

BARTLESVILLE FIRE DEPARTMENT

Protecting Our Community by Providing Exceptional Service



FIRE INVESTIGATION REPORT

WITH ORIGIN AND CAUSE REPORT

Investigation conducted in accordance with NFPA 921 and NFPA 1033

Incident Number:	2026-1451 (NERIS/CAD: 2026-000001451)
Incident Date/Time:	April 14, 2026, at 21:17 hours (9:17 PM) — Fire Alarm Timestamp
On-Scene Investigation Date:	April 14–15, 2026
Incident Address:	1582 Industrial Boulevard, Bartlesville, Oklahoma 74006
Property Name:	Blue Whale Materials
Lead Investigator:	Fire Marshal / Fire Investigator Brady Watson (FD-3)
Assisting Personnel:	Deputy Fire Chief Barry Campbell (FD-2); Training Officer Curtis Formby (FD-4)
Incident Commander:	Battalion Chief Edwin Brown (Battalion 1)
Engine 3 Company Officer:	Stephanie Silva (Out-of-Class Captain) — Fire Incident Report Author
Fire Chief:	Harold Call (FD-1)
Method of Notification to Fire Investigator:	Rob Bigbee (Blue Whale Materials employee) contacted Fire Marshal Watson by cell phone at 21:18 hours. Fire Marshal Watson arrived on scene at 22:06 hours, April 14, 2026.

Original Report Date: April 22, 2026

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On April 14, 2026, at approximately 21:17 hours, the Bartlesville Fire Department (BFD) received a report via the Bartlesville Dispatch Center of a fire in the battery storage yard at Blue Whale Materials, located at 1582 Industrial Boulevard, Bartlesville, Oklahoma. Units were dispatched at 21:18 hours. Engine 3 arrived on scene at 21:24 hours as the first-due apparatus. Out-of-Class Captain Stephanie Silva conducted the initial size-up after cutting a secured lock on the west gate to gain access. Initial conditions revealed an approximately 80 ft. x 80 ft. outdoor lithium-ion battery storage area with multiple pallets fully involved in fire, estimated flame heights of 20 feet, and significant radiant heat precluding safe close-access by suppression crews.

Blue Whale Materials operates an end-of-life consumer-grade lithium-ion battery recycling facility, receiving spent batteries from across the nation. Batteries are stored on wooden pallets in cardboard boxes — known as gaylord containers — throughout a 5-acre fenced industrial yard, pending breakdown and processing for plastics and metals recovery. A significant quantity of palletized battery product was staged in the eastern to northeastern portion of the storage yard at the time of the fire.

All suppression operations were conducted using a defensive strategy due to the hazards associated with lithium-ion battery thermal runaway. Blue Whale Materials employees utilized forklifts and a skid steer to move

pallets and spread burning product under the direction of incident command, allowing large-volume water streams to be applied to cool involved and adjacent batteries. The incident required a sustained water shuttle operation and mutual aid from multiple agencies. Operations ran from initial dispatch on the evening of April 14, 2026, through incident clearance at 12:28 hours on April 15, 2026; a total operational period exceeding 15 hours. No civilian or firefighter injuries were reported.

This investigation was conducted in accordance with NFPA 921: *Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations* and NFPA 1033: *Standard for Professional Qualifications for Fire Investigator*.

Cause Classification: ACCIDENTAL / UNINTENTIONAL — ORIGIN BATTERY UNDETERMINED

PROPERTY AND OWNER / OPERATOR INFORMATION

Property Name:	Blue Whale Materials
Property Address:	1582 Industrial Boulevard, Bartlesville, Oklahoma
Property Type:	Industrial recycling facility — end-of-life lithium-ion battery processing
Lot Description:	Approximately 5-acre tract; gravel surface; fully enclosed with 8–12 ft. chain-link fence with pedestrian and vehicle gates throughout
Access Gates:	Vehicle Gates: West gate (20 ft. wide); North/Northeast gate (20 ft. wide)
Structure on Site:	One 60 ft. x 60 ft. enclosed metal building on concrete foundation; northwest corner of property. No damage to building reported.
Security:	Allied Security — 24-hour on-site private contract security
Storage Operations:	End-of-life consumer-grade lithium-ion batteries stored on wooden pallets in cardboard boxes (gaylord containers) throughout open yard

Incoming batteries at this facility represent a mixed population of cell chemistries, form factors, charge states, and ages received from collection programs nationwide. Batteries are not individually screened for physical condition, state of charge, or thermal stability prior to bulk outdoor storage. This practice is consistent with the general operational model of the battery recycling industry and is a material factor in the causation analysis of this fire.

Blue Whale Materials — Company Overview

The following company information was obtained from the Blue Whale Materials website (<https://www.bluewhalematerials.com>) and from statements made by company representatives on scene.

Blue Whale Materials' proprietary technology recycles spent lithium-ion batteries to safely reclaim and responsibly supply a high-value Blacksand® product containing cobalt, nickel, and lithium for the growing electrified economy. Subsidiary BW Energy & Innovation provides custom battery testing and evaluation services, including performance and abuse testing for numerous battery chemistries and end-of-life battery testing and grading for reuse and remanufacturing. Founded in 2015, Blue Whale Materials has evolved to develop a full suite of domestic collection, testing, and processing solutions.

Blue Whale Materials — Key Personnel

The following Blue Whale Materials personnel were identified as administrative leadership at Blue Whale Materials.

