from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan were unemployed within the Asylum-8-Group.

On par with the social-economic structure of the applicants for asylum, they were primarily male and younger than 35. They were looking for unqualified positions in job market segments in which language skills and training are not deciding factors, such as logistics, commercial cleaning or restaurants.

50 Federal Labor Agency (2018). Data from the BA Statistics on Refugee Migration - Frequently Asked Questions.

51 Federal Labor Agency (2019a). Compact Job Market Overview. Refugee Migration, status April 2019.

West Balkans Regulation

In October 2015, the West Balkan Nations (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia) were declared safe countries of origin with the aim of bringing relief to the asylum system. This measure was accompanied by a liberalization of job market access for individuals from these countries, which expires at the end of 2020 and is called the West Balkans Regulation. The purpose of this was to facilitate income migration from the West Balkans. Specifically, a special work visa was introduced, for which the immigrants had to file an application in their respective home countries. The prerequisites include a binding job offer in Germany as well as the consent of the German Federal Labor Agency (BA). Moreover, applicants must not have received benefits according to

the Asylum Applicant Benefits Act in the prior 24 months. What makes this Regulation unique is that the residency permit in the form of the visa is awarded regardless of professional qualifications, language skills or income thresholds. In 2018, the BA approved 46,000 applications under the West Balkans Regulation (about 57 percent untrained workers, 40 percent trained workers, 1 percent specialists). However, only 21,000 related visas were issued. Due to the high volume of applicants, capacity bottleneck arose, so that the waiting period until a visa application can be submitted exceeded one year.⁵²

52 Brückner and Burkert (2017). West Balkans Regulation: Job in Lieu of Asylum?; Printed Publication of the German Bundestag 19/8229 of 11th March 2019.

32.9 %

ASYLUM-8-COUNTRY IMMIGRANTS
EMPLOYMENT QUOTA.

A TOTAL OF

385,000


INDIVIDUALS FROM THE ASYLUM-8-COUNTRIES WERE
SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTION PAYERS IN APRIL 2019
(312,000) OR HELD MINI JOBS (73,000).

12.3 %

UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OF ALL WORKING AGE
FOREIGNERS IN GERMANY IN APRIL 2019. THE
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OF ASYLUM-8-COUNTRY
IMMIGRANTS WAS SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER - 34.5 %.

THE UNEMPLOYMENT
RATE OF ASYLUM-8-
COUNTRY IMMIGRANTS
DROPPED BY 15.5 PERCENT
FROM APRIL 2017 TO
APRIL 2019.

Figure 22:
Unemployment rates of refugee migration context
individuals from the Asylum-8-Countries



Source: Federal Labor Agency 2019c.

388,000

REFUGEES FROM ASYLUM-8-COUNTRIES WERE REGISTERED
AS JOB SEARCHERS IN APRIL 2019. OF THIS FIGURE, 158,000
WERE UNEMPLOYED.

The improvement of language skills, the acceptance of educational degrees acquired abroad and access to training and advanced education courses are key factors for the sustainable job market integration of refugees. They provide the foundation for permanent integration into job segments that require higher qualification levels.⁵³ Due to lack of German language skills, the integration of a job market with other qualification demands as well as incentives to quickly accept employment, prompted many refugees to take less sophisticated jobs than they had occupied in their countries of origin. In 2017, the median gross monthly income of refugees working full time was EUR 1,600, which equals around 55 percent of the median income of German full time employees. This year, the average monthly income of all working refugees totaled around EUR 1,000. While there is no direct link between asylum status and work, the wages of tolerated immigrants were significantly lower. Approved refugees, on the other hand, spent more time looking for work. Post successful participation in job market policy integration activities and upon receiving advice and job placement assistance from the Federal Labor Agency, they scored better job market opportunities and higher incomes.⁵⁴

Integration Seminars and Job Market Policy Measures

The purpose of integration seminars is to teach the German language, culture, history and legal system. In conjunction with the increased immigration levels, the integration seminar offers and the number of participants have both increased. Asylum-seekers from countries with a good residency perspective have the option to participate voluntarily while their asylum applications are pending. Approved asylum applicants and tolerated immigrants may be mandated to participate

in integration seminars if they do not have sufficient command of the German language or if they receive unemployment benefits II or benefits in accordance with the Asylum Applicant Benefits Act. EU citizens and German nationals who require integration and lack command of the German language may also be approved for these courses. The following analysis is therefore based on participants and their nationality, not just on refugees.

After the strong immigration years 2015/16, the integration seminar system stabilized in 2018. A total of 256,000 participation eligibility notices were issued in 2018 - 120,000 fewer than the year before. Most of the eligibility notices went to new immigrants, the group of EU citizens and individuals who had integration needs after living in Germany for an extended period of time came in second. A similar situation is evident when it comes to new course participants. While 292,000 still registered in 2017, the number of participants in integration seminars dropped to 203,000 in 2018 (see Figure 23). Of them, about two thirds participated in a general integration course. Women outnumbered men for the first time that year.⁵⁵

The share of participants from Asylum-8-Countries is on the decline. In 2017, of the new participants, 34.6 percent came from Syria - by 2018, that number shrank to 19.1 percent. The allocation of new course participants from other countries of origin with a good residency perspective saw a similar development (Eritrea, Iran, Iraq and Somalia). The share of European participants, including individuals from Romania, Poland and Bulgaria, on the other hand rose from 17.2 to 23.7 percent. Overall, in 2018, 223,000 participants passed the German exam for immigrants. Of them, around 52 percent attained Language Skill Level B1.

53 SVR Migration (2019b). Jahresgutachten 2019.

54 Brücker et al. (2019). Zweite Welle der IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Befragung: Geflüchtete machen Fortschritte bei Sprache und Beschäftigung.

55 Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees (2019e). Bericht zur Integrationskursgeschäftsstatistik für das Jahr 2018.

Besides the BAMF integration seminars, job market policy tools deployed by the Federal Labor Agency foster the professional integration into training and employment. They include activation and professional integration measures, among them specific programs for refugees, such as vocation-related language training (KomBer) or competency determination and job market introduction programs (PerF, KompAs, Kommit). Other job market related tools are vocational choice courses and vocational training classes or funded advanced professional education, the fostering of career starts as well as measures that create jobs, such as programs that support the employment of long-time unemployed individuals through wage subsidies.

In January 2019 a total of 84,000 asylum-seekers were participating in a labor market policy program (see Figure 24). Compared to the year prior, this figure grew by around 9 percent (+13,000); however, compared to January 2017 the number increased only by about 5 percent (+4,200). Two fifths of the refugees who received funding in January 2019 were participating in a program to activate and integrate them into the job market, while 27 percent participated in offers for professional choices and training. The former category of participants saw the highest increases over the years.

19.1 %

OF THE NEW INTEGRATION COURSE PARTICIPANTS CAME FROM SYRIA IN 2018 - WHILE 34.6 % CAME FROM THIS COUNTRY IN 2017.

THE AVERAGE MONTHLY IN-COME OF WORKING REFUGEES IN 2017 WAS AROUND EUR 1,000.

New Home, New Career: Ribal Kousa, Malteser First Responder

By Daniel Boss

FC Barcelona, Borussia Dortmund and rising star SC Paderborn – Ribal Kousa's fan heart beats for these clubs. The 32-year-old Syrian explains that soccer is his big passion. If his schedule allows it, he'll watch television and feverishly root for his team. Debates and chats among experts with his coworkers are part of it all. After all, everyone at the Malteser Service Office in Paderborn knows the first responder's dedication to the game.

"Every now and then I play ball myself," says Ribal Kousa, whose command of German is now somewhere between good and outstanding thanks to the courses he took and the challenges of his everyday work life.

The young man who hails from Aleppo has found peace in Germany. He and his wife Aya fled their home because of the civil war in 2014. It had already ruined their source of income and become a serious danger to their lives. After numerous interim stops, the couple, who did not have children, made it to Paderborn, where Ribal Kousa's sister lived at the time. Although he was full of hope for a better future at the time, the young textile salesman could not have imagined that he would start a completely new career in his new homeland.

An Act of Fate Precedes an Opportunity

His wife got sick, had to have surgery and spent several weeks at the hospital until she recovered. It is the driver of the ambulance who introduces the couple to the Malteser organization. "I was intrigued with the job of the drivers and their kind ways of helping others," comments Ribal Kousa. These days he is working with the first responders from back then every

single day. At the time, Ribal Kousa didn't wait long before he filed an application for his current position with the assistance of the Job Center. He gets the job. "On August 15, 2017 I began my life as a "Bufdi," he remembers as if it had happened yesterday.

The professional skills he acquired along with his personal commitment and his interpersonal skills ensured that the approved refugee could assume his job responsibilities seamlessly after he completed the 14 months as a federal service volunteer. However, now he is a full-time professional. His duties include regular dialysis runs, bringing and picking up children to and from kindergarten and food deliveries. So far, after handling several hundred rides, Ribal Kousa has had only two negative experiences. Once, an elderly lady referred to him as "stupid and dangerous," just because of his ethnicity. "I simply said nothing and continued to do my job like I always do," says the first responder, shrugging his shoulders.

He prefers to remember his first assignment as a first responder. Because the condition of a senior man who was supposed to be taken to the hospital, suddenly worsened, he was permitted to drive under emergency clearance. "I instantly had to master the full program." As a result, the patient received quick and successful help. Maybe Ribal Kousa will soon drive with blue lights flashing and sirens howling more often. After all, he keeps a keen eye on the next steps on the career ladder: Ambulance and emergency medic.



Starting job training is subject to similar regulations as the general entry into the labor market: Approved asylum applicants have unrestricted access to the apprenticeship market. Asylum-seekers whose applications for asylum are still in process are permitted to start academic or vocational training after a three-month waiting period. Under the so-called 3+2-Regulation of August 2016, asylum-seekers whose applications were denied while they were completing an apprenticeship are issued an immigrant tolerance notification for their entire apprenticeship and the subsequent two years, if the apprenticeship


34.7 %

OF THE APPLICANTS RECEIVED AN APPRENTICESHIP ASSIGNMENT FROM OCTOBER 2018 THROUGH APRIL 2019.

providing company hires them or if they find another job. This does not apply to asylum-seekers from safe countries of origin; they must have sufficient command of the German language and a scholastic education.

The Federal Labor Agency records applicants for vocational training facilities for each reporting year from October 1 - September 30. The number of individuals with a refugee migration context who applied for vocational training in the period from October 2018 through April 2019 compared to the entire reporting year 2017/18 increased significantly by 9 percent (+2,400) to 29,000 (see Figure 23). Slightly over one third of the applicants received a training assignment from October 2018 through April 2019. In June 2018, around 27,000 refugee context apprentices from Asylum-8-Countries had registered. Their number has almost doubled since the year before.


Figure 23:
New course participants based on nationalities in 2017 and 2018



Note: While Romanian, Bulgarian, Polish and Italian are among the ten most represented nationalities, they have been consolidated under Europe to distinguish them from the other EU member states.

Source: Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees 2018, 2019e.


Figure 24:
Number of participants in the refugee migration context based on select job market tools and categories of measures



Note: Others includes categories Participation of Handicapped Individuals and Free Subsidies/Other Subsidies.

Source: Federal Labor Agency 2019c.

Figure 25:
Refugee migration context applications for apprenticeships



Note: The reporting year spans the period of 1st October through 30th September. The data through April 2019 are included in reporting year 2018/19.

Source: Federal Labor Agency 2019c.

Altena: How a Small Town Masters Integration

By Julia Hübner

Two men are doing their part to turn a vacant old structure located at the address Freiheitstraße 26 in Altena into an integration center⁵⁶. One is in his early 20s, a refugee from Guinea who has been in Altena for a short while. The other man has lived in the small town in the Sauerland region his entire life. As a master commercial painter, he runs his family-owned business. Anette Wesemann, from the town's integration office, will later refer to the grand opening of the center as a milestone. Before that, it evolves into a personal milestone for the talented refugee who has crafts skills: The work he does with the master painter results in his recruitment as an apprentice.

He is one of around 450 refugees who live in Altena today. Finding his own apartment and job, learning the language, developing social relationships - there are lots of milestones that will eventually turn Altena into his hometown. Some of the immigrants still have to master several of them. However, Andreas Hollstein, the mayor and Anette Wesemann agree - things are going well. They know that especially the job market integration process will take some time. The numbers confirm their positive assessment: Half of the refugees in Altena are either participating in vocation preparation programs or have already found jobs. This places Altena above the national average.

Job Market Integration: Challenge and Opportunity Go Hand in Hand

Besides the language, the particularities of the German training system also pose a challenge, as Anette Wesemann, who works at the town's integration office, knows: "Try to convince someone to complete an apprenticeship as a

metal worker if he can make more money every month as an untrained worker at the same company right away. Receiving the wages of an apprentice feels like taking a step back at first." The young man from Guinea, who took an apprenticeship offer as a commercial painter was one of the first refugees who chose a traditional training path in Altena.

Mayor Hollstein considers immigration a huge opportunity for the aging town that has its business roots in the metal processing industry. Like many other industrial sites, it is up against a shortage of trained workers. "Altena is not the only place that needs immigrants to balance out the demographic evolution. That alone is good reason to support the people who come here to the best of our abilities and to integrate them."

Volunteer Engagement as a Recipe for Success

The small town voluntarily took in 100 of the 450 refugees who live here. Volunteers made the biggest contribution to making this possible. Andreas Hollstein is keenly aware of that. With what the town calls >Stellwerk<, Altena has had a well working volunteer structure since 2007. The alliance of around 200 volunteers originally worked on senior support projects. However, when a group of immigrants from Eritrea approached the Stellwerk with the desire to

⁵⁶ The Malteser Migration Report 2017 included a detailed report about Altena, after the municipality received the first National Integration Award in May 2017. The town received a lot of admiration for this achievement, but also many hostile comments from asylum opponents. Dr. Andreas Hollstein, the mayor even became the target of a violent attack. The current report aims to document how the primarily volunteer-based integration work has evolved.

learn German, a language course facilitated by volunteers was set up – the first of many projects targeting refugees.

Esther Szafranski, 53, is part of the core team of volunteers, which coordinates the alliance's work. Inspired by a Swedish report, she was the one who initiated the so-called Caretakers Project. All refugee families in Altena were assigned Caretakers who assisted them with the challenges of being new in town. "I was enthusiastic about the concept," she reports. "It was hard for me to imagine how a family could find its way around here without any assistance." She took care of two families with the help of two others. One family came from Iraq and the other from Syria - there were a total of eleven immigrants. At first, they used gestures to communicate, the topics were bus routes and appointments with agencies, but a two-year-old child also had a fever on a Sunday once and had to be driven to the local hospital. Then a boy, who had an ear injury after an explosion had to be taken to an expert in Dortmund.

"Since then, the families have arrived and don't need us any longer."

The fact that volunteer services for refugees are beginning to decline slowly can be attributed to the reality that refugees now need far less support. "That's actually very good news," underscores Andreas Hollstein. Esther Szafranski, who no longer has regular interactions with her Caretaker families, agrees: "At first, we saw each other at least once a week as there were a lot of challenges to overcome. But now the families have arrived and don't need us any longer." Once the families moved into their own residences, the Caretaker relationships ended. "Now we see each other only on special occasions, e.g. when the youngest child was born last year."

Anette Wesermann, on the other hand, reports that many contacts remain active. Because of her work, she is in close contact with the refugees

and volunteers. She says that in some instances, a role change is beginning to evolve. "Three years ago, an older Caretaker drove a young refugee around to show him things - now he lifts her walker into the car and drives her," she observes. The fact that many of the refugees now need less support makes her happy for yet another reason: "We now have the time to provide individual care to those who need special attention because of the fate they have suffered."

A Definitive Goal: More Refugees in Volunteer Positions

Migration will continue to play an important role in the future. Mayor Hollstein is certain that will happen. Hence, the experiences made over the past few years are important for future strategies. Volunteer positions, there's no doubt about it, are part of Altena's proven structure. That's another reason Anette Wesermann has made it her goal to integrate more refugees into volunteer advocacy work.

Mayor Andreas Hollstein and Anette Wesermann, who works for the City of Altena's integration office, consider immigration a huge opportunity.



Asylum-related Immigration – Fiscal Aspects





Asylum-related Immigration – Fiscal Aspects

Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Lars P. Feld, Patrick Hirsch, Katharina Pfeil

Just like in the previous years, the German federal, state and municipal governments as well as the social security administration generated surpluses, although the increase immigration had a direct impact on government finances. The total spending of the federal government in connection with asylum-related immigration alone, exceeded EUR 20 billion each in 2016, 2017 and 2018 and thus made up well over half a percent of the gross domestic product. The figures in the federal budget provide the best basis for an ad hoc estimate of the costs incurred as a result of the acceptance of asylum-seekers.

However, such a quantification is anything but trivial since the spending is allocated to different budgets and incurred on all administration levels. Moreover, federal spending does not include the costs of states and municipalities that exceed the relief granted by the federal government. Figure 26 shows the costs of the federal, state and municipal government as well as those of social security in a graphic. It also aims to underscore that the depicted total spending does not represent additional expenditures resulting from the high immigration levels of asylum-seekers in 2015/16, but takes into account all expenses in the refugee migration context.⁵⁷ For instance, significant funding had already been used and planned in the different segments. Furthermore, the spending for child care or the provision of social housing does not exclusively benefit asylum-seekers.

This Chapter is divided into the following sections: First, it depicts the direct spending in the

refugee migration context and discusses the relief granted to states and municipalities. Next, it addresses the impact on social security and finally, it identifies the long-term fiscal consequences.

Direct Fiscal Costs

Based on the system used by the German Minister of Finance, there is a distinction between spending aiming to combat the causes of flight and domestic funding. The latter item comprises costs that are paid directly by the federal government and of items paid to provide relief to the states and municipalities. In 2018, the total of asylum-related expenses paid by the federal government amounted to about EUR 23 billion or 6.8 percent of the total federal spending (see Figure 27). The costs of combating the causes of flight, totaled EUR 7.9 billion. This amount thus exceeded the forecast by 1 billion. The domestic spending totaled EUR 15.1 billion, EUR 7.5 billion of which were paid to the states and municipalities to relieve their budgets.

The anticipated costs in 2019 are estimated to come in at around the same levels as they did in recent years. Expenses of EUR 13.0 billion are slated to go to domestic spending, while EUR 6.9 billion will be provided to combat the causes of flight. Across all of the years in review, they were among the primary cost items. When statistical tracking began in 2016, the relief granted to states and municipalities made up the largest amount. In 2019, the share of this cost item will likely be

⁵⁷ Federal Accounting Office (2018). Final Memorandum to the BMF on the Audit of Refugee Funding Paid by the Federal Government.

around EUR 6.1 billion.⁵⁸ Integration and especially social transfer benefits that are directly affiliated with the positive outcome of asylum applications, a greater need was not identified until some time had passed. The Minister of Finance makes a similar assumption as the Federal Labor Agency and the Job Market and Vocational Research Institute (see Chapter Job Market), when it concludes that the integration of asylum-seekers, despite the high demand for workers, will be a gradual process.⁵⁹ The consequence of this is that the integration and in particular social expenditures, which currently total more than EUR 2 and 4 billion, will likely remain at high levels. The costs of acceptance, registration and housing during the asylum application process remain at a consistent annual level of around EUR 1 billion. In addition to the previously described expenses, more funding for national security will be provided in the future according to the Minister of Finance and the Minister of the Interior.⁶⁰

The Costs of Combating the Causes of Flight

A major portion of the federal funding budgeted by the Minister of Finance in connection with refugees and asylum was spent on combating the causes of flight in all reporting years. In the time span 2016 through 2022, the estimated total is EUR 47 billion. These costs include measures that restrict irregular migration, such as the creation of residency perspectives in the countries of origin. The aim is to achieve the former primarily through the improvement of the economic situation of people in these countries. This includes the making available of educational and employment options or the improvement of the local infrastructure. The main recipients of funding,

besides Syria's neighboring countries (Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey) are Iraq, Afghanistan and some African nations.⁶¹

Germany in particular made contributions to the EU-Turkey-Compact, which had a sustained impact on migration into Europe. In fiscal year 2016, it contributed EUR 127 million, in 2017 188 million, in 2018 95 million and 2019 18 million in bi-lateral funding to Turkey.⁶² Spending USD 396 million, Germany was also the third largest provider of funding to the budget of the UN refugee aid organization UNHCR. Hence, Germany tripled its contribution over the past four years, ranking behind the United States and the EU. Based on contributions per capita, Germany ranked tenth in the world with a contribution of approximately USD 5 per resident.⁶³ To effectively combat the causes of flight that prompt people in war and crises zones to leave, it is also one of the primary responsibilities of politicians to diplomatically support processes working towards peace.

On the European level, the budget of the Frontex border protection agency has been significantly increased in recent years. The boost in funding aims at expanding the competences, staff and step-by-step independent action capabilities of Frontex. Protecting the EU's exterior borders is essential as it prevents illegal border crossings and maintains the freedom of movement within the Schengen territory (see Chapter on the Evolution of Migration).

THE
330 mn
EURO FRONTEX BUDGET IS
ALMOST DOUBLE OF WHAT IT
WAS IN 2015.

58 This includes compensation funds of EUR 1 billion for social housing, which are not reported in the statement of the German Minister of Finance (Monthly Report April 2019).

59 Federal Minister of Finance (2018b). Federal Financial Forecast 2018.


60 Federal Minister of Finance (2018a). Refugee-related Costs in the Federal Budget 2017 through 2022.

61 Forichon (2018). Financing Refugee Hosting Contexts: An Analysis of the DAC's Contribution to Burden- and Responsibility-Sharing in Supporting Refugees and Their Host Communities..

62 Printed Publication of the German Bundestag 19/3648 of 31st July 2018.

63 Donor Profiles. UNHCR website. <http://reporting.unhcr.org/donor-profiles>, accessed on 4th June 2019.

Figure 26:
Simplified Schematic Depiction of the Overall Economic
Asylum-related Expenses Based on Responsible Payer



Note: The term “Relief to the states and municipalities by the federal government” is called “Relief to states and communities by the federal government” in this Chapter.

Source: In-house assessment.

7.9 bn

EUROS FOR THE COMBATING OF
CAUSES OF FLIGHT IN 2018.


4.5 %

SHARE OF DOMESTIC SERVICES
PROVIDED FOR THE ACCEPTANCE OF
ASYLUM-SEEKERS IN THE OVERALL
FEDERAL SPENDING IN 2018.

ABOUT 100 bn

EUROS WILL LIKELY BE PROVIDED BY
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FROM 2015
THROUGH 2020 THAT ARE AFFILIATED
WITH ASYLUM-RELATED IMMIGRATION.

Figure 27:
Asylum-related benefits paid by the federal government (in billion Euros)



Note: As of 2019, the figures in this list are forecasts. Data for the planned relief paid to states and communities starting in 2020 are not yet available.

Sources: Financial Forecast of the Federal Minister of Finance 2018b and Printed Publication of the German Bundestag 19/10650; in-house calculations.

Relief for States and Municipalities

In Germany, the states bear a vast portion of the burden related to the acceptance and integration of asylum-seekers. However, in many cases, the municipalities initially take on a lot of this burden. They provide medium-term housing, they disburse funding to assist with the cost of living and healthcare and they assist refugees with the integration into society. To enable these communities to handle these diverse tasks effectively, temporary funding support was initially necessary, especially in 2015 and 2016, when immigration surged. Based on federal legislation, the states are actually responsible for the provision of adequate funding to the municipalities. However, given that the acceptance and integration of refugees is considered a national matter, the federal government has been providing relief in this context since 2016. The states are granted relief first and are tasked with allocating funding to the municipalities.

In 2016, relief funding paid to states and municipalities totaled EUR 9.3 billion and dropped to EUR 6.6 billion in 2017. In 2018, the federal government reimbursed EUR 7.5 billion to the states. Relief for disbursed social security benefits pursuant to the AsylbLG make up one of the key individual items (see Figure 28). The relief amount of EUR 670 per person and processing month and the one-time amount of EUR 670 for negative outcomes are both based on the average costs accrued by an asylum-seeker in 2014. The cost of benefits pursuant to the AsylbLG is retroactively calculated on the basis of the actual number of recipients.

The lump sum payment for integration is another significant part of the relief paid to the states. It is allocated to the states based on their total population count and initially was limited to a total of EUR 2.0 billion per annum from 2016 through 2018. In the interim this amount has been increased to EUR 2.4 billion and has been extended by another year. The same is true for the absorption of the costs for housing and heating through federal funding. This measure aims

at the provision of compensation municipalities incur for housing and heating provided to recipients for basic needs pursuant to SGB II and XII.⁶⁴ Additional funding of about EUR 1 billion annually was provided for social housing construction and for unaccompanied minor refugees. To guarantee adequate housing and services for minors, the states received financial support for youth support facilities in the amount of EUR 350 million per annum.

Despite billions of federal aid, reports according to which some municipalities received inadequate funding from the states, i.e. that the funds are not fully passed on by the states or that the costs to the municipalities exceed the amounts reimbursed multiple times, are coming in with growing frequency.⁶⁵ Through mid 2019, there was also uncertainty about the share the federal government would absorb for the acceptance and integration of asylum-seekers starting in 2020. Given that the number of asylum applications has dropped significantly in recent years and is now getting closer to the 2014 levels, a new regulation was supposed to be implemented from the perspective of the Federal Minister of Finance. The proposal initially called for the payment of annual lump sum amounts to be reduced step-by-step instead of the individual relief payments. Based on related computations, this would reduce the cost absorption by the federal government to about EUR 1.3 billion per annum.⁶⁶

7.5 bn

EUROS WERE REIMBURSED TO THE STATES AND COMMUNITIES BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN 2018.

⁶⁴ Funding for regular benefits pursuant to SGB II comes from the federal government through the job centers of the Federal Labor Agency.

⁶⁵ German federal government (2019). Report of the federal government on federal measures that support the states and municipalities in refugee and integration spending and the use of funding by the states in 2018.

⁶⁶ Scholz plans to reduce funding for refugee aid – the heads of Germany’s federal states are protesting, in: Handelsblatt of 20st March 2019. <https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/bundeshaushalt-scholz-will-gelder-fuer-fluechtlingshilfe-kuerzen-laenderchefs-laufen-sturm/24123944.html>, accessed on 5th June 2019.

In June 2019, this proposal was retracted and the current provision will remain in place for the time being.⁶⁷

Prior to that, the states and municipalities criticized the proposal. They were concerned that they would be left to handle the integration work on their own. Accordingly, in particular the costs for assistance with housing and heating as well as integration services are still very high. Potential reductions could place the success of integration in jeopardy. Moreover, such measures could lead to municipal tax increases, which could result create a risk for the acceptance of refugees in communities.⁶⁸ On the other hand, the relief granted by the federal government was not available until the special situation since 2015 made it necessary. As the numbers of arrivals decline along with pending proceedings, refugees who have been granted asylum are gradually entering the job market and the regular social security systems. Hence, the pressure on municipalities and state finances has also declined and the urgent need to continue to provide this level of relief to states and municipalities has decreased. In the absence of such relief, the federal (financing) responsibility for the success of integration would be amplified.

Impact on Social Security

The congruence of a well-functioning social system with the acceptance of refugees remains a controversial issue, given the concerns that the German social system could be destabilized. Figures are now available that describe the effects of immigration on the most important social security systems. They include benefits paid in accordance with the Asylum Applicant Benefits Act (AsylbLG), the basic insurance for job seekers pursuant to SGB II (Hartz IV), statutory health insurance and statutory retirement insurance.

Social benefits for asylum-seekers are governed by the AsylbLG. Besides individuals in pending asylum proceedings (first time and follow-up applications), these benefits are available to tolerated immigrants, those who have received executable orders to leave the country and spouses, life partners and children of these eligible individuals.⁶⁹ The aforementioned groups are considered in need of help since they have barely any adequate income or savings. The entitlement to benefits pursuant to the AsylbLG expires for many asylum-seekers once they have been approved for asylum. At that point, they are either responsible for their own incomes or, if necessary, have the option to apply for basic benefits pursuant to SGB II and XII.

The scope of social benefits pursuant to the AsylbLG is based on what is considered the minimum required to ensure dignified living conditions and covers the asylum-seekers essential personal needs. This means that the regular benefits paid to a representative person are still 10 percent below the benefit scope of the German basic minimum.⁷⁰ However, compared to other European countries, the benefits granted in Ger-

⁶⁷ Refugee spending blows up the federal budget, in: FAZ.net of 6th June 2019. <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/bund-und-laender-einigen-sich-auf-fluechtlingsfinanzierung-16225228.html>, accessed on 11th June 2019.

⁶⁸ The cost of integration: Laschet criticizes refugee aid reductions, in: FAZ.net of 19th March 2019. <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/fluechtlingshilfen-laschet-kritisiert-scholz-16096614.html>, accessed on 5th June 2019.

⁶⁹ Federal Statistics Office (2018f). Social Benefits Paid to Asylum Applicants in 2017.

⁷⁰ As of the 16th month of eligibility for regular benefits, the scope of the benefits is adjusted to the basic coverage pursuant to SGB XII, which translates into an increase. Those who have orders to leave the country and eligible individuals who violate mandates, are subject to reduced benefits.

many are still quite high.⁷¹ The reductions implemented since 1993, aimed at limiting the incentives for asylum immigration into Germany and prevent misuse. The efforts of the German government to reduce the benefits paid to those living in group housing facilities within the scope of the AsylbLG, failed in the spring of 2019 because the states raised objections.⁷² Principally, asylum applicant benefits increase since they are adjusted to rising prices just like the basic benefits. The most recent adjustment was made in 2019 in conjunction with the Migration Package.