Co-founder / Chief Strategy Officer:	David Fauvre
Co-founder / Chief Executive Officer:	Robert Kang
SVP of Engineering & Technology:	Brian Schupbach — Present at the fire incident
Director of Operations:	Kevin D. Chesnut — Present at the fire incident
Supply Chain Manager:	Corey Carter — Present at the fire incident; operated skid steer/forklift during suppression
Employee:	Rob Bigbee — Present at the fire incident; initial contact with Fire Marshal Watson
Employee:	Austin Burress — Present at the fire incident; operated skid steer/forklift during suppression
Employee:	Josh Shambles — Present at the fire incident; operated skid steer/forklift during suppression
Employee:	Terry Parker — Present at the fire incident; operated skid steer/forklift during suppression

Multiple additional Blue Whale Materials employees were present on site during the incident. Blue Whale Materials insurance is carried through Alliant Insurance Services, Inc., per Director of Operations Kevin D. Chesnut.

Blue Whale Materials — Facility Locations in Bartlesville

Blue Whale Materials maintains multiple facilities within the industrial park in the city limits of Bartlesville. Only 1582 SE Industrial Boulevard (open storage yard) was affected by this fire.

1341 SE International Drive:	Approx. 6,800 sq. ft. building — Not affected by the fire
7323 SE International Court:	Approx. 50,000 sq. ft. building — Not affected by the fire
1560 SE Industrial Boulevard:	Approx. 100,000 sq. ft. building — Not affected by the fire
1582 SE Industrial Boulevard:	Approx. 5-acre tract with 3,600 sq. ft. building — Building not affected; fire confined to open storage yard

Note: Aerial photograph taken November 2025. Included to illustrate the proximity of the south storage yard to surrounding structures relative to the April 14, 2026 area of origin.



Note: Photo shown below is the fire debris which was spread out by the Blue Whale Materials using skid steers and forklifts. Photo dated: April 15th 2026.



METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

In accordance with NFPA 921, meteorological conditions at the time of the incident were documented from the Engine 3 incident report authored by Out-of-Class Captain Stephanie Silva. Weather data was gathered from Emergency Networking, the third-party incident reporting software utilized by the Bartlesville Fire Department.

Date/Time:	April 14, 2026 at 21:17 hours (9:17 PM)
Temperature:	73.04°F
Humidity:	78%
Cloud Cover:	100% (overcast)
Barometric Pressure:	30.36 in Hg
Visibility:	6 miles
Wind Speed:	18.03 mph
Wind Direction:	West
Precipitation:	Light rain

Impact on Investigation: Ambient temperature of 73°F with 78% humidity and overcast skies is consistent with conditions that can elevate thermal stress on stored battery product. Westerly winds at 18 mph were a factor in fire behavior and flame spread direction within the storage yard. Light rain was present during suppression operations. These meteorological conditions do not support a natural fire causation hypothesis; no lightning activity was recorded prior to or at the time of fire ignition. It is noted that the broader northeastern Oklahoma region was under thunderstorm and tornado warnings at the time of the incident; however, no lightning strike was identified as a contributing ignition factor at this location. The ambient temperature and wind conditions are consistent with documented environmental factors that may accelerate spontaneous thermal runaway in compromised lithium-ion battery cells.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Responding Units: Bartlesville Fire Department

Name	Rank / Role	Unit / Call Sign	Station / Agency
Harold Call	Fire Chief	FD-1	Central Fire Station
Barry Campbell	Deputy Fire Chief	FD-2	Central Fire Station
Brady Watson	Fire Marshal / Fire Investigator	FD-3	Central Fire Station
Curtis Formby	Training Officer / Safety Officer	FD-4	Central Fire Station
Edwin Brown	Battalion Chief (Incident Command)	Battalion 1	Central Fire Station
Stephanie Silva	Out-of-Class Captain / Company Officer	Engine 3	Station 3
Jonathan Colliver	Firefighter	Engine 3	Station 3
Joseph Swartzendruber	Firefighter	Engine 3	Station 3
Thomas Brink	Driver/Operator — Pump	Engine 3	Station 3
Brett Howard	Company Officer	Tower 1	Central Fire Station

Chad Marshall	Driver/Operator — Aerial	Tower 1	Central Fire Station
John Schmidt	Firefighter	Tower 1	Central Fire Station
Josiah Rovenstine	Company Officer	Engine 11	Central Fire Station
Dustin Lott	Driver/Operator — Pump	Engine 11	Central Fire Station
Timmy Vann	Firefighter	Engine 11	Central Fire Station
Mathew Tate	Company Officer	Engine 4	Station 4
Braden Wano	Driver/Operator — Pump	Engine 4	Station 4
Derek Tampleton	Firefighter	Engine 4	Station 4
Daniel Barham	Firefighter	Engine 4	Station 4

Mutual Aid Agencies

Dewey Fire Department:	1 Engine (connected to Tower 1); 1 Tanker/Water Tender
Ochelata Fire Department:	2 Tankers/Water Tenders
Oglesby Fire Department:	5 Tankers/Water Tenders
Washington County Emergency Management:	1 Tanker/Water Tender
Bartlesville Ambulance Service:	EMS — on-scene rehabilitation and medical monitoring
Bartlesville Police Department:	Scene security and perimeter control