Through 2009, the number of benefit recipients declined, which also reduced the expenses pursu-


ant to the AsylbLG (see Figure 29). Recipient numbers did not grow again until 2010 and reached their peak in 2015. Spending increased through 2016, although the number of recipients was already declining. This is the result of a statistical recording deficit in 2015, when the large number of asylum-seekers made the timely recording of the spending and costs impossible.⁷³ Increased rents and cost intensive temporary (group) housing are other reasons for the disproportional cost increase. In 2017, the total benefit spending pursuant to AsylbLG amounted to EUR 5.6 billion. Hence, these costs decreased by around 38 percent compared to the previous year. These benefits are funded by the states and municipalities, which have received relief from the federal government since 2016 based on a final settlement. The federal government reimbursed lump-sum amounts of EUR 670 per person and

71 Comparison of Refugee Benefits in the EU, in: Deutsche Welle of 19th June 2018. <https://www.dw.com/de/leistungen-für-flüchtlinge-im-eu-vergleich/a-44287802>, accessed on 28th June 2018.

72 Asylum Applicant Benefits Act: Bundesrat stops the Bundestag, in: tagesschau.de of 10th March 2019. <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/sozialleistungen-asylbewerber-101.html>, accessed on 5th June 2019.

73 Federal Statistics Office (2018f). Social Benefits Paid to Asylum Applicants in 2017.

Figure 28:
Relief paid to states and communities



Note: Only the annual estimates are provided for 2017 and 2018. The peak statements pursuant to the AsylbLG are not yet available. The amounts refer to the total relief paid to all states. Item "Other relief" refers to funds provided to improve childcare and the lump sum benefit for unaccompanied minor refugees.

Sources: Printed Publications of the German Bundestag 18/12688, 19/2499 and 19/10650; in-house calculations and in-house assessments.

process month and a one-time identical amount for those who are denied asylum. In conjunction with this, the federal government reimbursed about EUR 1.2 billion in 2017 and another billion after the final settlement in 2018. The states and municipalities funded the rest of these costs on their own. A more concise allocation is not available in the official statistics.

The total spending in conjunction with the AsylbLG can be divided into three categories. Basic benefits describe regular benefits for nutrition, housing and other use and consumption goods. Cost of living aid is the additional benefit, which, as of the 16th month, is based on the basic living benefit amount. Special benefits are primarily healthcare and care benefits.

At the end of 2017, 469,000 beneficiaries were paid under the AsylbLG. About two thirds of the recipients were male (309,000), close to 4 percent had (part time) jobs (17,000) and close to a third were still minors (140,000). According to the submitted asylum applications, most of the recipients pursuant to the AsylbLG came from Afghanistan (83,000), Iraq (45,000) and Syria (29,000). However, more than 94,000 beneficiaries from Europe, i.e. about 20 percent, received asylum applicant benefits. This group is still constituted of many immigrants from the West Balkans, Russia and Turkey. Compared to the year prior, this number dropped by close to 36 percent for the second time in a row. This decline is directly related to the drop in asylum applications and completed asylum processes.⁷⁴ However, tolerated immigrants and individuals who have received executable deportation orders are still eligible for benefits upon completion of the process. In 2017, the groups made up 14.4 resp. 3.8 percent of the recipients of asylum applicant benefits (see Figure 30). This is the likely reason why cost of living aid has increased by about 70 percent compared to 2016 while spending on basic benefits declined by about 55 percent. Hence, in 2017 cost of living aid benefits made up a significantly larger portion of

the benefits. A normalization is evident if one makes distinctions based on the length of the benefit payments. The number of those who have been receiving asylum applicant benefits for only a short time has declined considerably. In 2016, asylum processes that took a long time led to an increase of cases in which beneficiaries received benefits for more than twelve months. At the end of 2017, the number was much lower while the number of long-term recipients did not simultaneously increase.


As described above, asylum-seekers do not receive regular German social benefits for quite some time, given that they are first covered by the AsylbLG. Only once their asylum applications have been approved, are they eligible for regular benefits under basic coverage pursuant to SGB II and XII.⁷⁵ The number of individuals eligible for regular benefits from the Asylum-8-Countries in basic coverage does therefore not increase until they have spent a certain amount of time in the country (see Figure 32).⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Federal Statistics Office (2018h). CORRECTION Asylum Applicant Benefits 2017: Around 469 000 eligible individuals.

⁷⁵ The analysis and figures are based on the basic coverage for job seekers pursuant to SGB II. Only a relatively small percentage of refugees currently receive basic coverage for retirees or those affected by an existing disability pursuant to SGB XII.

⁷⁶ While the AsylbLG statistics include asylum applicants and tolerated immigrants from all nations, the refugees cohort of those receiving basic coverage benefits can only be determined approximately through the declaration of those eligible for benefits from non-European asylum countries of origin.


Figure 29:
Gross spending and recipients within the scope of AsylbLG



Note: Gross spending is reported in bn. EUR in the left-hand scale and recipients are shown in the right-hand scale. Recipients of asylum applicant benefits are reported as of 31st December of the given year.

Source: Federal Statistics Office 2018g.

Figure 30:
Recipients of social security benefits pursuant to AsylbLG based on residency status



Note: Asylum applicant benefits recipients are reported as of 31st December of the given year.

Source: Federal Statistics Office 2018g.


Given that the employment of many asylum-seekers proves to be difficult due to lack of language and professional skills, a disproportionate number of them initially receives the basic benefits for job seekers. Based on the asylum applicant benefits payments a large percentage - about a third - of those receiving basic benefits are minors. At the end of 2018, about a million Asylum-8-Country nationals were dependent on basic benefits. The largest increase by 49,000 was recorded in December 2016. Despite continued immigration from the Asylum-8-Countries, the number of immigrants receiving basic benefits has been declining since 2018. The aid quota, i.e. the percentage of beneficiaries receiving regular benefits compared to the number of immigrants from these countries was around 62 percent. Compared to the year prior, the quota fell by around 2 percentage points. As a result of the acceptance of refugees in basic coverage an in-

creasing number of people are living off of basic coverage despite the intact German job market - in particular young people. Job market policy tools are being deployed to ensure that refugees do not remain dependent on these benefits in the long-term.

The costs expended on regular benefits under the basic coverage model for the unemployed are funded by the federal government through the job centers of the Federal Labor Agency. Housing and heating costs are covered by the municipalities with the assistance of the federal government. In 2018, lump sum relief payments totaled EUR 1.3 billion.

From the perspective of the Spitzenverband Bund der Krankenkassen (Health Insurance Plan Alliance), asylum-seekers do receive appropriate healthcare in Germany without imposing finan-

Figure 31:
Recipients of social security benefits pursuant to AsylbLG based on the duration of benefit payments to date in months



Note: Asylum applicant benefits recipients are reported as of 31st December of the given year.

Sources: Federal Statistics Office 2018g; in-house calculations, own assessment.

cial burdens on statutory health insurance plans. Those who receive benefits pursuant to the AsylbLG, are granted access to the basic health benefits, but are initially not covered by the statutory health insurance underwriters. The granting of healthcare benefits is a discretionary service provided by the competent municipal authorities. As of the 16th month of receiving benefits, asylum-seekers are given virtually equivalent access to statutory health insurance along with the adjustment of their asylum applicant benefits. Their health insurance premiums are paid by the payers of their asylum applicant benefits, so that the statutory health insurance underwriters do not incur any additional burdens.⁷⁷ They do not actually join the statutory health insurance plan until they have been approved for asylum.

The future feasibility of Germany's statutory retirement insurance model is primarily at risk because of the demographic developments. Many German baby boomers are about to reach retirement age. Hence, it must be anticipated that the number of working age residents will drop significantly in the near future. At a first glance, it would seem that increased immigration numbers may counteract this problem. The allocation system ensures that every time a new premium payer is added, retirement insurers receives additional income, which reduces the pressure caused by funding bottlenecks. In particular the relatively young average age of the asylum-seekers and the fact that most of them are working age immigrants, can at least reduce the constraints in the medium-term, provided that expeditious and sustainable job market integration can be achieved.⁷⁸

Besides the demographic development, it makes sense to take a look at the pension entitlements and the social security situation of asylum seekers who are retirees. Based on the equivalency principle in effect in Germany, refugees who have reached retirement eligibility based on age, receive a pension if they made sufficient contributions while working and had insurance for a sufficient length of time. If they don't meet these requirements, they would receive the regular benefits of basic coverage at that age pursuant to SGB XII. In 2016, the number

of Asylum-8-Country insured individuals under the statutory retirement insurance plan rose by close to 63 percent.⁷⁹ However, at the end of 2016, only 31 percent of these individuals had mandatory insurance. Yet most of them - 63 percent - were awarded only so-called credit times as a result of the benefits they received through basic coverage, which will have little positive impact on pensions. Moreover, only about 20 percent of the women had mandatory insurance compared to 35 percent of the men. Likewise, there were distinct variances between the countries of origin. The largest group - Syrians - had the lowest percentage of people with mandatory insurance (12 percent). Also, the average estimated annual incomes of immigrants from all Asylum-8-Countries who had employment incomes, was very low at EUR 11,900.

The longer these disparities with regard to the number of those holding mandatory insurance and wages compared to locals exist, the lower the pension entitlements of future retired refugees will be. To ensure long-term successful societal integration, this development should be averted. This once again underscores the importance of


31 %
ONLY ABOUT
OF IMMIGRANTS FROM ASYLUM-8-
COUNTRIES WERE ENROLLED IN
MANDATORY INSURANCE AND AC-
QUIRING RETIREMENT INSURANCE
ENTITLEMENTS IN 2016.

77 Focus: Asylum Applicants/Refugees. Website of the GKV-Spitzenverband. https://www.gkv-spitzenverband.de/gkv_spitzenverband/presse/fokus/fluechtlinge_asylbewerber/fluechtlinge.jsp, accessed on 31st March 2019.

78 Vogt and Althammer (2015). Immigration to Germany: Macro-economic Scenario Analysis of the Impact of Increased Migration on the Senior Quotient and Premiums to Statutory Retirement Insurance.

79 The German Retirement Insurance statistics do not only distinguish between the asylum status of the insured. The optimum distinction can only be made for those from the Asylum-8-Countries. See German Retirement Insurance (2018). Insured Individuals Report 2018: Statistic Analyses of the Insured under the German Retirement Insurance Plan.

Figure 32:
Eligible immigrants from Asylum-8-Countries for regular benefits under SGB II



Sources: Federal Labor Agency 2019b and Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees 2019a; in-house calculation, in-house assessment.

asylum-seeker integration into the job market and into employment situations that render them subject to mandatory social security insurance with respective wages. From the overall economic perspective, a further negative trend for the sustainability of the funding for statutory retirement insurance is anticipated as a result of asylum-related immigration. The reasons cited are once again the two elementary levers - the premium amounts, which is based on gross income and the anticipated duration of premium payments.⁸⁰ Other calculations show that it is not possible to expect permanent relief for the funding of the German retirement insurance system from the volume of temporary migration observed, regardless of the qualifications of the im-

migrants.⁸¹ A financial stabilization of the statutory retirement insurance model can likely only be attained through the permanent immigration of qualified individuals and sustainable retirement policies. Consequently, from the perspective of the Expert Council for the Evaluation of the Overall Economic Development (SVR Wirtschaft) sustained high immigration rates of individuals who can be quickly integrated into the job market, is indispensable for the safeguarding of wealth in Germany. A distinction between asylum-related and income-related qualified immigration will also have to be made.⁸²

⁸⁰ Raffelhüsch (2018). Introduction: Open Borders or Generous Social State: Is it Impossible to Have Both?!

⁸¹ Vogt and Althammer (2015). Immigration to Germany: Macro-economic Scenario Analysis of the Impact of Increased Migration on the Senior Quotient and Premiums to Statutory Retirement Insurance.

⁸² SVR Wirtschaft (2018). Annual Evaluation 2018/19.

Funding of Asylum-related Spending

The asylum-related funding makes up around 6 percent of the German federal budget or 0.6 percent of the gross domestic product. This is a challenge for the medium-term financial planning of the federal government. No new debt had to be accrued to fund the ongoing expenses to date, since the spending could be covered by the high amount of surplus generated by the current federal households. Most of the municipal and state households also generated surpluses - some of them thanks to relief provided by the federal government. Hence, the public budgets were not strained. Based on the positive budgetary situation and the economic development in the past few years, a special reserve, which is referred to as the refugee reserve, could be accrued on the federal level, which currently totals EUR 35.2 billion. Hence, this reserve currently equals around 10 percent of the annual federal budget. Since 2016, generated budget surpluses were added to this reserve to manage the longer-term costs affiliated with the acceptance and integration of asylum-seekers. Given that the reported costs were already declining, it was anticipated that the reserve will likely not be needed for the intended purpose and that it will be possible to fund the additional costs from the current budgets.⁸³

Considering the demographic development and the interest that has to be paid on existing public debt, it would certainly make sense from an economic perspective to dissolve the reserve and use it to reduce the debt. After the reduction of the growth budget for 2019, it is likely that the tax revenues will drop as well. Based on the initial figures, the German Minister of Finance is thus planning to make withdrawals from the refugee reserve in the years to come. The maximum amount that can be withdrawn is equivalent to the spending incurred in the refugee migration context. Plans call for the withdrawal of EUR 5.5 billion in 2019; 9.8 billion

in 2020, 12.4 billion in 2021 and 7.5 billion in 2022.⁸⁴ As a result, the reserve would be consumed by 2022.

Long-term Effects

The Malteser Migration Report 2017 explained the long-term effects of the acceptance of refugees from the financial sciences perspective. According to this report, asylum-seekers would translate into an additional burden for the welfare state if the immigrant potential could not be productively integrated into the job market. In several cases, the models were based on sustained high net immigration from asylum countries of origin of 200,000 immigrants per annum.

At this point, it can already be concluded that this number - at least for 2017, 2018 and 2019 - was too high (see Chapter on the Evolution of Migration), so that the effects have been overestimated. Moreover, the integration of refugees into the workforce from the perspective of the SVR Wirtschaft is evolving more rapidly as suggested in the forecast models (see Chapter on the Job Market).⁸⁵ This further reduces the fiscal effects, which were already assessed as tenable.

⁸⁴ German Finance Minister (2019). Corner Stone Resolution passed by the German federal government in reference to the 2020 Federal Budget Bill and the 2019-2023 Financial Forecast.

⁸⁵ SVR Wirtschaft (2018). Jahresgutachten 2018/19.

⁸³ German Federal Bank (2018). Monthly Report November; Independent Advisory Board of the Stability Council (2017). 8th Commentary of the Advisory Board 12/2017.



Eleven women and nine men, shown here amid the organization team, participate in advanced training as “psycho-social counselors” in Rostock.

Refugees as Psycho-social Counselors: “He’s one of us, he’ll understand me.”

By Joanna Figgen

Refugee housing employees are confronted with the question how they can provide more help and support to refugees every single day. “Many people are unable to simply continue their lives here from one day to the next, since they haven’t had a chance to process a lot of things,” observes Charleen Brüggmann, a Malteser Werke staff member in Rostock. Here in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the Malteser organization is currently the largest operator of refugee group housing facilities.

Hence, the Catholic aid organization has launched a pilot program in partnership with

the non-profit organization “Ipso” (the name is short for International Psycho-social Organization) in February 2019: Together they are training refugees as psycho-social counselors over the course of a year. It will be the responsibility of these counselors to speak to refugees who have not been able to process the trauma of fleeing, in their shared native language and relate to them more effectively thanks to their joint cultural backgrounds. Charleen Brüggmann explains: “You can have doctors with the best possible education attempt to talk to a refugee; however, if the person won’t open up, the medical professional will not make any headway.”



Malteser Project Manager
Charleen Brüggmann and Training
Manager Lothar Dunkel.

The training begins with an intense phase that lasts three months, during which the participants e.g. familiarize themselves with psychological fundamentals to better comprehend stress responses and reactions to difficult life situations. A nine month practice period follows, which is accompanied by trainers and supervisors in face-to-face conversations with the individual trainees and weekly seminar days. During the practice phase, the new psycho-social counselors already meet with their refugee clients. The quality of the counseling sessions is always guaranteed. “We pay very close attention to make sure that we meet the responsibility mandates. The risk of suicide, for instance, is a separate topic in our training program. In these cases, our counselors know that they have to contact us, the supervisors right away,” says training manager Lothar Dunkel, the former head of the School Psychology Department in Münster.


Counselors with Great Personal Strength and Life Force

To be able to do their future work, the counselors have to be emotionally stable, since they will sometimes be confronted with matters that are similar to their own experiences. Consequently, the training plan bets on vast first-hand experience and self reflection. “If I were to tell

you the life stories of many of the people in the course, you would wonder how they are even able to sit up straight in a chair and smile. They have lived through things we couldn’t even come up with in our dreams,” observes Lothar Dunkel.

This is another reason why the participants had to go through a multi-phase application process prior to starting the course. Besides good language and intellectual skills, motivation, stress management capabilities and empathy are also prerequisites. The group in Rostock has other unique character traits in Lothar Dunkel’s eyes: “The participants we have chosen for this class are incredibly strong. They have great personal strength, a life force and a will to survive, that’s just amazing.”

One of the 20 participants is Dr. Farooq Ibad. “If I’ll have the chance to help people – regardless of whether it happens in Germany or in Afghanistan – it will be an honor for me,” says the man from Afghanistan in English. According to Charleen Brüggmann, the demand is enormous: “To cover all the needs for support, we will definitely need more psycho-social counseling.”

A photograph of a man from the waist up, wearing a light blue t-shirt and dark blue jeans. His hands are cuffed behind his back with metal handcuffs. The background is slightly blurred, showing some greenery and a wooden structure.

Crime – Migration and Felonies



Crime – Migration and Felonies

Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Lars P. Feld, Patrick Hirsch, Katharina Pfeil

There is still a great disparity between the subjective perception of security and objective security situation, i.e. registered crime, in Germany.⁸⁶ Not only in the context of migration, but also in general, Germany is a much safer place than a large part of the population imagines.⁸⁷ The participation of immigrants in crimes ultimately also gets a lot of attention as a result of media reports. Sometimes background information that is important to assess the situation is not taken into account.

Taking a different look at the criminal statistics accrued by law enforcement and reported by the Bundeskriminalamt (PKS), this Chapter first examines the current situation and the development of crime in Germany since 2015/16. The PKS lists all infractions that have been reported to the police, based on categories of crimes and suspects, across one-year-periods. However, the statistic has its weak points that limit its value as a reliable source of information (see text box PKS). The listing based on crimes underscores the areas where preventative action must be taken. Next, this article will take a closer look at the countries of origin and the socio-demographic backgrounds of the asylum-seeking suspects. In closing, it depicts the development of hate crimes directed at foreigners.

All of the figures provided below do not include crimes against immigration laws, since they can only be committed by foreigners. This includes “Crimes Against the Residence, Asylum and Liberal Cross Border Travel Act/EU,” which make up at least 10 percent of the crimes committed by asylum seekers. The distinction from

general criminality achieved makes it possible to compare the number of cases with those committed by the German population.

IN **10 %**

OF ALL CASES IN WHICH ASYLUM-SEEKERS MAKE APPEARANCES AS SUSPECTS, THE ALLEGATIONS REFER TO VIOLATIONS OF IMMIGRATION LAWS.

5.4 mn

CRIMES WERE REGISTERED IN 2018, WHICH TRANSLATES INTO A DECLINE OF 3.4% COMPARED TO 2017.

30.5 %

NON-GERMANS WERE SUSPECTS IN THE GENERAL CRIME STATISTICS FOR 2018.

⁸⁶ German Federal Police (2019a). The German Victimization Survey 2017.

⁸⁷ Feltes et al. (2018). The Fear of Foreigners. Criminal Fears and Insecurity Perceptions in the Context of Migration and Flight Research Status.

Suspect Statistic of the Law Enforcement Crime Statistic (PKS)

The PKS suspect statistic is the most important crime statistic in Germany. However, its meaningfulness is limited because of a few weaknesses. First and foremost, it is what German law enforcement calls a Hellfeld-Statistik (light field statistic), which includes only solved or reported crimes. Dark field crimes are illegal acts and felonies law enforcement is not aware of, i.e. those that have not been reported or remain undiscovered. Figures gleaned for anonymous surveys indicate that dark field crimes still make up a significant part of criminal activity and that reporting patterns and thus coverage are only improving very gradually.⁸⁸ Second, because it is a suspect statistic, it only lists suspects. It is the responsibility of the courts to determine who the perpetrators are. Hence, it is not a given that all individuals listed in this statistic have actually committed crimes. This means that in some cases, an indictment does not occur and in others, there is no conviction or sentence imposed. Third, the PKS likely attributes too much importance to aggravated crimes, because they are more likely

to be reported than less serious crimes.⁸⁹ Fourth, the PKS is what is called a situational snapshot of the respective reporting year. It factors in attempted and concluded criminal acts the police was aware of and that have been transferred to the district attorney's office. Crimes that result in lengthy investigations are added to the PKS after a delay. For instance, about 25 percent of the crimes included in the 2018 PKS were actually committed in 2017 or earlier.⁹⁰ Fifth - suspects accused of multiple crimes are added to the statistic just once. As a result, the statistic of suspects provides only an incomplete overview of all crimes. Sixth, only a limited amount of more thorough information about the suspects is available. For example, it is not possible to compare the number of non-German suspects with foreigners living in Germany, since the statistic also includes foreigners who stay in Germany only temporarily, such as tourists.

88 Enzmann (2015). Reporting patterns and law enforcement registration practices.

89 Walburg (2019). Migration and crime – complex interdependencies and differentiating findings.

90 Federal Criminal Police (2019b). Crime in the Immigration Context.

Development of Crime

Crime, based on all registered criminal acts, is on the decline in Germany in the medium-term. While close to 6 million felonies were recorded by law enforcement in 2009, the number had dropped to around 5.4 million in 2018. Compared to the previous year, it dropped by 3.4 percent. This development is also evident from the number of registered subjects per annum (see Figure 33). In 2018, a total of 1.93 million suspects were investigated. Of them 1.34 million or 69.5 percent were German citizens; 0.59 million or 30.5 percent were non-Germans. The latter number includes all suspects who do not have German citizenship, including those who

have been living in Germany for decades as well as refugees or tourists. The 30.5 percent share indicates that the share of non-German suspects was considerably higher than the percentage of the overall population of Germany made up by foreigners living in Germany, which is 12 percent. As far as the allocation of these shares is concerned, it must be taken into account that in the PKS non-Germans are overrepresented, given that all individuals who are in Germany temporarily are also included in this statistic. Moreover, there are indications that the reporting quota is higher if the criminals are allegedly foreigners (in particular when it comes to serious crimes, such as sexually mo-

tivated crimes or homicides).⁹¹ On the other hand, the Experts Council of German Integration and Migration Foundations (SVR Migration) presumes that the PKS underestimates the extent of crimes involving non-German suspects because of multiple crimes. The PKS counts every suspect only once, even if this person has committed multiple crimes.⁹²

As far as the making of associations between immigration by asylum-seekers and crime is concerned, it is of particular importance to differentiate between the reasons for being in the

country.⁹³ Not all asylum-seekers are individuals who immigrated since 2015, given that a distinction based on the time the asylum-seekers have been in the country cannot be made on the basis of the PKS data. In 2018, a total of 166,000 asylum-seekers were crime suspects, which is equivalent to a share of 8.6 percent of all suspects. Hence, asylum-seekers were identified as suspects at a higher rate than their 2 percent share of the overall population would suggest.⁹⁴ Asylum-seekers and non-German suspects both share the parameters of being more frequently


91 Pfeiffer et al. (2018). The Evolution of Violence in Germany.

92 SVR Migration (2019b). Annual Evaluation 2019.

93 This Chapter uses the terms "asylum-seekers suspected of crimes" and "suspected asylum-seekers" synonymously. They are used in place of the "Immigrants" category in the PKS. This category includes those in pending asylum proceedings, with approved asylum status, tolerated immigrants as well as individuals who are staying in Germany illegally.

94 Regardless of the statistic this is based on (asylum-seekers or based on the number of asylum applications 2015–2018).

Figure 33:
Evolution of the number of all reported crimes in one year in Germany



Note: Since reporting year 2018, the term asylum-seekers includes all suspects registered in Germany under residency reason asylum applicant, asylum eligible, contingent refugees listed in the PKS.

Source: PKS German Criminal Police 2019c.

listed as subjects who have committed multiple crimes than Germans and that they are reported more frequently.⁹⁵

In the peak immigration years 2015/16, the number of suspect asylum-seekers increased significantly. However, this trend did not continue. In fact, the opposite is true: The number of suspected asylum-seekers dropped by 4.1 percent from 2016 to 2017. It continued to decline by another 0.9 percent from 2017 to 2018. In the reviewed period, it is however only possible to compare the figures of non-German and asylum-seeking suspects within certain limits, since the population representing these groups did change considerably in Germany during this period. The increase of the number of suspected asylum-seekers in 2015/16 can likely be attributed especially to their significantly increased population numbers. Investigations show that the share of immigrants among suspects can be referenced to suspects staying in Germany for longer periods of time.⁹⁶ This is reflected in the PKS: Compared to 2017, besides the number of suspected asylum-seekers, the number of suspected non-Germans also declined (by about 2 percent). This is remarkable, given that the respective population groups grew during the same period.

Figure 34 depicts with regard to 2018, how many suspects within a group were under investigation based on specific crimes. Most of the suspects in all groups were held responsible for violent crimes, including primarily physical injury. Around 60,000 asylum-seekers were suspected of having committed such crimes (Figure 34 left). As previously described, non-Germans and asylum-seekers are on average more frequently suspected of crimes. Based on the distribution of crimes among German suspects as a reference, it is possible to identify the categories of crimes, in which non-Germans and asylum-seekers are

suspected in higher or lower numbers.⁹⁷ Asylum-seekers were in particular suspected of crimes in the category of violent acts with greater frequency (Figure 34 right). Their relative share was the highest in the segment of crimes such as homicide or sexually motivated crimes.

8.6 %

WAS THE PERCENTAGE OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS SUSPECTED OF CRIMES IN THE GENERAL CRIMES STATISTICS FOR 2018.

0.9 %


WAS THE DECREASE RATE OF THE NUMBER OF SUSPECTS AMONG ASYLUM-SEEKERS IN 2018 COMPARED TO 2017.

⁹⁵ Federal Criminal Police (2019b). Crime in the Immigration Context.; Pfeiffer et al. (2018). The Evolution of Violence in Germany.

⁹⁶ Walburg (2019). Migration and Crime – Complex Interdependencies and Differentiating Findings.

⁹⁷ These calculations are based on the method used in the Annual Evaluation 2019 of the SVR Migration. The evaluation allows for a depiction regardless of the absolute number of cases.

Figures 34:
Suspects Based on Categories of Crimes in 2018



Socio-demographics and Residency Perspective of Asylum-seeking Suspects


The relationships between migration and crime are multi-layered. The comparison of shares of suspects should therefore be enhanced by adding the socio-demographic structure and the residency perspectives of the respective group.

The comparison of suspects based on country of origin and share of all asylum seekers shows definitive differences (see Figure 35). The reason is likely inherent in the different residency perspectives. Crime-sociology studies show that low residency perspectives and long waiting periods go hand in hand with high psychic stress. Not receiving a positive asylum notice reduces the opportunities to earn a living through regular

employment. Earning an additional income through criminal acts may offer an alternative.⁹⁸

Considering the share of suspects from different countries based on their residency perspective, this reason appears to be plausible. Of the asylum-seekers suspected of crimes, 36.8 percent hail from the five Asylum-8-Countries - i.e. Syria, Iraq, Iran, Eritrea and Somalia, who, in general have better residency perspectives. Compared to their share among asylum-seekers of 52.9 percent in 2015 through 2018, they were significantly under represented (see Figure 35). In particular asylum seekers from Syria and Iraq were less frequently registered as suspects based on their ratio among asylum-seekers. On the other hand,

⁹⁸ Christ et al. (2017). „All Day Waiting“: Konflikte in Unterkünften von Geflüchteten in NRW.



Note: The dark blue and gray lines indicate whether the persons suspected of a crime are over or under represented when compared to German suspects. Calculated on the basis of the method used in the Annual Evaluation 2019 of the SVR Migration.

Sources: PKS Federal Criminal Police 2019c; in-house calculations, in-house assessment.

7.3 percent of the suspected asylum-seekers came from the North African Maghreb Countries, although their share in the asylum-seeking immigrant community from 2015 through 2018 was just 1.3 percent, i.e. very small. More than 50 percent of the suspected asylum-seekers from Maghreb Nations were actually suspected of multiple crimes.⁹⁹ Likewise, individuals from the other Asylum-8-Countries and the West Balkans, who also have adverse residency perspectives, were more frequently suspected of committed crimes (see Chapter on Asylum Procedures).