Unit Response Times

PSAP Time:	04/14/2026 at 21:17:00
Dispatch Time:	04/14/2026 at 21:18:49 per radio transmission time stamp.
Engine 3 (First Due):	Dispatched: 21:18:49 On Scene: 21:24:50 Cleared: 04/15 08:23:44
Engine 4:	Dispatched: 21:18:49 On Scene: 21:25:00 Cleared: 04/15 00:08:16
Engine 11:	Dispatched: 21:23:20 On Scene: 21:30:11 Cleared: 04/15 00:08:16
Reserve Engine:	Approximate Dispatched Time: 02:20 On Scene: 02:30 Cleared: 04/15 04:40
FD-2 (Campbell):	Dispatched: 21:47:28 On Scene: 21:47:28 Cleared: 04/15 09:33:36
FD-4 (Formby):	Dispatched: 22:35:45 On Scene: 23:35:45 Cleared: 04/15 00:51:58
FD-3 (Watson):	Dispatched: 21:18:58 On Scene: 22:06:00 Cleared: 04/15 04:45 approximately
FD-1 (Call):	Dispatched: 21:37 On Scene: 21:39:36 Cleared: 04/15 02:04:24

Water Supply

Primary Hydrant — E11:	5-inch supply line from hydrant on Industrial Blvd. (NW corner of property)
Primary Hydrant — T1:	5-inch supply line from hydrant north of storage yard by north gate
Relay Operation:	E4 established relay pumping operation to supply E3
Water Shuttle Duration:	Approximately 3 hours; all mutual aid tankers participated
Water Shuttle Contribution:	Dewey FD, Ochelata FD, Oglesby FD, and Washington County Emergency Management

ARRIVAL CONDITIONS AND INITIAL SIZE-UP

BFD Engine 3 — First-Due Arrival (21:24 Hours)

Engine 3 arrived on scene at 21:24:56 hours as the first-due apparatus. Company Officer Stephanie Silva, acting in an out-of-class Captain capacity, conducted the initial size-up. Access to the property was made through the west gate after Engine 3 personnel cut the secured lock on the gate chain (west gate).

Initial size-up conditions identified:

Arrival Conditions:	Heavy fire — approximately 80 ft. x 80 ft. outdoor lithium-ion battery storage area with multiple pallets fully involved
Flame Height:	Estimated 20 feet
Radiant Heat:	Significant; precluding safe close access by suppression crews
Fire Location:	Eastern to northeastern portion of the 5-acre storage yard
Access:	West gate secured; lock cut by Engine 3 personnel on arrival. Third-party security unlocked and opened the north gate.
Water Supply:	Hydrants and water shuttles
Fire Suppression System on Property:	None on the storage yard. Fire alarm system with thermal cameras and flame detectors with notification system present on property. Thermal cameras within the storage yard were non-operational at the time of the fire, per post-incident interview with on-duty security personnel.
Weather:	Light rain; westerly winds 18 mph; 73°F; 100% overcast

Incident Command

Battalion Chief Edwin Brown (Battalion 1) arrived on scene at 21:28 hours and assumed Incident Command. Battalion 1 later transitioned into an Operations role, maintaining oversight of all fireground operations for the duration of the incident. Due to the hazards associated with lithium-ion battery fires, including thermal runaway, extended burn potential, and toxic gas generation, all operations were conducted with a defensive strategy throughout.

TACTICAL OPERATIONS NARRATIVE

The following tactical narrative is based on the fire incident report authored by Engine 3 Out-of-Class Captain Stephanie Silva.

Initial Attack — BFD Engine 3 and Engine 4

Engine 3 (E3) and Engine 4 (E4) deployed two 1¾-inch (150 ft.) preconnect attack lines and one 2½-inch (200 ft.) attack line. Three portable master stream devices (blitz fire monitors) were placed into operation to provide large-volume water application from a defensive position. Initial water on fire was established at approximately 21:28 hours (estimated). Due to fire intensity and pallet proximity, crews were unable to safely advance to the southeast corner of the yard to establish a water supply at that location.

At approximately 21:38 hours, E3 and E4 exhausted their initial water supply from the engine water tanks before Engine 11 could establish a sustained hydrant connection. Water application was temporarily interrupted.

Water Supply — BFD Engine 11

Engine 11 (E11) established the primary water supply by deploying a 5-inch supply line from a hydrant on Industrial Boulevard at the northwest corner of the property, supplying Engine 4 (E4) and supporting relay operations. The sustained water supply was reestablished at approximately 21:43 hours. E4 established a relay pumping operation to supply E3. Upon securing a sustained water supply, the E3 equipment operator utilized the deck gun for elevated master stream application.

BFD Tower 1 Operations

Tower 1 (T1) arrived on scene and was positioned on the north side, outside the battery storage yard. T1 was supplied by a 5-inch supply line from a hydrant and was operational at approximately 22:00 hours for elevated master stream application. The Dewey Fire Department engine was connected to T1, and Dewey established a draft operation utilizing hard suction from two portable tanks while relay pumping to support T1 operations.

Water Shuttle Operations

A sustained water shuttle operation was implemented and maintained for approximately three hours. All tankers completed approximately 14 rotations each to maintain continuous water supply to portable tanks supporting drafting operations. Participating agencies and apparatus included:

Dewey Fire Department:	1 Tanker (Water Tender)
Ochelata Fire Department:	2 Tankers (Water Tenders)
Oglesby Fire Department:	5 Tankers (Water Tenders)
Washington County Emergency Management:	1 Tanker (Water Tender)

Blue Whale Materials Employee Assistance — Forklifts and Skid Steers

Several Blue Whale Materials employees were on site throughout the incident. At the direction of incident command, employees utilized forklifts and a skid steer to move pallets and materials, isolating burning product and creating separation between involved and uninvolved areas. This operational assistance contributed to exposure protection and allowed suppression crews to direct water application at individual burning batteries. The investigative consequences of this scene disruption are documented in the Scene Examination section of this report.