The fact that the consideration of the demographic data, such as age and gender, is important for the analysis of the general criminality of asy-

lum-seekers, is evident from the comparison with the local population. Among German and non-German residential population groups, the suspects were largely male among almost all categories of crimes. In 2018, this applied to 73.7 percent of the German and 80.3 percent of the non-German suspects. In accordance with the much higher share of men among asylum-seekers (see Chapter on the Evolution of Migration), asylum-seeking men are suspected of a crime in 86.3 percent of the cases, while women are suspected of crimes in only 13.7 percent of all cases.

53.9%

WERE SUSPECTS FROM THE ASLUM-8-COUNTRIES. ASYLUM APPLICATIONS FROM THESE COUNTRIES MADE UP 68.2% OF ALL APPLICATIONS.

⁹⁹ German Federal Police (2019b). Crime in the Context of Immigration.

With regard to age, the group of suspected asylum-seekers is also distinctly different from all

other suspects. In 2018, by comparison, they were much younger. About 65 percent of all suspected asylum-seekers were younger than 30; while that number was only 40 percent among all suspects. This is not surprising, given that the overall population of asylum-seekers is much younger (see Chapter on the Evolution of Migration).

Figure 37 underscores the relationship between age and criminality.¹⁰⁰ For 2018, all suspects are depicted in relation to the overall population at the respective age in Germany. This Figure shows that young people in Germany are far more frequently suspected of crimes than older men and women. Adolescents and young adults tend to be far more frequently involved in crimes in most countries and societies than older members of the population.¹⁰¹ As far as homicides and sexually motivated crimes are concerned, young people are also more frequently suspects. The statistics are different in the segment of white collar crimes. Usually, older individuals are more represented in this category. Overall, it is safe to say that the asylum seekers living in this country as well as the foreign population is, on average, considerably younger than the German population. This is likely an explanation for the higher crime rates among non-German residents and in particular among asylum-seekers.

The SVR Migration says that the higher crime rates among non-Germans and asylum-seekers cannot be completely explained based on socio-demographics and residency perspectives.¹⁰² Additional factors, such as social background, education and qualifications may also play a role. However, the PKS is not in possession of any data that would make such distinctions possible. Moreover, the reasons for fleeing as well as the experiences during flight have likely left behind

trauma in many cases.¹⁰³ Refugees also find themselves confronted with the challenge to assimilate in a new country with different rules, a different culture and different living situations. Group dynamics, living in close proximity with many others, unstructured daily routines in the group housing facilities amplify frustrations and foster conflicts.¹⁰⁴

The depiction of these backgrounds underscores the importance of successful integration from the perspective of crime prevention. Both sides are responsible for its success. It can be facilitated through adjustments to asylum legislations as well as the engagement of the receiving society. Crime prevention aims at keeping refugees from ending up in the social fringes with lack of perspective and limited education and career opportunities.¹⁰⁵ Expeditious asylum processes and clarity on the residency perspective support this process. The development of crime must be monitored throughout this process, given that rising crime rates among asylum-seekers may be indicators of integration problems.

Development of Hate Crimes Against Foreigners

Crimes subject to mandatory reporting that are politically motivated (PMK) and have right-wing backgrounds remained at the previous year's level in 2018 of around 20,000 cases. Hate crimes motivated by a hostile stance vis-a-vis foreigners, which explicitly targets foreign groups and individuals rose to 7000 cases compared to the year prior (+14.6 percent). After it had more than doubled compared to 2014, the cases of hate crimes against foreigners dropped significantly in 2017 compared to 2015/16 (see Figure 38). Moreover,

100 An analog depiction for non-German suspects cannot be provided because of the data status.

101 Crimes Committed by Adolescents – Facts and Figures Federal Center for Political Education. <https://www.bpb.de/politik/innenpolitik/gangsterlaeufer/203562/zahlen-und-fakten>, accessed on 25th June 2019.


102 SVR Migration (2019b). Annual Evaluation 2019.

103 Richter et al. (2015). Waiting for Asylum: Psychiatric Diagnoses at the Central Reception Facility in Bavaria; Brücker et al. (2019). Second Wave of the IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Survey: Refugees are Making Progress in Language and Employment.

104 Walburg (2019). Migration and Crime – Complex Interdependencies and Differentiating Findings.


105 Walburg (2019). Migration and Crime – Complex Interdependencies and Differentiating Findings.

Figure 35:
Comparison of the percentage of suspects with the percentage of asylum-seekers based on nationalities



Source: PKS Federal Criminal Police 2019c and Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees 2019a; in-house calculations, in-house assessment.

Figure 36:
Suspects by gender in 2018



Source: PKS Federal Criminal Police 2019c.

A TOTAL OF

860**VIOLENT HATE CRIMES AGAINST
FOREIGNERS WERE REPORTED IN
2018.**


in 2018, 860 violent hate crimes against foreigners were registered (+8.3 percent). While this represents a reduction by around 29 percent compared to 2016; the number of cases is still considerably higher than the 520 registered crimes in 2014, and thus at a continued high level.

In 2018, hate crimes against foreigners that explicitly targeted refugees, totaled 1,770 registered cases. This represents a decline by 7.0 percent compared to 2017.¹⁰⁶ The increase of attacks of asylum housing facilities also clearly shows the criminal violence against refugees. In 2015/16,

such crimes also saw a massive increase. While they have dropped by around 80 percent in the past two years to a total of 173 cases in 2018 (see Figure 39), statistically speaking a crime against a housing unit occupied by asylum-seekers occurred every second day in 2018.

¹⁰⁶ Minister of the Interior, Construction and Homeland (2019). Politically Motivated Crime in 2018.


Figure 37:
Relation of suspects to population based on age in 2018



Note: Number of all suspects per 1,000 residents of the same age.

Sources: PKS Federal Criminal Police 2019c and Federal Statistics Office 2018b; in-house calculations; depiction based on Heinz 2016.


Figure 38:
Development of hate crimes against foreigners



Note: Violent hate crimes against foreigners are also referred to as hate-driven violent acts against foreigners.

Source: PMK Minister of the Interior, Construction and Homeland (2019); in-house assessment.

Figure 39:
Crimes against housing facilities for asylum-seekers



Source: PMK Minister of the Interior, Construction and Homeland 2019; in-house assessment.

National Treasure Human Being. Migration and the German Identity

By Prof. Dr. Franziskus Heereman

In Germany, the question as to what defines us as a nation comes up again and again. This question became urgent in recent years, given the large influx of refugees. If the unknown grows, one wonders about the known. And while some opine that a thing called German culture does not exist, a party promoting the mantra that all parties except this party are in the process of abolishing Germany, which is why the mission must be to return to the Germany of our forefathers, was elected into the German parliaments.

Dignity Instead of Values

That's the definition of the extremes. In between that, one hovers around the identity question by calling upon German or European values. However, this is highly problematic. After all, the term value has its roots in economics. Values have a price and the amounts correlate. Ten quarts of milk will buy you a crate of beer. With the wages of a nurse, you can rent a yacht on the Adriatic Sea for a week. Hence values have only a subjective meaning, which is the very reason the economic trade is actually made: At the time, what I buy is more important to me than the object I trade for it. In other words, if the matter in hand is values, there would be nothing that couldn't be conjured up as an equal value. Everything would be negotiable. However, doesn't the question concerning our identity not pertain to the one thing that cannot be negotiated? The one thing that cannot be exchanged for anything else? Yet - how would that work if our identity were rooted in values? Where and how do we find the one thing that is not negotiable? Well, regardless of what role it may play within the scope of personal or club statements inspired

by emotional ups and downs, Germany is, first and foremost a nation. The identity of a nation can be found in its constitution. It is the foundation, which is why it is difficult to amend. Germany's Constitution also has a unique side - it states about its fundamental standards that they cannot be amended at all.¹⁰⁷

At the heart of these basic rules, which, according to the Constitution are not available for any legitimate access, is a term that clearly contradicts the talk about values and its omnipresence in everyday politics must irk the constitutional patriots. Long before value evolved into the dominating ethical term, Kant had a vision of the problem affiliated with it and said: "In the world of purposes, everything either has a price or dignity. Anything that has a price, can be substituted with something else as an equivalent. However, what is superior to any price and thus does not have an equivalent, has its dignity."¹⁰⁸ This means: If we have any foundation beneath our feet, which is not subject to randomness, it's dignity. A value for which there is no other value and, which is therefore beyond all values. And this non-value, which is above any trade, is not a principle, a mentality, a history, a religion, a good trait - it is the living human being: everyone. Every human being stands beyond values; he does not allow an exchangeable value. It has such a strong meaning that it cannot even be offset against his equivalent: It is not permitted to sacrifice one human being to save other human beings. In other words: The human being must

107 The so-called Eternity Clause GG Art. 79 Sect. 3, that prohibits any amendment of the Constitution, among other things with regard to the protection of human dignity.

108 Kant, I. (1968). The Fundamentals of the Metaphysics of Customs. Academy Edition Vol. IV, 434.

not ever be just a means - not for anything. After all, he is his own final purpose, end in itself (known as the second version of Kant's categorical imperative¹⁰⁹).

A purpose is what freedom wants. Freedom includes the option to choose purposes and bring them to fruition. Nevertheless, besides purposes we can choose freely, there are those I am already supposed to pursue since they have already set and because they are purposes as to themselves. They are all humans. Their free existence is not a purpose I can set at will - I have to want it and have to for its sake.

The Minimum National Neutrality Requires is World View Based Determination

This is our foundation and if we do not have it, we do not have any foundation at all. What we have instead is sand drifts made of values that can be offset against each other and the hierarchy of which is random. Yet, this randomness does not lead to more freedom, because it cannot guarantee that it will be honored with absolute respect. Instead, it ultimately means that the strongest will be the winner that takes it all. There is only one principle, which if it is rendered absolute does not make it totalitarian and which it is not rendered absolute leads to totalitarianism: human dignity. That's why tolerance cannot be "the soul of Europe" as the most supreme authorities tell us. Instead, it is an attitude derived from human dignity, which must be justified citing it as the foundation. The fact that it is not the

highest principle is already evident because it cannot be applied to itself nor to its opposite: tolerating tolerance does not suffice; it has to be demanded if it is supposed to be the ruling principle. And its opposite definitely must not be tolerated - intolerant behavior must be prevented. Similar rules apply to national neutrality in world view matters: it is only possible if in virtually all world view issues it is at a minimum based on¹¹⁰ world view based determination. The neutrality the state maintains under the rule of law is rooted in radical partisanship. Bias for the dignity of everyone. If it took a neutral stance vis-a-vis the claim of human dignity from a world view perspective, there would be no reason to defend against the suppression of specific or entire groups. The eye of the needle leading into the vastness of world view based plural community is a decision against world view based neutrality when it comes to the question as to whether human dignity is real and to the prevention of all behavior that opposes it to any relevant extent.

The question is, who is entitled to human dignity? The sole criterion for human dignity that does not hollow out its absoluteness, is "biological membership of the human race" (Robert Spaemann)¹¹¹. Any other definition immediately undermines the principle discussed here. In this

110 What must be examined here is not the space in which world view issues are decided simultaneously, if one votes for human dignity. It is probably clear that this decision will have a slew of implications, e.g. questions related to liberty and responsibility, in which one simultaneously makes commitments. See Zichy, M. (2017). The Image of the Human Being and Human Rights. *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, 71(3), 380–406.

111 Spaemann, R. (1996). *Persons: Experiments on the Differences between Something and Somebody*. Klett-Cotta, 264.

109 Ditto, 429.

case, we do not have human rights, but racial rights, intelligence rights, brain rights, autonomy rights or whatever - but definitely not equality, but pluto, oligo, aristo or whatever-crazy, i.e. powers that assign dignity.

Germany's identity is worthy of protection only because of and to the extent of Germany holds on to the claim that regardless of any personal stance in the face of the holy, there is something sacred the reverence or non-reverence for which is a personal matter and that is not negotiable: every human being.

The question, when it comes to our ultimate identity, is whether we, fed by whatever religious, philosophical, world view or cultural wellspring, hold on to this commitment to the "Sacrality of the Person"¹¹² (Hans Joas) steadfastly without being led astray or not. However, the Sacrality of the Person, is the identity of Germany because Germany does not own this identity. This means two things: 1) We have been given this identity only by having it bestowed upon us. We don't own it, we have it as a guiding star by which we have to change direction and correct our course time and again. Hence, in a sense, it does not belong to us - we belong to it. 2) And not only do we belong to it, every community is at its beck and call. Consequently, Germany cannot desire this ultimate identity exclusively for itself, but must want to constitutionally and factually have this identity with, if possible all nations and communities.¹¹³

112 See in association with the Émile Durkheim Formulas: Joas, H. (2011). *The Sacrality of the Person: A New Genealogy of Human Rights*. Suhrkamp Verlag, 82–107.

113 Hence, the call for "More Europe" that makes sense in times of increasing particularism is only legitimate to the extent that the creation of superior units does not weaken the protection of the individual, but strengthens it. Every individual is more important than Europe.

We are given this identity only by having it bestowed upon us. Those who don't subscribe to that, those who don't say about every human being that it is good that he principally has to have the freedom to make his own determinations, are subject to laws that impose penalties. If someone observes these laws only to escape penalties, he may be a guest or citizen of Germany who will not be bothered, but he won't be one of those who carry this identity (by claiming it for themselves in a way that they are aware of the claim it has upon them).

World Views as Guarantors or Risks for Human Dignity

The challenge we are facing is: Are there enough people who uphold human rights not because they would otherwise be subject to penalties, but because they are convinced that they are in meaningful, i.e. to follow Kant, not merely in compliance with an imposed obligation, but because it is their duty? That's where the Böckenförde Dictum, according to which "the liberal, secularized state lives from preconditions it cannot itself guarantee."¹¹⁴ A society, in which the majority of the citizens no longer shares the commitment to human dignity, will ultimately abolish the general fundamental rights that the constitution states cannot be abolished, albeit it cannot prevent their abolishment any more than it can prevent its own abolishment as a whole. Even for constitutions it is true that they may not be worth the paper they are printed on if it doesn't have the power to be enforced embodied by humans.

114 Böckenförde, E.-W. (1976). *State, Society, Freedom*. Suhrkamp Verlag, 60.

The erosion of the faith in the sacrality of the person is always a real danger that has its roots in certain world views. It is one of the sad truths of Christianity, that it during the centuries when it held a suppressive majority, committed crimes against human dignity in many ways, so that the frequently heard remark that human dignity would not exist without Christianity is simultaneously largely correct as far as dignity as an idea is concerned, but quite ambivalent for dignity as a statutory and societal reality, since enlightenment and the declaration that religion is a personal matter have made a determining contribution to the process of the discovery of human rights.

The erosion of the acknowledgment of human dignity is a real danger within every human's heart and in every concrete world view. These days, we are primarily focusing on the question to what extent Islam can connect to the sacrality of the person and the human rights that come with it and are not for sale. This underscores that talking about values will not move us ahead. Instead, every single person must be asked the simple, strict question: Is it the nature of your Islam that it sees every human being as a sacred being with the same rights and obligations or is it not? If your Islam is not like that, this country, if you are entitled to it, will offer you asylum, will protect you and care for you in many ways. However, you will not be able to be part of the identity we are committed to. If we were to allow you not to commit to this identity, we would pull the rug out from under you and us; the rug that we can stand on and be free residents of Germany.

This, nevertheless, is a question to be posed not only with regard to Islam, but to any person and every world view. Erosions of the sacrality of the

person may begin with a wide range of registers in the concert of world views and just as easily from unfettered capitalism or socialism; from a religion or persistent atheism. And sometimes it is revealed to us that world views that could not be more contrarian in their mission statements because they do not make the human being their top priority, but these missions statements, are shockingly similar when it comes to their violations of human dignity.

Neither Complete Isolation Nor Completely Open Borders

Every discourse on migration policies should be preceded by the preamble: The complete isolation of Germany and complete open border policies for everyone or tolerance for any action that is not compatible with human rights are not available options. Both polar positions are ruled out because of our commitment to human rights: the right to be given asylum is a human right Germany acknowledges because it respects human dignity and reinforced by its historic experience that millions of people have survived the years when Germany imposed terror upon them, because they found asylum in other countries or were subjected to suppression, torture and death because they were denied asylum. Not only do we have to whatever we can to prevent racism and totalitarianism from sprouting up in this country as we take responsibility for our history. We must also be a place of refuge for those who are forced to live under such conditions elsewhere. On the other side of the equation, migration policies that by not implementing any migration restrictions undermine the commitment to the dignity of everyone, cannot be per-

mitted. If our migration policies were to result in a massive influx of people who do not have respect for the liberal rights of all, this would not be a lesser violation of human dignity than a total lockout of refugees. If we know that we do not want either one of these two extremes, this would disqualify those who are truly extreme and our debates would not have to be as harsh, because we would know that we agree on principle, even if we don't as far as the concrete diagnosis or the proper tools are concerned.

Our Identity: Every Person is Sacred

The great miracle that Germany, after its race through hell, was able to evolve into a democracy under the rule of the law, that shocked by the logic of this hell has found its sacred ground in human dignity, should amaze us time and again and fill us with gratitude. Democracy faces pressure in many places - from leftist as well as right-wing extremism and religiously motivated disdain for humanity. For all who love it, it is essential to realize that there is no constitution in place that will ensure that our Constitution will remain in effect for eternity. From an ideational perspective, no other concept radiates as forcefully as the insight into the dignity of every human being. However, from a factual point of view, maintaining this principle is far more fragile than taking it for granted makes us believe. Love for the homeland defined as love for the Constitution thus is a duty. Not as a silly feeling of superiority, but defined as an option for our republic; and those who want the Germany of their fathers back will have walk to the beat of a different drum if they are defining these beings as someone other than the fathers and mothers

of the Constitution. One doesn't protect what one doesn't appreciate. There may eventually come a day when all we can do is sadly look back on what we once had. – This does not have to happen, but we will only stay alert if we keep that possibility in mind.

Our identity: every person is sacred. Not a single person in this country must be considered one who does not count and to the extent that we can ensure this without risking this identity, we will be a place of refuge for people whose dignity is being trampled in their home countries.

The question everyone must answer and the truly fundamental issue of our democracy is not: "Do you believe in Western values?" but "Do you uphold the dignity of every single person?" Our identity hinges on upholding this truth, regardless of the world view based grounds. Just holding on to will prevent a relapse into barbarity.

Because of this dignity, Germany has no less of an obligation to those who do not accept the absolute dignity of everyone, because such individuals cannot lose this dignity by not committing to it. If any such person does not have this faith in dignity, the person may, because he or she was born here or because he or she would not be safe in their home country, may belong in Germany, but will not be part of Germany.



Community Participation – Refugee Integration



Community Participation – Refugee Integration

Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Lars P. Feld, Patrick Hirsch, Katharina Pfeil

Since the peak immigration years 2015/16, Germany's asylum policies have been characterized by efforts to integrate on the one hand and controlling migration on the other hand.¹¹⁵ The tougher asylum law provisions, for instance, were combined with an expansion of integration offers. The facts described in the previous chapters on the development of immigration, the legislative foundations, the job market, the fiscal aspects as well as crime, provide the basis for the analysis of the integration status of refugees in Germany.

The objective of integration is to include immigrations into community life. As a dual process, it requires a welcoming stance from the accepting community and mutual understanding.¹¹⁶ Making all of the facets of integration measurable is complicated by the fact that the available data do not do the complexity of integration justice. When considering the employment quota as an indicator of labor market integration, the interactions between the different areas, such as language, job market or housing are not taken into account. For instance, it is possible that job market integration progresses without any problems, although the refugees experience discrimination because of their ethnicities, which makes it impossible to call this a successful integration process. Furthermore, the integration climate does not only depend on objective scenarios, but also on moods and points of view related to refugees. The official statistics are not analyses of integration aspects such as

contact frequency or identification. Hence, there is a lack of indices related to social and cultural participation. The integration barometer of the Expert Council of German Foundations for Integration and Migration (SVR Migration) is an exception from that rule. Another problem stems from the large number of different statistical records on the federal, state and municipality levels, which makes the comparability of data too limited to arrive at conclusions as to the all-encompassing status of integration. Furthermore, official statistics do not sufficiently factor in the reasons for migration, which is why it is impossible to identify the refugee groups. This makes the assessment of the integration progress of these groups more difficult.

Taking the described weaknesses of integration tracking into consideration, this Chapter takes a more expansive look at structural integration. Subjective assessments from representative surveys, such as the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees, provide additional insights to take a differentiating look at the status of integration and the integration climate (see Figure depicting the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey).¹¹⁷ In its descriptions, this Chapter is based on the categorization by sociologist Hartmut Esser, who breaks down integration into four fields - structural, identification-based, cognitive-cultural and social.¹¹⁸ *Structural integration* is affected by the statutory framework and is defined by official statistics, such as the employment quota. The previous Chapters of this Report cover this part of the

115 SVR Migration (2019b). Annual Evaluation 2019.

116 German Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration (2013). "Social Participation." Actions Recommended by the Council of the Integration Commissioner; SVR Migration (2017b). How does Integration Succeed? Asylum-seekers About their Living Situations and Participation Perspectives in Germany.

117 The IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey is conducted through the cooperation of the Institute for Labor Market and Career Research (IAB), the German Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) and the Socio-economic Panel (SOEP).

118 Esser (2001). Integration and Ethnic Layers.

integration process. The next paragraphs will first address *identification-related integration*. It is divided into the attitudes of the accepting community towards immigration, political and societal participation, the sense of belonging and the identification of the refugees with the accepting communities. Based on the aforementioned, *cognitive-cultural integration* will be evaluated on the basis of education status and language skills. The

field of *social integration* is closely linked to that. It addresses primarily the question of interactions with the accepting society and the housing situation, which will be the final scenario addressed herein.

Identification-related Integration: Participation and Inclusion

Societal and political participation, inclusion and identification with the values and culture of the accepting country are all part of identification-based integration. The prerequisite for a sense of belonging is that refugees are integrated into social relationships and are participating in everyday events. However, identification with the accepting society does not have to result in disintegration from the society of origin. It is possible for refugees to have ties to their countries of origin and simultaneously with the accepting country (hybrid identity).¹²¹

Given that identification-related integration cannot merely begin with the group of immigrants, the attitudes of the accepting society towards immigration and refugees play determining roles. Ultimately, the public interest in the issue is the benchmark. Migration and integration were topics that had a significant presence in the media and the political discourse in recent years. At the same time, the public opinion on the issue of immigration and the acceptance of refugees has hardly changed.

In conjunction with the General Survey of the Population Conducted by Social Sciences (ALLBUS), the general German population has been surveyed on its attitude towards refugee migration since 1980 and most recently in 2018. Respondents were asked to state whether they consider the immigration of refugees a risk or more of an opportunity for the economy, community life,

The IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees

The IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees is repeated every year and is conducted through the cooperation of the Institute for Labor Market and Career Research, the German Office for Migration and Refugees and the Socio-economic Panel. The random survey subjects are drawn from the Central Register of Foreigners and comprises asylum-seekers in Germany as well as the members of their households.¹¹⁹ A total of 4,527 adult refugees participated in the first wave of surveys in 2016. In 2017, 2,630 of these participants were surveyed a second time, while 2,965 individuals were newly added to the roster.¹²⁰ Weighted results make it possible to arrive at representative conclusions about the group of immigrants who are refugees in Germany. The following analyses refer to 4,346 respondents in 2016 and 5,493 respondents in 2017. The data generated during the second wave of surveys were published in the spring of 2019.

119 Brücker et al. (2018). IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees 2016: Study design, results from the field and analyses of scholastic and professional qualification, language skills and cognitive potential.

120 Brücker et al. (2019). Second Wave of the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey: Refugees Are Making Linguistic and Employment Progress.

121 Benet-Martínez und Haritatos (2005). Bicultural Identity Integration (BII): Components and Psychosocial Antecedents.; Berry (1997). Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation.; Heckmann (2015). Integration von Migranten. Einwanderung und neue Nationenbildung.

the social state and safety in Germany. Society as a whole appeared to be skeptical, especially with regard to the perception of safety (see Figure 40). The effects on Germany's social state were also seen in a negative light. How the effects on the German social system actually evolved to date can be derived from the Fiscal Aspects Chapter. The effects on community life and the economy were viewed in a comparatively positive light.

The comparison between 2016 and 2018 reveals growing optimism with regard to the effects on the German economy. The percentage of those who view the immigration of refugees as an opportunity rather than a risk for the economy rose by close to 7 percentage points. This is likely related to the advancement of integration of asylum-seekers into the German labor market and the declining numbers of asylum-seekers overall (see Chapter on the Evolution of Migration and the Job Market).

“Principally, residents don’t see the immigration situation in a much more negative light. The attitudes are a lot more ambiguous than the media excitement sometimes suggests.”

SVR Migration Annual Evaluation 2019, Page 13

In 2018, the consensus that the acceptance of refugees should not be stopped (48.8 percent) outweighed the opposite opinion among the population in general, although the expectations concerning the effects of immigration were rather negative (see Figure 41). Only 32.0 percent had an adverse opinion. Hence, the population did not consider the acceptance of refugees a fundamentally negative scenario.

From the perspective of the refugees, the situation is largely positive. In 2017, a prominent majority felt very welcome in the country (see Figure 42). Despite concerns among the accept-

ing society, the perception remained the same in a comparison of the surveys of 2016 and 2017. In fact, the percentage of those who feel completely welcome increased by 3 percentage points. Moreover, the percentage of refugees who had already experienced discrimination in Germany dropped slightly (see Figure 43). In 2017, 27.7 percent stated that they are rarely discriminated against because of their ethnicity. Compared to the previous year's survey, this equals a decline by well over 5 percent. Nevertheless, around 9 percent of the respondents still stated that they frequently face discrimination.


Among the surveyed refugees, 23.6 percent said in 2017, that they very often or often feel socially isolated and 25.9 percent were under the impression that they were being excluded. In comparison to the year prior, nothing much had changed. Identification-related integration, based on these assessments of societal participation, appears to be especially difficult for tolerated immigrants (see Figure 44). The cited social isolation and exclusion from society more frequently than approved asylum-seekers. Especially inter-social relationships and participation in everyday life do play a deciding role when it comes to the development of a sense of belonging.

Remarkably, tolerated immigrants, based on their own admissions, have much looser ties to their home countries (see Figure 45). Of them, 40.5 percent felt that they had barely any or no ties to their home countries; which is equivalent to almost twice as many than those among the approved asylum-seekers who feel this way. Furthermore, tolerated immigrants had much greater concerns of not being able to remain in Germany (see Figure 46). Although their likelihood of being able to stay in Germany in the

23.6 %

OF THE INTERVIEWEES STATED THAT THEY FREQUENTLY OR VERY FREQUENTLY FEEL SOCIALLY ISOLATED. 37.1 % OF THE TOLARATED IMMIGRANTS GAVE THESE RESPONSES.


Figure 40:
Effects of the immigration of asylum-seekers on different societal fields
in the perception of the overall population



Note: Categories “Higher risk”, “Tends to be a risk” and “Tends to be a chance” and “More of a chance” were consolidated under categories “Risk” and “Chance”.

Source: GESIS – Leibniz-Institute for Social Sciences 2018.


Figure 41:
Affirmative responses to the statement: “The immigration of refugees to Germany should be stopped.”



Note: Categories “Absolutely agree”, “Tend to agree” and “Don't quite agree” as well as “Do not agree at all” were consolidated under categories “Agree” and “Don't agree”.

Source: GESIS – Leibniz-Institute for Social Sciences 2018.

Figure 42:
Response to the question: “Do you feel welcome in Germany today?”



Sources: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees 2016 and 2017, weighted.

long-term were minimal, this may indicate that this group might be more willing to integrate. It was not until the Promotion of Employment for Foreigners Act became effective that tolerated immigrants gained improved access to integration programs (see Chapter Asylum Process). The uncertainty about their perspective reduces their chances of participating and feeling included and thus to integrate successfully.


From 2016 to 2017, the percentage of refugees who were concerned that they would not be able to remain in Germany increased across all groups. The increase among approved asylum-seekers is particularly astounding - it increased by well over 15 percentage points.

As far as the stance towards democracy and constitutional rights is concerned, refugees differ very little from Germans. They agreed with statements such as “It’s important to have a democratic system,” “Citizen’s rights protect

people from government suppression,” or “Women have the same rights as men,” at about the same rate as German respondents.¹²² Although the majority of refugees come from countries with authoritarian governments, most of them shared the values of liberal and equal-rights based societies.


122 Brücker et al. (2016). Flight, Arrival in Germany and Initial Steps Towards Integration; Baier and Böhm (2019). Refugees Have a Liberal Understanding of Democracy Much Like Interviewees in Germany.

Figure 43:
Response to the question “Here in Germany, how often have you personally experienced discrimination because of your country of origin?”



Sources: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees 2016 and 2017, weighted.


Figure 44:
Assessment of community participation



Note: Categories “Frequently” and “Often” were consolidated, as were categories “Rarely” and “Never”.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees 2017, weighted.


Figure 45:
Response to the question “How strong do you feel your ties to your home country are?”



Note: Categories “Very strong” and “Strong”, as well as “Weak/no ties” were consolidated.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees 2017, weighted.

Figure 46:
Response to the question “Are you concerned that you might not be able to stay in Germany?”



Note: Categories “Yes, very concerned” and “Yes, some concerns” are consolidated in the figure.

Sources: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees 2016 and 2017, weighted.