Blue Whale Materials employees who operated forklifts and/or skid steers during fire suppression operations:

Josh Shambles:	Operated skid steer
Austin Burress:	Operated forklift
Terry Parker:	Operated forklift/skid steer
Corey Carter:	Operated forklift

RESTORATION AND CLEAN UP

Management at Blue Whale Materials has stated a third-party vendor “Clean Harbor” has been contracted to conduct site clean-up.

Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality (ODEQ) has been contacted and made aware of the fire incident.

Medical and Rehabilitation

Bartlesville Ambulance Service was on scene and established a rehabilitation area, allowing crews to cycle through for rest, hydration, and medical monitoring during extended operations. No civilian or firefighter injuries were reported. Firefighters operated in an environment with unknown inhalation exposure hazards due to the combustion byproducts of lithium-ion battery thermal runaway, including hydrogen fluoride, carbon monoxide, and volatile organic compounds. Firefighters utilized appropriate personal protective equipment throughout operations.

FIRE INVESTIGATIVE METHODOLOGY

This investigation was conducted in accordance with the scientific method as outlined in NFPA 921. The investigation followed a systematic approach:

- **Receipt of Assignment:** Fire Marshal Watson (FD-3) initiated the investigation upon arrival on scene at 22:06 hours, April 14, 2026.
- **Preliminary Scene Assessment:** Initial observations and safety evaluation conducted during active suppression operations.
- **Evidence Documentation:** Photographic of product, fire patterns, burn indicators, and scene conditions during and following suppression.
- **Data Analysis:** Examination of char patterns, thermal damage gradients, and origin indicators within the battery storage area.
- **Hypothesis Development:** Formulation of origin and cause theories based on physical evidence and known lithium-ion battery failure modes.
- **Hypothesis Testing:** Evaluation of theories against physical evidence, CAD/incident report data, employee observations, and established fire science.
- **Final Analysis:** Determination of fire area of origin and cause classification.

The investigation incorporated field examination during active and post-suppression phases, review of the Engine 3 incident report authored by Out-of-Class Captain Stephanie Silva, review and analysis of security/surveillance video footage provided by Blue Whale Materials, and application of NFPA 921 principles applicable to specialty materials fires.

SCENE EXAMINATION

Site Conditions Upon Investigator Arrival — 22:06 Hours, April 14, 2026

Fire Marshal Brady Watson (FD-3) arrived on scene at 22:06 hours while suppression operations were still active. FD-3 accessed the 5-acre storage yard via the west gate, which had been opened by Engine 3 personnel after cutting the original lock upon first-due arrival. Active water application from master stream devices and handlines was ongoing at the time of the investigator's arrival.

Area of Origin

Physical fire damage indicators, burn pattern intensity, and initial size-up observations documented by Out-of-Class Captain Silva are collectively consistent with a fire origin in the eastern to northeastern portion of the 5-acre storage yard — the location of active palletized battery storage at the time of the incident.

Burn patterns are consistent with a low, ground-level origin within the pallet storage configuration rather than from any external elevated or peripheral ignition source. The fire's initial presentation — multiple pallets heavily involved with 20-foot flame heights upon first-due arrival at 21:24 hours, approximately 7 minutes after the PSAP call at 21:17 hours — is consistent with rapid escalation from a thermal runaway event that had been developing for some period prior to discovery. This observation is further corroborated by the video surveillance timeline, which documented visible smoke at the area of origin at approximately 21:02 hours, approximately 15 minutes before the PSAP call.

Floor of Origin:

Ground level — pallet storage area, open-air yard.

Area of Origin:

Eastern to northeastern sector of the battery storage yard, 1582 SE Industrial Boulevard, Bartlesville, Oklahoma, consistent with NERIS incident data and field observations.

Fire Development and Behavior

Lithium-ion batteries are subject to thermal runaway, a self-sustaining exothermic decomposition reaction within a cell that produces intense heat, flammable gases, and in many cases fire and mechanical rupture of the cell casing. Once initiated in a single cell, thermal runaway generates sufficient radiant and conductive heat to trigger cascading thermal runaway in adjacent cells and batteries. In the storage configuration present at Blue Whale Materials — end-of-life batteries in cardboard boxes (gaylords) on wooden pallets staged in close proximity — the cardboard packaging, plastic battery casings, and wooden pallets provide supplemental fuel loading that accelerates flame spread between storage units. This configuration is consistent with the rapid, large-scale fire development observed upon first-due arrival and with the sustained high heat release rate that required multiple hours of large-volume master stream operations to fully control.

Scene Disruption

A significant limiting factor of this investigation is the extent of scene disruption that occurred during suppression operations. Blue Whale Materials employees, acting at the direction of incident command, utilized forklifts and a skid steer to spread burning and adjacent battery product beginning at approximately 22:00 hours. This action was tactically appropriate and contributed to confinement of the fire to the storage yard; however, it produced the following investigative consequences:

- The original spatial arrangement of pallets, battery casings, and cardboard boxes was disturbed and destroyed prior to complete investigative documentation of the scene.
- Burn pattern indicators on individual pallets and boxes were disrupted or obliterated by mechanical displacement.
- Battery cells that may have represented the specific origin battery were crushed, scattered, or commingled with secondary-involvement product.

- Additional batteries not originally involved in the fire were damaged or destroyed during mechanical spreading.
- From approximately 23:00 hours on April 14 through approximately 04:30 hours on April 15, a skid steer and forklifts were used to spread remaining debris to a single layer during hot spot checks, further disturbing post-suppression evidence.

These scene conditions are documented per NFPA 921 as factors that place limitations on the investigation and are fully accounted for in the origin and cause classification that follows.

ORIGIN AND CAUSE DETERMINATION

Area of Origin

In accordance with NFPA 921, the area of origin is defined as the general geographic location within a scene where the fire began. Based on physical fire damage indicators, burn pattern analysis, thermal damage gradients, first-arriving unit size-up data, and documented fire behavior, the area of origin is determined to be:

Eastern to northeastern portion of the 5-acre open-air battery storage yard at 1582 Industrial Boulevard. The active palletized lithium-ion battery storage area at the time of the incident.

Point of Origin

The specific point of origin; the individual battery, box, or pallet from which thermal runaway first initiated, could not be identified. Scene disruption from forklift and skid steer operations during suppression, combined with total thermal destruction of the storage product in the origin area, precluded identification of a specific origin item. Per NFPA 921, when origin cannot be identified to a specific point due to fire damage and scene disruption, Undetermined is the scientifically appropriate and professionally required classification for that element.

Video Evidence Examination

Blue Whale Materials provided security/surveillance video footage spanning 20:00 hours to 23:43 hours on April 14, 2026. The footage was captured from a camera mounted on the south side of the building at 1560 SE Industrial Boulevard (designated the South Building), facing south. This camera captured the majority of the fire incident from initial smoke development through suppression operations.

The camera is identified as: S. Bldg. South Pan Tilt Camera.

Video Incident Timeline

(This timeline is based on security/surveillance camera video footage timestamps from Blue Whale Materials and recorded radio/telecommunication dispatching records from the Bartlesville Dispatch Center.)

19:59:58 — Video begins. Employees and/or third-party vendors and contractors are present on the property at 1560 SE Industrial Boulevard. Multiple vehicles are visible in the south parking lot. No fire activity is observed in the south storage yard. A United States flag mounted on the northeast corner of the south storage yard fence is moving consistent with strong winds from the south/southwest. The north vehicle gate to the south storage yard is closed.

20:16 — Light rain is observed beginning on the property.

20:52 — Rain intensity has increased. Visible moisture is present on the concrete parking lot surface.

21:02:14 — A small release of smoke is observed emanating from the area of origin in the south storage yard. This is consistent with the incipient stage of fire development.

21:02:32 — Smoke and visible flames are observed at the area of origin in the south storage yard. Fire behavior is consistent with the growth stage of fire development.

21:02:51 — Sustained fire growth is observed at the area of origin in the south storage yard.

21:09:36 — A dark-colored SUV pulls into the south parking lot of 1560 SE Industrial Boulevard and parks in a stall facing north, directly behind a white four-door sedan.

21:10:12 — An unidentified male with dark hair exits the SUV and opens the rear passenger door to don safety gear, including a reflective vest, safety helmet, and backpack. The male then walks toward the portable/modular building at 1560 SE Industrial Boulevard and enters the structure. Based on his direction of travel, it does not appear that he observed the fire in the south storage yard at that time.

21:12:55 — Horn and strobe notification devices mounted on the light poles within the south storage yard activate, indicating the fire alarm control panel has detected a fire condition within the yard.

21:14:52 — An unidentified male wearing a green reflective shirt and white safety helmet is observed walking southbound from the portable/modular building area toward the south storage yard. The male appears to be observing the smoke condition and appears to be speaking on a cellular phone, with his right hand raised to his right ear. He proceeds to the north gate to observe the fire, then walks westbound along the gravel road between 1560 and 1582 SE Industrial Boulevard, exiting the camera's field of view at 21:16:28.

21:16:11 — The on-duty security guard is observed inside the south storage yard running toward the fire on the east side of the yard. Upon arriving at the fire area, the guard observes the fire for several seconds, then moves toward the north gate. The guard exits through a pedestrian gate located east of the north vehicle gate and attempts to unlock and slide open the vehicle gate. For reasons not apparent on video, the guard is initially unable to open the vehicle gate. The guard re-enters the storage yard through the pedestrian gate and subsequently opens the vehicle gate. The guard then exits the storage yard and is observed running westbound along the fence line until exiting the camera's field of view.

21:16:55 — A Securitas Technology dispatcher (first name: Cheryl) contacts Bartlesville Dispatch Center to report a fire alarm activation at 1582 SE Industrial Boulevard, Bartlesville, Oklahoma 74006. Cheryl advises that a fire alarm activated at 21:16 hours on Pole No. 4, Flame Detector. The listed point of contact for the property is Corey Carter with Blue Whale Materials. Cheryl further advises that a second fire alarm notification was received on Pole No. 3, Zone 20, Flame Detector, at 21:17 hours. Securitas Technology callback number: 1-800-548-4478.

21:18:38 — Bartlesville Dispatch Center dispatches Engine 3 and Engine 4 to 1582 SE Industrial Boulevard for a flame detector/fire alarm activation.

21:18 — Blue Whale Materials employee Rob Bigbee contacts Fire Marshal Brady Watson by cell phone to advise that the fire alarm activation is believed to be an actual fire in the south storage yard. Fire Marshal Watson relays this information directly to Battalion Chief Edwin Brown by phone. Battalion Chief Brown confirms that units are already en route and states he will pass the information to responding apparatus.

21:19:34 — The on-duty security guard opens the north vehicle gate.

21:20 — The fire in the south storage yard is observed in a rapid growth stage, transitioning toward a fully developed fire condition.

21:20:34 — Engine 3 radios Bartlesville Dispatch Center confirming response to the fire alarm.

21:20:58 — Engine 4 radios Bartlesville Dispatch Center confirming response to the fire alarm.

21:22:23 — Blue Whale Materials employee Rob Bigbee arrives on scene in a dark four-door pickup truck, parking approximately 150 feet from the north vehicle gate. He exits the vehicle and observes the fire.