Integration Requires Competent Support: Integrato

By Klaus Walraf

War, escape and the loss of loved ones and of their homes - these are the experiences of many of the refugees who have come to Germany to seek asylum here. "Refugee consultants now have the opportunity to all tend to these deeper scars," says Patrick Hofmacher, Managing Director of the Malteser Werke. "In the peak phase of refugee migration from 2015 to 2017, there was no time to professionally prepare for these challenges."

Professor Ulrich Papenkort from the Social Works and Social Sciences Department of the Catholic University of Applied Sciences in Mainz also observes that "The time has come for the service organizations to retroactively qualify their staff after they have only been able to react for such a long time." The Germany-wide advanced education program "Integrato," which the University has developed in partnership with the Malteser organization and launched in the fall of 2018, aims specifically at making this possible.

Staff members providing services to refugees require a wide array of competencies to professionally fulfill their duties. A defined training program is not available. Integrato helps them acquire the essential legal, social, psychological and cultural knowledge or to deepen what they already know. The education programs address questions that are key for successful integration. "How do I raise my children without violence? How are diseases like HIV / Aids diagnosed and treated? Will I remain on my own with my grief after losing my home and my family members? Are mental illness and disabilities taboo? How do I establish relationships to people in my neighborhood?"

Learning in Modules

Attending the training program has paid off for Sebastian Lemke, who works as a consultant for the Caritas in Karlsruhe at two initial acceptance housing facilities: "In the Loss and Grief module, I have learned, through exchanges with my coworkers, how different people from different cultures handle this issue." He says that his everyday support for refugees doesn't focus on death as often as a reason for loss. Lemke says that the loss of a sense of self-esteem is far more common. "This may be the result of the fact that someone won't be able to perform the vocation they are trained in here in Europe, because the degree acquired at home is not accepted here. Or, the societal respect someone may have earned through hard work suddenly does not mean anything. People also grieve about these types of losses to close out the past and embrace the current situation," the social worker observes. He says that role play during the training program made the problem tangible for him on a personal level. "I had to work through it and I learned to approach people with more sensitivity," Lemke explains. This sensitivity is part of his core responsibilities as he identifies those who need special protection among several hundred who live at his initial acceptance housing facility. Among them are not only pregnant women, seniors or people suffering from mental illnesses, but also those whose psyche has been permanently traumatized.

The training program is also practically helpful for Pierre Linn, who accompanies minor refugees for the Malteser organization in Zornheim near Mainz. "After I completed the

Loss and Grief module, quite a few things make even more sense to me. On the one hand, I was able to establish a relationship with an Afghan boy, who was very withdrawn. For a long time, we, the staff were under the impression that the boy was responding to us as if we had made a mistake. However, I now know that the only reason he retreated was his grief.” This opened the door to further help the boy.

The training series Integrato is taught in Dortmund and targets the employees of refugee facilities, volunteers, representatives of non-profit organizations and church communities. It aims to advance the qualifications of the support staff. The program comprises eight modules, each of which can be completed individually.



Refugees have a lot of questions about different areas of life. Advanced training initiative Integrato aims at giving consultants answers.



Cognitive-cultural Integration: Education and Language

Esser lists cognitive-cultural integration as the second field. It includes educational level, language skills and the awareness of the traditions and informal rules, such as public behavior. The understanding of values beneath all of the aforementioned is not only developed through integration measures, but also through joint conversations, contacts and participation in societal activities.¹²³ It is possible to establish contacts and further improve ones language skills in the context of employment. Hence, rapid job placement would be helpful from an economic perspective and would also strengthen the integration from a social and cultural perspective. Language skills are also a prerequisite for immigrants to interact with the accepting society and that allow them to participate in the labor market or the education system. While the integration discourse in Germany is dominated by a stronger communication of cultural values, the integration policies still focus primarily on job market integration and the acquisition of language skills.¹²⁴


123 SVR Migration (2019b). Annual Evaluation 2019; Schöpf (2017). Successful Value Generation in the Migration Context.

124 SVR Migration (2019b). Annual Evaluation 2019.

Compared to the German population, refugees on average boast a lower education level (See MM17). At the same time, they are eager to get an education. Around 44 percent of those surveyed wanted to obtain a general education degree in 2017, while 68 percent said that their goals included an apprenticeship or academic studies.¹²⁵ Overall, the participation in education - i.e. the percentage of refugees in some type of educational training (school, academic studies or apprenticeship) has risen to 9 percent by 2.8 percentage points from 2016 to 2017. This positive development occurred regardless of whether the refugees had already been approved for asylum or whether they were tolerated immigrants and was particularly evident among those who had been in the country for extended periods of time. The education participation among those younger than 30 was almost three times as high than it was among immigrants over 30. However, there are significant gender gaps (see Figure 47). While both, male and female refugees are increasingly participating in education, the educational participation among male refugees compared to the entire group of male refugees was twice as high in 2017 than the participation of women. Lack of German language skills are likely among the reasons for the contrast between educational goals and actual educational participation.

What makes the transition into the German education system and the start of employment more difficult, is the lack of German language skills among asylum-seekers prior to immigrating into Germany. In the three competency fields - speaking, writing and reading - more than 93 percent of the respondents said that they do not speak German at all. Only 0.9 percent consider their command of the language excellent or good when it comes to reading, 1.1 percent when it comes to writing and 2.1 percent when it comes to their conversational skills.


Figure 47:
Participation in education based on gender



Sources: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees 2016 and 2017, weighted.

125 Brücker et al. (2019). Second wave of the IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Survey: Refugees are making progress with language and employment.


Figure 48:
Assessment of German language skills based on categories Conversation, Writing and Reading



Note: Categories "Excellent" and "Good" as well as "OK/not so good" were consolidated.

Sources: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees 2016 and 2017, weighted.

Figure 49:
Assessment of German language skills based on time in Germany in 2017



Note: Categories "Excellent" and "Good" as well as "OK/not so good" were consolidated. The average of three competency fields conversation, writing and reading is shown.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees 2017, weighted.

Between 2016 and 2017, the language skills of refugees improved considerably (see Figure 48). While in 2016, only 16.8 percent of the respondents had excellent or good command of the German language based on their own assessment, a year later, close to 30.5 percent of the refugees classified themselves as this proficient. The participation in language courses increased their conversational competencies.¹²⁶ In writing and reading, the shares of excellent and good qualifications rose by 11.7 and 11.1 percentage points to 32.0 and 36.4 percent.

Approved asylum-seekers developed slightly higher language competencies than tolerated immigrants and asylum-seekers with pending applications, which may - among other things - be attributed to their access to integration courses. Likewise, younger refugees under the age of 30 had better skills than those over 30. Male refugees thought they had far better language skills than women. In 2016 and 2017, in particular refugee mothers with toddlers indicated that their language skills were minimal. Nevertheless, the language skills of women did improve between 2016 and 2017. Participation in language courses actually had a stronger impact on women than men.¹²⁷

There is also a positive relationship between German language skills and the time immigrants spent in Germany (see Figure 49). The very good and good assessments increased by 30 percentage points after three and more years in Germany. The percentage of people without any German language skills dropped by 27.6 percent. Nevertheless, after three years in Germany, 6.2 percent of the interviewees stated that they do not speak, write or read German at all.

Besides the self-assessment of language skills, the survey provides information on how refugees use their German language skills in everyday life and in which context they use them most frequently (see Figure 50). One important factor for learning a foreign language is the use of the language.¹²⁸ Refugees used it most frequently in conjunction with training/apprenticeships (92.3 percent) or at the workplace (86.0 percent). When interacting with friends, about a quarter of the refugees spoke primarily German, while 40.8 percent still communicated in their native languages. Immigrants made the least use of German in their family settings (4.0 percent). Within the family, refugees spoke their native languages in 78 percent of all cases. These results point out that the work and training environment is a key factor for the utilization of language and the cognitive-cultural integration into the acceptance society. It is also remarkable that a respectable 25 percent speak German with friends.

Social Integration: Contacts and Housing

Social integration can be described as inclusion in the societal life through frequent interactions between acceptance and immigrant societies. These interactions occur at the workplace, in neighborhoods and in everyday situations. Social contacts with the acceptance society and the inclusion in networks can ultimately also make it easier to find jobs.¹²⁹ Moreover, they foster societal cohesion and reduce uncertainties and prejudices that go hand in hand with immigration.¹³⁰

126 Brücker et al. (2019). Second wave of the IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Survey: Refugees are making progress with language and employment.; Scheible and Rother (2017). Learning German Quickly and Successfully – How?.

127 Brücker et al. (2019). Second wave of the IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Survey: Refugees are making progress with language and employment.; Scheible and Rother (2017). Learning German Quickly and Successfully – How?.

128 SVR Migration (2019b). Annual Assessment 2019.; Liebau and Schacht (2016). Learning Languages: Refugees Almost on Par with Other Migrants.

129 Lancee (2012). Immigrant Performance in the Labour Market.; Putnam (2000). Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital.

130 Contact hypothesis according to Pettigrew et al. (2011). Recent Advances in Intergroup Contact Theory.; Pettigrew und Tropp (2006). A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory.; Pettigrew und Hewstone (2017). The Single Factor Fallacy: Implications of Missing Critical Variables from an Analysis of Intergroup Contact Theory.

9.0 %

OF RESPONDENTS WERE PURSUING A SCHOLASTIC/ACADEMIC DEGREE OR AN APPRENTICESHIP.

30.5 %

OF THE REFUGEES SAID THEY SPOKE GERMAN EXCELLENTLY OR WELL IN 2017.


67.0 %

OF REFUGEES WHO HAVE BEEN IN GERMANY FOR FOUR YEARS SPEND TIME WITH GERMANS DAILY OR FREQUENTLY. THIS PERCENTAGE INCREASES THE LONGER THEY STAY IN GERMANY.

56.0 %

OF REFUGEES LIVED IN PRIVATE APARTMENTS IN 2017; 44.0% IN GROUP HOUSING.

Figure 50:
Use of language in different contexts



Note: Categories "Mostly other language" and "Equally in different languages" were consolidated under "Other".

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees 2017, weighted.

Both sides play a part in the improvement of interactions and the success of social integration: refugees and the acceptance society. The SVR Migration explains that there is a link between the frequency of interactions and the integration climate: The more often individuals who are part of the acceptance community interact with immigrants, the more positive the assessment of the integration climate.¹³¹

Command of the German language provides the point of departure for contacts with people outside of the immigrants' own ethnic group. At the same time, German language skills are acquired more quickly and improved, the more frequently immigrants speak German in their everyday lives.¹³² Educational institutions, clubs and social engagements are just as important as the provision of accommodations outside of geographically remote group housing facilities. About 70 percent of the respondents completely agreed that regular, for instance weekly, contacts between refugees and locals are important contributors to the improvement of German language skills, the understanding of each other's cultural traditions and the development of a circle of acquaintances and friends. The level of agreement grew significantly the longer the immigrants were in the country. After stays of less than one year, the rate was around 57 percent as far as the improvement of German language skills is concerned. After four years, the rate was already 80 percent.

Moreover, every year refugees spend in Germany, the time they spend with Germans increases - from 10.1 percent to 42.3 percent every day after they have been in the country for four years. Interactions with the acceptance society varies by gender: Male refugees state that they interact with Germans more frequently (see Figure 52). The difference is particularly striking at the workplace, where 45.5 percent of men and only 21.7 percent of woman have daily or frequent

contact with Germans. Of the women, 70.3 percent never have contact with Germans. Among circles of friends, the difference is not quite as vast (46.0 percent of the men versus 35.4 percent of the women have daily to frequent interactions). Unlike in circles of friends and at the workplace, the differences between males and females are virtually non-existent when it comes to neighborhood interactions: 30.6 percent of the female refugees and 31.4 percent of males have daily to frequent contact with Germans.

Moving into a personal residence increases the sense of being part of society and is key for social and cultural integration. For integration, this step into independence and self-accountability is a central component. It offers the opportunity to meet and share with the acceptance society. Having one's own residence as a personal place of refuge was not a given for many refugees in 2017. 56 percent of all refugees lived in private residences, while 44 percent stayed in group housing facilities. A year earlier, more than half of them (50.4 percent) lived in a group housing facility.

Moving out of group housing prevents the stigmatization of refugees because at such housing projects, they are exposed to higher visibility. When making the move into decentralized accommodations, it is essential from an integration policy perspective, to ensure that a segregation of immigrants and the acceptance community is averted. For refugees, who frequently have financial issues, it is, however, extremely challenging to find private residences. Besides the tough residential housing scenarios in densely populated areas in Germany, there are indications that rentals frequently don't work out because of bureaucratic hurdles or owners are hesitant to rent to refugees.¹³³


Some of the factors that boost the chances that refugees can obtain private housing include in particular German language skills and employment. The share of refugees living in private housing is also higher if the immigrants, prior to mov-

131 SVR Migration (2018c). *Stable Climate in Germany's Integration Policies*; Weins (2011). *Group Threat or Contact?*.

132 Liebau and Schacht (2016). *Language Learning: Refugees Virtually on Par with Other Migrants*.

133 Foroutan et al. (2017). *What type of access do refugees have to the housing market?*.


Figure 51:
Response to the question “How much time do you spend with Germans?”
based on length of stay in 2017



Note: Categories “Several times a week” and “Every week” were consolidated under category “Frequently”. Categories “Every month” and “Not often” were consolidated into category “Rarely”.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees 2017, weighted.

Figure 52:
Contact with Germans based on gender



Note: Categories “Several times a week” and “Each week” were consolidated under category “Frequently”. Categories “Every month” and “Less often” were consolidated under category “Rarely”.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees 2017, weighted.

ing to Germany, had family or friends in Germany and thus expressly chose Germany as their destination country. Individuals and families with minor children receive priority services from government agencies, so that they obtain private housing more frequently.¹³⁴

To assist with housing, the government provided funding as part of the rent for 84.4 percent of refugees residing in private housing in 2017. Compared to 2016, this percentage declined by 5.1 percentage points. However, in this tough market environment, it will likely prove difficult, to find affordable housing that meets the maximum rent limits required by the government.

The share of refugees who live in group housing facilities has dropped along with longer stays. Despite long stays in Germany, many refugees still lived in group housing. Of those who had been in Germany for three or four years, 33.5 percent continued to live in group housing facilities.

Among other things, this can likely be attributed to the residential situations of tolerated immigrants, 59.4 percent of whom still lived in group housing in 2017 (see Figure 53). Compared to 2016, the share only dropped by 2.5 percentage points. Some tolerated immigrants are under a mandate to live in group housing facilities, for instance, if they hail from a safe country of origin. For asylum-seekers from these countries, a so-called residency obligation has been in effect since the end of 2016 (see Chapter Asylum Process).¹³⁵ For approved asylum-seekers, the residential situation has slightly improved. In 2017, only 31.8 percent of these immigrants still lived in group housing; all others had already moved into private housing. Among them, more than half indicated that one or several other apartments in the same building were occupied by refugees.