21:23:20 — Engine 11 radios Bartlesville Dispatch Center confirming response to the fire alarm.

21:24:04 — An unidentified female caller contacts Bartlesville Dispatch Center via 911 to report observing a large fire in the industrial park while passing the area. Dispatch advises the caller that fire units are already en route.

21:24 — Engine 3 radios Bartlesville Dispatch confirming arrival on scene in the industrial park.

21:24 — Engine 4 radios Bartlesville Dispatch confirming arrival on scene. Captain Tate (Engine 4) reports this appears to be a large fire. Out-of-Class Captain Silva (Engine 3) radios that Engine 3 is making entry to the yard via the Knox Box (west vehicle gate); reports multiple pallets on fire with heavy flame conditions.

21:24:42 — Engine 3 advances inside the south storage yard and positions the apparatus approximately 200 feet from the active fire. Engine 3's crew deploys attack handlines and initiates defensive suppression and cooling operations.

21:24:50 — Engine 4 advances inside the south storage yard and positions approximately 30 feet behind Engine 3.

21:25:35 — Battalion Chief Edwin Brown (Battalion 1) arrives on scene and makes contact with Rob Bigbee, who is positioned on the north side of the south storage yard observing the fire.

21:26 — Employees and/or third-party contractors begin moving personal vehicles out of the parking lot between the 1560 and 1582 SE Industrial Boulevard properties.

21:26:29 — A Bartlesville Police Department officer arrives on the roadway where Battalion Chief Brown and Rob Bigbee are located. The officer makes contact with both individuals, after which Rob Bigbee returns to his vehicle and repositions it further from the fire scene.

21:27:17 — Battalion 1 (Brown) radios Station 2 to initiate emergency hire back of off-duty firefighters, requesting additional crews and a second Battalion Chief.

21:27:36 — Engine 3 radios that they will attempt to connect to the fire hydrant in the southeast corner of the south storage yard; however, access was precluded by active fire and debris.

21:28:08 — The Bartlesville Police officer makes contact with the on-duty security officer. Following this contact, the security officer conducts a sweep of the portable/modular building area to assist in clearing personnel from the immediate fire scene near 1560 SE Industrial Blvd. Additional employees and contractors are observed returning to their vehicles and departing the area.

21:28:34 — Tower 1 is en route to the industrial park.

21:29:50 — Engine 3 starts applying water on the burning pallets and material.

21:29:58 — Engine 4 requests that Blue Whale Materials employees operate forklifts to begin moving product away from the fire. Battalion 1 acknowledges and coordinates directly with Blue Whale personnel on scene.

21:30:11 — Engine 11 arrives on scene.

21:34 — Engine 11 connects to fire hydrant at the intersection between 1560 and 1582 SE Industrial Blvd.

21:36 — Tower 1 arrives on scene and begins positioning for aerial master stream operations on the north roadway between 1560 and 1582 SE Industrial Boulevard.

21:37 — Fire Chief H.C. Call (FD-1) arrives on scene.

21:37:17 — Bartlesville Police radios Bartlesville Dispatch Center to advise Battalion 1 that the building at 1560 SE Industrial Boulevard, north of the fire, has been completely cleared of occupants.

21:38 — Engine 11 activated the fire hydrant that was supplying Engine 4.

21:40:05 — Engine 3 radios Battalion 1 to report the apparatus water supply is exhausted.

21:45:03 — Tower 1 extends the platform ladder and begins flowing an aerial master stream, supplied from the fire hydrant located west of the north vehicle gate at 1582 SE Industrial Boulevard.

21:51:48 — Battalion 1 requests that Bartlesville Dispatch Center contact the water treatment plant to activate additional pumps, increasing pressure and volume on the fire hydrant supply lines.

21:53:27 — Battalion 1 advises that a tornado warning has been issued for Tulsa County and requests that Bartlesville Dispatch keep incident command informed of any additional inclement weather tracking toward Bartlesville.

21:57:11 — Bartlesville Dispatch dispatches Dewey Fire Department for mutual aid to 1582 SE Industrial Boulevard.

22:00:45 — Battalion 1 requests that Bartlesville Dispatch Center dispatch Oglesby Fire Department and Washington County Emergency Management to provide additional tankers/water tenders to 1582 SE Industrial Boulevard.

22:05:42 — Dewey Fire Department Chief Terry Young (Dewey FD-1) arrives on scene and stages near Tower 1 in the roadway between 1560 and 1582 SE Industrial Boulevard.

22:06 — Bartlesville Fire Department Fire Marshal / Fire Investigator Brady Watson (FD-3) arrives on scene and initiates the fire investigation.

22:07:40 — Dewey Fire Department Tanker arrives on scene and begins water shuttle operations in support of Tower 1. Portable dump tanks are positioned in front of Tower 1.

22:09:38 — Deputy Fire Chief Barry Campbell (FD-2) requests one ambulance from Bartlesville Ambulance Service and requests Washington County Emergency Management assistance in establishing a firefighter rehabilitation area.

22:12:28 — Battalion 2 (emergency hire back, Battalion Chief David Taylor) radios Battalion 1 (Brown) to advise that Stations 2, 3, and Central Fire Station are staffed with hireback crews.

22:12:49 — Dewey Fire Department Engine arrives on scene and begins pumping water from the dump tanks to Tower 1 via a supply line, supporting continued aerial master stream operations.

22:30 — Weather conditions update: rain intensity has increased and wind conditions have strengthened, with winds shifting to the southwest.

22:34:02 — Bartlesville Fire Department Training Officer / Safety Officer Curtis Formby (FD-4) arrives on scene.

22:41:56 — Ochelata Fire Department arrives on scene with tankers/water tenders.

23:33:39 — Fire Chief H.C. Call (FD-1) notifies Bartlesville Dispatch Center that the fire is under control.

23:43:25 — End of available video footage from Blue Whale Materials.

00:00:17 (04/15/2026) — Engine 11 clears the scene at 1582 SE Industrial Boulevard and proceeds to Central Fire Station for equipment decontamination.

00:08:05 — Engine 4 clears the scene at 1582 SE Industrial Boulevard and proceeds to Central Fire Station for equipment decontamination.

00:51:42 — Training Officer / Safety Officer Curtis Formby (FD-4) is released by command and clears the scene.

02:30 (Approximately) — Reserve Engine arrived on scene to relief Engine 3 from the fire scene. (Reserve Engine: Captain Jimmy Scully, Equipment Operator Phillip Mendell, Firefighter Mark Curtis, and Firefighter Mark Stukey.

23:30:00 through approximately 04:30 (04/15/2026) — Blue Whale Materials employees Josh Shambles and Terry Parker continue using skid steers and a forklift to maneuver burned and unburned product throughout the south storage yard. Bartlesville Fire Department personnel continue to apply water via master streams to cool product and extinguish extension fires as needed. Employees spread fire-involved material to a single layer in and around the area of origin and seat of the fire to facilitate extinguishment. Significant destruction of product is observed both as a direct result of the fire and as a consequence of the mechanical spreading operations.

04:40 (Approximately) (04/15/2026)— All units from the fire incident at 1582 SE Industrial Boulevard clear the scene and return to service.

Video Evidence — Investigative Notes

During an interview conducted on Wednesday, April 15, 2026, the day following the fire incident, on-duty third-party security officers stated that the thermal cameras located within the south storage yard had not been functioning correctly and had not been accessible for monitoring at the security desk for approximately two weeks prior to the fire.

During review of the security/surveillance video footage, it was observed that the flame detectors did not activate the fire alarm control panel until approximately 21:12:55. This is a significant finding: visible fire was observed by video at the area of origin at approximately 21:02:51, indicating an approximate 10-minute delay between observable fire conditions and flame detector activation. This delay may be attributable to detector positioning, sensitivity settings, or the possibility that the detectors were not functioning correctly at the time of the incident — consistent with the security officers' statement regarding inoperative thermal cameras in the same yard.

Cause Determination

Fire Cause:	Accidental / Unintentional
Origin Battery:	Undetermined
Ignition Mechanism:	Spontaneous thermal runaway — internal failure of a consumer-grade lithium-ion battery cell
First Material Ignited:	Lithium-ion battery cell(s); cardboard packaging and/or wooden pallet material and plastic casing
Fire Spread Path:	Cell-to-cell and pallet-to-pallet with thermal runaway propagation

Basis for Accidental / Unintentional Classification

The fire is classified as Accidental / Unintentional. This classification is supported by analysis of the physical evidence through application of the scientific method as required by NFPA 921. Consumer-grade lithium-ion batteries received at end-of-life recycling facilities represent a population with elevated spontaneous thermal runaway risk due to the following mechanisms:

- **Internal Short Circuit via Dendrite Formation.** Over the charge/discharge lifecycle of a lithium-ion cell, metallic lithium dendrites can grow through the separator membrane, eventually bridging the electrodes and creating an internal short circuit. This process requires no external trigger and can occur while a battery is at rest.

- **Manufacturing Defect — Latent Internal Contamination.** Metal particle contamination introduced during battery production can create a defect that remains dormant through much of the cell's service life before triggering an internal short with no external cause.
- **Separator Degradation.** The physical separator between battery electrodes degrades with age, heat exposure, and physical stress. A compromised separator can fail spontaneously without any externally applied heat or force.
- **High State of Charge (SOC) at Time of Storage.** End-of-life consumer batteries frequently arrive at recycling programs at unknown — including fully charged — states of charge. Batteries stored at or near 100% SOC are significantly more chemically unstable than those stored at partial SOC.
- **Prior Overcharge or Physical Damage History.** Batteries with a history of overcharging, over-discharge, or physical impact may carry latent structural damage that is not externally visible and that can trigger delayed thermal runaway when the battery is at rest.

Any one or combination of the above mechanisms is consistent with the observed fire originating spontaneously from within the battery storage area without any external ignition source. No evidence of incendiary origin — including accelerant patterns, multiple unconnected points of origin inconsistent with thermal runaway propagation, indicators of forced entry, or indicators of tampering — was identified.

Elimination of Other Causes

Incendiary (Arson):	No indicators of deliberate fire-setting. No accelerant patterns. No access breach beyond suppression-related gate cut. No known motive. ELIMINATED.
Natural:	No lightning, seismic activity, or other natural phenomenon identified as a contributing factor. Meteorological data does not support natural causation. ELIMINATED.
Accidental — External Ignition:	No external heat source impinging on the storage area was identified. Accidental internal battery failure (thermal runaway) is the most probable mechanism supported by the physical evidence.

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS CONSIDERATIONS

Combustion Products — Lithium-Ion Battery Thermal Runaway

Thermal runaway in lithium-ion battery cells generates a complex mixture of hazardous combustion and decomposition products. Personnel operating at this incident were exposed to an environment with unknown inhalation hazards throughout extended operations. Relevant hazardous materials produced include:

Hydrogen Fluoride (HF):	Highly toxic gas from decomposition of fluorine-containing electrolyte solvents (LiPF ₆). Immediately dangerous to life and health at low concentrations. Primary inhalation hazard.
Carbon Monoxide (CO):	Product of incomplete combustion. SCBA required throughout all operations.
Volatile Organic Compounds:	Including benzene, toluene, and other compounds from electrolyte decomposition.
Lithium Oxides / Salts:	Residual in post-fire debris. Reactive with water; skin and respiratory irritant.
Fine Particulate:	Carbon and metal oxide particulate from combusted battery components and cell casings.