The vast majority rated the residential neighborhood in which they lived in group or private housing as very safe or quite safe (see Figure 55).

There was barely any difference in the assessment of safety between genders. Women actually assessed the neighborhoods as safer than men. For 86.5 percent of those living in group housing, their facilities were safe. 9.5 percent assigned a rating of quite unsafe and 3.5 percent giving ratings of extremely unsafe.

The perception that a neighborhood is unsafe may have two causes: On the one hand, there have been repeated incidents at group housing facilities. It is almost impossible to prevent tensions and conflict between people from different countries of origin living in close quarters.¹³⁶ On the other hand, shared housing increases the visibility of refugees. Hence, this type of housing makes refugees appear much more like foreigners since they often live separately and frequently in fringe areas of the accepting communities.¹³⁷ The large number of attacks targeting group housing facilities motivated by hostility against foreigners in 2015/16 is an indication (see Chapter on Crime). Decentralized housing in private residences is an important step towards mingling, interaction with and acceptance by the integrating society and integration into the local social life.


¹³⁴ Baier und Siegert (2018). The Refugee Housing Situation.

¹³⁵ SVR Migration (2019b). Annual Evaluation 2019.

¹³⁶ Giesing et al. (2019). ifo Migration Monitor: Facts on Refugee Crimes.


¹³⁷ Laschet et al. (2016). Recognizing Opportunities - Creating Perspectives - Making Integration Possible.

Figure 53:
Residents of Group Housing




Sources: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees 2016 and 2017, weighted.

Figure 54:
Occupants of housing facilities based on length of stay 2017



Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees 2017, weighted.

Figure 55:
Security perception in residential area or group housing facility in 2017



Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees 2017, weighted.

Nour Alfadel has successfully completed her training as a Malteser Youth Group Leader at the Freiburg Church District.



From Group Housing to Own Youth Group

By Philipp Richardt

Nour Alfadel is a cheerful 17-year-old. She is studying for school and is currently working towards her middle school degree. She spends a lot of time with her friends on the banks of the Lake of Constance and loves to talk about her life on Instagram. She already has more than 6,000 followers since Nour has a lot to talk about. Three years ago, she, her parents and four siblings escaped Syria because of the war and they had to build a new life here in Germany.

Once they had arrived in Germany, her story began at a group housing facility in Constance. There, the Alfadel Family shared a bath and toilet with several other families, which was located in the hallway. They only had a few square meters of privacy. This is why the Mädelsstreff (Girls' Meeting) program offered by the Malteser organization and a local refugee aid organization was just the right thing for Nour. She found a piece of breathing room in her everyday life here, most of which she otherwise spent in the close quarters of the group housing facilities in the early days. In the Mädelsstreff, young refugee women of all nations meet with Germans of the same age to spend a fun time in a protected space. At the same time, this venue offers a great opportunity to learn important details about the everyday lives of refugees in Germany. The refugees find out how they can buy which ticket for a trip to the next larger city or why Germany distinguishes between a high school diploma and a general equivalency diploma, although both render graduates eligible for university studies. At the beginning, this wasn't easy for many to understand.

It didn't take long for the Malteser representatives to become aware of Nour at the Mädelsstreff. "She was always very helpful and atten-

tive to the others," remembers Silvia Baumann, the initiator of the Mädelsstreff. "I was quickly convinced that I should ask her whether she would be interested to become an active part of the Malteser Youth Program." In early 2018, she became a member and Nour is now assisting in her first group lesson. The kids love her and her cheerful ways and Nour's eyes are lighting up when she talks about her Youth Group work. "After all, I can't just teach the children something, it also works the other way around. For instance when it comes to language. The kids don't just switch to English when I don't know a certain German word, which would be what most adults would do. They explain it until I have learned the word," she explains, laughing.

In the spring of 2019, Nour completed her training as a Youth Group Leader and took responsibility for her own group as the first refugee youth group leader of the Freiburg Church District.

She has now been living in the Lake of Constance region for almost three years and likes it a lot. She pronounces the name of her new hometown just like the locals - Konschtanz. For the 17-year-old it is the center of her world. She has friends here and she plans to spend her future in this town. Once she graduates from middle school, she is planning to get her GED and subsequently study. She doesn't quite know what her major will do, but definitely nothing that requires working with numbers and Excel worksheets. "I definitely want to have a career that will allow me to work with people," she says. That's another thing she was able to narrow down while she spent time in the Malteser organization.

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Editorial Information

Publisher

Stiftung Malteser Migrationsbericht
 Contact address: Erna-Scheffler-Straße 2,
 51103 Köln, Germany
 E-Mail: malteser@malteser.org
 www.malteser.de

The Stiftung Malteser Migrationsbericht is being administrated by the Malteser Stiftung, a legally established public foundation under civil law domiciled in Munich, Germany.

Commissioner for the Malteser Migration Report

Karl Prinz zu Löwenstein

Design and Production

muehlhausmoers corporate communications gmbh,
 Köln, Germany

Translation

Orbis Fachübersetzungen, Mönchengladbach, Germany

Printshop

Longo Deutschland GmbH, Augsburg, Germany

Photo credits

Cover: Dirk Moll, Page 5: Rene Traut, Page 7: Walter Eucken Institut, Pages 8–9: iStock/FatCamera, Page 23: ZDF/Laurence Chaperon, Pages 24–25: Ostkreuz/Espen Eichhöfer, Pages 33–35: Dirk Moll, Pages 42–43: Dirk Moll, Pages 44–45: iStock/fotografixx, Page 55: Dirk Moll, Page 59: Dirk Moll, Pages 60–61: iStock/Axel Bueckert, Page 74: Joanna Figgen, Page 75: ipso gGmbH, Pages 76–77: picture alliance/Johannes Neudecker/dpa, Pages 94–95: Dirk Moll, Page 103: Dirk Moll, Page 112: Angelika Kessler, Page 125: Malteser

Post Script

With this second Migration Report, the Malteser organization in Germany makes an important contribution to the objective discussion of migration issues. I expressly welcome this initiative. Unfortunately, the debate is still largely driven by emotions, frequently fears and rushed assessments, which, to make things worse are also sometimes politically misused. Obviously, we must take reservations and fears - whether they are justified or not - seriously. Collecting and compiling facts is the first essential step to achieve this. Not until then should we discuss, which action should be taken that is reasonable and smart, which weight we have to give concerns and reservations and how we can best accommodate the human dignity of everyone involved.

Refugees Remain a Most Relevant Issue Around the World

Migration into Europe and refugee immigration has considerably settled down compared to the era from 2015 to 2017. Nevertheless, the topic is still a most relevant one and will continue to be in the decades ahead of us. There is no doubt, the tensions in the Middle and Near East are ongoing. The events in Sudan and Algeria show that an increasing number of countries in North Africa are on the brink of civil war like scenarios. If Libya should be caught up in a war and its just deployed coast guard no longer keeps refugees from seeking escape traveling across the Mediterranean, the situation can change dramatically very quickly.

Hundreds of thousands are waiting there, living in the most miserable conditions, to cross the ocean.

An estimated more than 70 million people around the world are refugees. Two thirds of them are seeking shelter in their own countries. Most of the refugees that make up the other third are staying in the immediately adjacent countries. Most of these countries are also extremely poor. Besides persecution, war and other weaponized conflicts, climate change is expected to also trigger mass migration. In this context we frequently overlook the fact that most of these migrants from countries south of the Sahara desert will move south and not to Europe and can thus also contributed to the destabilization in the south of Africa. Some uprisings are already in evidence in South Africa.

The problem is further compounded by contrary population developments and the enormous disparity in wealth. While Africa's population will double from now 1.25 billion to twice that number - 2.5 billion - by 2050, Europe's population is contracting significantly. The Middle East and North Africa would need 5 million additional jobs per annum just to maintain the already catastrophic employment levels that already exist. For all of Africa that would be 20 million. Germany, on the other hand, would need 360,000 immigrant workers to defend its economic strength. In the future, fewer and fewer workers will be available for recruitment from other EU countries.



Initially, it is not a humanitarian but a social policy decision how we will handle this phenomenon. However, such decisions do have humanitarian effects. That's why the Malteser organization must get involved.

Isolation Drives the Slave Trade

We are observing with grave concern that the consistent safeguarding of the exterior borders of the EU causes more and more migrants to turn to criminal human trafficking gangs or fall into their hands and into financial bondage. The human trafficking structures are becoming more professional and stronger. Things are getting so bad, that refugees are offering their organs to pay for their transports. A medical infrastructure for organ removal already exists. Due to the scars left behind by these surgeries, it is possible to determine that parts of the liver were frequently also taken from migrants who consented to have a kidney removed. The number of refugees dropped off directly on the Italian coast from special boats has increased significantly, but cannot be recorded, since most of them disappear in the country right away. Many of these people end up in slavery-like employment arrangements without any rights or medical care. The trafficking of Nigerian girls to be sent into prostitution is another consequence of the reinforced human trafficking infrastructure. There have never in human history been as many slaves as there are today. The total number is estimated to be just under 30 million and they have fewer rights today

than they did in times when slavery was legal. Hence, the Malteser organization has appointed two Special Ambassadors who are addressing this scandal. One works in Geneva at the UN and with other international organizations; the other has been directly assigned to Nigeria. There he recently helped with the opening of a center providing support to returning women and girls, who were able to flee prostitution.

While we feel that reasonable border protection is necessary, we caution anyone to live in the illusion that this alone will solve the problems.

It is certainly understandable that the sheer size of the problem brings uncertainty and frequently fear into the hearts, especially since one-size-fits-all solutions are not on the horizon. However, this doesn't release us from the duty to approach the challenges constructively.

The Migration Report addresses the legal differentiations of German asylum legislation in great detail. I would like to point out two things at this point: On the one hand, the asylum legislation in effect now was developed post World War II to protect the individual rights of the politically persecuted. It was not a concept for the management of mass migration. It is absolutely indispensable that we protect this right of the individual and that we sever it from the migration phenomenon. However, it will have to be further developed. The Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, in the development of which the Malteser organization

was actively involved, provide important foundations for this. In particular the Global Compact for Migration is assessed critically by many. It is worthwhile to carefully read the entire document. It takes into account the interests of the destination countries at least as much as those of the migrants and those of the countries of origin.

Furthermore, the countries of Europe cannot meet the challenges of mass flight nor those of migration on their own. Europe's disagreements on the matter send fatal signals to the countries of origin and foster the distribution of fake news, which - among other things - help the game of human traffickers and amplify the humanitarian problems.

We Need Legal Options for Migration

Pope Francis keeps demanding the making available or expansion of legal migration options. We expressly support his demands. This is a question of intelligence and an exclusively humanitarian appeal. It is the only way to effectively combat human trafficking crimes and it is the only option to properly address the fears and concerns of the local populations. It will be the only alternative to keep migration under control. In this context, one will have to consider new forms of training and preparation in the countries of origin as one of the prerequisites.

By now it is blatantly obvious that the provision of assistance in the countries of origin and the

opening of perspectives for the youth in these countries needs our utmost attention and support. Besides the improvement of training options and access to training, the primary goal must be the creation of jobs. This goes beyond the scope of work and expertise of the Malteser organization. This also does not appear possible to me if we do not review of our economic relations and dedicate a portion of our fortunes to this cause. Without narrowing the justice gap our efforts will not be successful. Pope Francis keeps reiterating this fact again and again. Once again, intelligence and the pursuit of humanitarian goals go in the same direction.

There is yet another untenable development that comes to mind in this context. More and more refugees are captured in camps. The average time refugees spend there now is more than 12 years. People who live in these camps are robbed of every perspective, the camps become huge burdens for the host countries and the necessary humanitarian aid is exorbitantly costly.

From the long-term perspective it would make much more economic sense and would make the situation much better for those affected, if they received initial financial aid directly in the host countries and to give them respective incentives to integrate the refugees early in the process. Uganda is a good example how this endeavor can be successful.

Integration Work as a Matter of Intelligence

This Migration Report addresses the challenges of integration in Germany in great detail and clearly underscores the difficulties those who do not have a good residency perspective, have. However, many of the affected immigrants stay in Germany in the long term. We have determined that in many countries, this milieu leads to the development of sub-cultures and resentments. It is, once again, a question of intelligence whether these types of restrictive policies pay off in the long run.

In Germany, we at the Malteser organization, have gained valuable experience. The Integration Mentor project is a successful model. Integration doesn't happen because the Constitution is being read, but through encounters with other people at work, in clubs and associations and in daily life. It is from those scenarios that respect for our legislation and its foundation flourishes.

Helping refugees is one of the traditional tasks of the Malteser organization. We provide this kind of help worldwide. Especially Malteser International is engaged in the focus areas right on location. Our Italian support service provides medical assistance to migrants who are lost at sea on ships of the Italian Coast Guard and Navy, and faces devastating situations time and again. The horrendous experiences those rescued share go beyond anything we can imagine. Many of those who are still planning to make the journey now know the risks

and attempt their escape nonetheless. The misery they are hoping to escape is this unfathomable and unbearable. We must face these facts, meet these people and expose ourselves to their stories and take notice of them. If we do that, we will hopefully find the strength and courage to search for sustainable, intelligent solutions. Respecting human dignity and advocating for lives that meet the standards of human dignity everywhere is a question of survival - also for us here in Europe.

ALBRECHT FREIHERR VON BOESELAGER,
Grand Chancellor of the Sovereign Order
of Malta

The Malteser Organization in Germany

WHO WE ARE: The Malteser organization in Germany is a Catholic aid organization and funds stationary facilities that provide healthcare and social services under the auspices of the German Association of the Sovereign Order of Malta. In Germany, about 51,000 members of the Malteser organization provide volunteer services to people in emergency situation - regardless of their religion, ethnic background or political convictions. Boasting more than 35,000 employees and professionals, the Malteser organization is also a major employer in the healthcare and social services field. Around the globe, the Order of Malta, which was founded in the 11th century, is responsible for projects and activities to aid those in dire need of help in more than 120 countries.

WHAT WE DO: Most of our civil rescue and disaster services, first aid training, the provision of support services to seniors, people with illness or disadvantages, youth and foreign work we do are based on volunteer work. We also operate social services, such as rescue and emergency medical services, ambulance services, home emergency assistance and food delivery services. The Malteser organization operates hospitals, senior assisted living facilities, schools and social services for youth, addicts and asylum-seekers.

HOW WE WORK: The Malteser organization today meets its Order's mission it set out to engage in 950 years ago, in a contemporary way that meets the needs of people as well as the societal framework in the most effective manner. All of our services and facilities are non-profit operations. What we generate in profits is invested into the maintenance and expansion of our service programs.

"Protecting the Faith and Serving the Sick and the Poor"

Mission Statement of the Order of Malta