TIMELINE OF EVENTS — ENGINE 3 FIRE INCIDENT REPORT (NERIS/CAD)

All times are from the NERIS/CAD incident record (Incident No. 2026-1451) and the Engine 3 incident report. Times noted as estimated are from the narrative authored by Out-of-Class Captain Stephanie Silva.

Time	Event
21:17:00 04/14/2026	PSAP receives report of fire in battery storage yard at Blue Whale Materials, 1582 Industrial Boulevard.
21:18:58	Dispatch of Engine 4 and FD-3 (Watson).
21:20:41	Engine 3 dispatched. En route: 21:20:43.
21:21:07	Engine 4 en route.
21:21:13	Battalion 1 dispatched. En route: 21:21:15.
21:24:56	Engine 3 on scene — first-due arrival. Out-of-Class Captain Stephanie Silva conducts size-up. Lock cut on west gate for access. Approximately 80 ft. x 80 ft. battery storage area with multiple pallets fully involved; 20-ft. flame heights; significant radiant heat.
21:25:08	Engine 4 on scene.
21:28 hrs (est.)	Water on fire — E3 and E4. Two 1¾-inch preconnects and one 2½-inch attack line deployed. Three blitz monitors in operation. Battalion 1 on scene at 21:28:08; assumes Incident Command.
21:35:46	Tower 1 dispatched. On scene: 21:35:48. Positioned north side of yard.
21:38 hrs (est.)	E3 and E4 exhaust initial water supply. Water temporarily interrupted while E11 establishes hydrant supply.
21:43 hrs (est.)	E11 establishes sustained hydrant supply. Three blitz monitors and E3 deck gun flowing.
21:47:28	FD-2 (Campbell) on scene.
22:00 hrs (est.)	Tower 1 operational. Water shuttle underway. Blue Whale employees begin forklift/skid steer pallet operations under IC direction.
22:06:00	FD-3 (Watson) on scene. Fire investigation initiated.
22:34:13	FD-4 (Formby) dispatched.
23:15 hrs (est.)	Water stopped. TIC hot spot check. Skid steer debris movement. Fire declared under control.
23:35:45	FD-4 (Formby) on scene.
00:15 hrs 04/15/2026	Water resumed on smoldering debris. Two blitz monitors and E3 deck gun flowing.
03:00 hrs (est.)	TIC hot spot check. Skid steer spreads debris to single layer. Some areas re-flare during movement.
05:00 hrs (est.)	Crews depart Blue Whale Materials.

NFPA 1033 COMPLIANCE

This investigation was conducted in accordance with NFPA 1033: *Standard for Professional Qualifications for Fire Investigator*. The following job performance requirements were addressed:

- **Scene Documentation:** Scene examined, photographed, and documented during and following suppression operations. Scene disruption factors documented per NFPA 921.
- **Evidence Collection and Preservation:** Physical evidence observations documented. Limiting factors formally recorded.
- **Interview and Data Collection:** Engine 3 incident report reviewed. Security/surveillance video footage reviewed and analyzed. Employee and security personnel observations incorporated. Allied Security log review recommended.

- **Origin Determination:** Area of origin established through burn pattern analysis and first-due observations. Specific origin battery classified Undetermined per NFPA 921.
- **Cause Determination:** Determined through application of the scientific method. All cause categories evaluated. Cause: Accidental / Unintentional.
- **Report Preparation:** Report prepared by Brady Watson, Fire Marshal / Fire Investigator, City of Bartlesville Fire Department.

CONCLUSION AND CAUSE CLASSIFICATION

The area of fire origin was determined to be the eastern to northeastern portion of the 5-acre open-air battery storage yard at 1582 Industrial Boulevard, Bartlesville, Oklahoma — the active palletized lithium-ion battery storage area at the time of the incident.

Physical fire damage indicators were examined. No hard evidence was identified to support any external ignition source, incendiary act, or natural cause. The weight of evidence is consistent with spontaneous thermal runaway within one or more consumer-grade lithium-ion battery cells stored within the identified area of origin.

The specific origin battery, pallet, or box from which the fire first initiated cannot be identified due to: total thermal destruction of the product in the origin area; physical displacement of pallets and battery debris during forklift and skid steer operations; and the homogeneous nature of the stored product precluding differentiation of origin material from secondary-involvement material.

Cause Classification: **ACCIDENTAL / UNINTENTIONAL — ORIGIN BATTERY UNDETERMINED**

The cause of this fire is determined to be Accidental / Unintentional — the result of a spontaneous thermal runaway event within one or more end-of-life consumer-grade lithium-ion battery cells. The specific origin battery cannot be identified and is classified as Undetermined per NFPA 921. This undetermined element does not affect the overall Accidental / Unintentional cause classification, which is supported to a reasonable degree of professional certainty as defined by NFPA 921 and NFPA 1033.

REPORT CERTIFICATION

This report has been prepared in accordance with NFPA 921: *Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations* and NFPA 1033: *Standard for Professional Qualifications for Fire Investigator*. The opinions and conclusions contained herein are based on the facts known at the time of report preparation and are subject to modification should additional information become available.

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Original Report Date: April 22, 2026

Updated Report on: April 23, 2026 (grammar editing)

END OF REPORT