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SOUTHERN AFRICAN JIHAD THE CABO DELGADO INSURGENCY

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PART I: UNCOVERING THE ORIGINS OF THE CABO DELGADO INSURGENCY

Executive Summary

The ongoing Cabo Delgado insurgency threatens:

- the country's all-important liquefied natural gas projects in the Afungi Peninsula area,
- cross border trade between Mozambique and Tanzania,
- other economic activities in the province such as mining and tourism.

Some potential may also exist for the insurgency to spread further.

In a 3 part series, Intelyse will examine the origins of the insurgency, the escalation of militant activity in the province in 2019, and the group's likely trajectory in 2020, including its potential impacts on security, politics, and commercial interests in the region.

In part 1 of this series, Intelyse intends to outline the origins and identity of the militants of Cabo Delgado. Since October 2017, the province has seen an increasingly deadly insurgency: Often attributed to the spread through Kenya and Tanzania of violent Islamic jihad attributed to the legacy of radical Kenyan Muslim cleric Aboud Rogo. This report will show that the migrating jihadis have found deep-rooted support within a marginalized minority segment of the local Muslim community.

Poverty and government neglect/marginalization, combined with feelings of resentment and disillusionment, are widespread throughout in Cabo Delgado.

The presence of rich natural resources and expanding levels of foreign investment have not benefited local communities. The Cabo Delgado province provides an environment primed for expanding, interconnected organized crime and violent extremism.




Image 1: Heatmapping of insurgency related incidents in Central Coastal Cabo Delgado, 01 May – 30 November 2019

The insurgency campaign is expanding geographically into areas designated for gas development, towards ruby deposit concentrates and the logistics and tourism hub of Pemba. As foreign businesses increase their presence, investment and operational activity in this area, it becomes

increasingly important to understand the Cabo Delgado insurgency as a significant and growing threat for 2020.

Poverty and Riches in Cabo Delgado

Cabo Delgado is located in north-eastern Mozambique, bordering Tanzania to the north, Niassa Province to the west, and Nampula Province to the south. The province is home to approximately 2.3 million people consisting primarily of ethnic Makonde, Macau, and Mwani peoples. The Mwani, with a population of between 120,000-200,000 are a minority Muslim community, with a history of conflict with the larger, mostly Catholic Makonde community.

According to World Bank data from 2017, Mozambique was ranked as the 7th poorest country in the world, with an average annual gross national income of \$1,200 per person in the country. While there has been progress in the last 15 years in reducing poverty in Mozambique, Northern regions such as Zambezia, Nampula, Niassa, and Cabo Delgado have not seen the same substantial improvement that has been seen in the Central and Southern regions of the country. For example, between 1996 -2015, poverty rates in Maputo City and Maputo province fell by around 70%, vs. a 20% reduction in most of the north, including Cabo Delgado.

The province has long been regarded as neglected, politically marginalized, and underdeveloped. At around 60% Cabo Delgado has the highest illiteracy rate in Mozambique: approximately 35% of children not attending school, and just 0.3% of post-secondary school education. Thousands of youths remain unemployed in the province as well, with youth unemployment estimated as high as 88%.

At the same time, the province possesses the country's most important natural resources. These include the largest deposits of rubies in the world, large stocks of timber, and most significantly, the presence of large reserves of natural gas in the Rovuma basin area, south of Palma town. 2019 has seen significant progress in plans to begin commercially processing these gas reserves at liquefaction plants on the Afungi Peninsula in the Caba Delgado district. In June, Anadarko Petroleum Corporation announced a Final Investment Decision (FID), representing a \$20 billion investment into the liquefaction and exportation element for Area 1 of the project, and the largest single LNG project approved in Africa. Reports indicated that FIDs on other elements of the wider LNG project are anticipated for companies including Total and Exxon in 2020. Foreign investment on this scale has not previously been seen in Mozambique and according to some investments, if successful, could more than double the country's GDP in the coming years.

Cabo Delgado's largely impoverished population has seen little to no benefit in recent years from the discovery and exploitation of these resources. This has triggered growing resentment and frustration at both the government and foreign entities operating in the province, setting the stage for the rise of an enigmatic insurgency.

Illicit activity, however, is thriving in the province. Meanwhile, government neglect, the porous nearby border with Tanzania, access to the sea, densely forested terrain, and poor economic prospects have led the province to become a lucrative area for organized criminal syndicates. Criminal factions operate in Northern Mozambique and Southern Tanzania, with many Mozambican groups reportedly based in Nampula province to the south. Rubies, timber, ivory, and heroin are all smuggled through Cabo Delgado, with human trafficking networks also active in the region.

Stage Set for Insurgency

The traditionally dominant form of Islam in Cabo Delgado for centuries has been a form of moderate Sufi Islam with local traditions and practices. This local brand of Islam was regarded as tolerant and had long co-existed peacefully with Christians and Animists dating back to the days of Portuguese rule. In the 1970s, a new and more conservative style of Sunni Islam entered Mozambique as Muslim Mozambicans who had studied in Saudi Arabia returned to the country. This conservative strain, however, remained a minority. Conservative Sunni practices became somewhat more common over time as a reaction to the persecution of Muslims by the anti-religious FRELIMO government during the first years after independence, though Sufism was and is still the dominant form of Islam in the province.

Clashes with Islamist elements in Mozambique were reported as early as the late 1980s, though the current insurgency appears to have roots in events that occurred about a decade later. In 1998, a group of young northern Mozambican Muslim leaders broke away from the Sunni Mozambique Islamic Council, officially forming Ansar al Sunna (AAS), also later known as Ahlu Sunna wa Jamma (ASWJ). AAS/ASWJ was initially formed due to the perception that black African members of Mozambique's Muslim community were discriminated against by Mozambican Arab and Asian Muslim leaders, and "African" members disdain for the council's close ties to the FRELIMO government. AAS/ASWJ would become increasingly Islamist, gaining a small but dedicated number of followers.

By 2014, individuals using the same group name(s) (AAS/ASWJ), would build 2 mosques in Mocimboa da Praia. Note that it is unclear if this later manifestation of AAS/ASWJ was a direct continuation of the group set up in 1998, or if the new group was merely inspired by the first. The new AAS/ASWJ group will continue to be referred to using this acronym.




Image 2: Cabo Delgado Insurgency, Natural Resources, and Key Locations

What is clear is that AAS/ASWJ elements before 2014 had been working to convert young men, primarily from the Mwani ethnic group, and to break away from existing mosques. Group members made efforts to disassociate themselves from the state, including from state schools and courts to establish their own "society". No clear central leader of the group emerged at this time. Instead, a number of clerics appeared to have initially formed a loose association with one another; some of these leaders appeared to have had some contact with Islamist and even jihadist circles outside of Mozambique.

At this time, most AAS/ASWJ members appeared to have been young, male Mwani Cabo Delgado natives, many of them itinerant street traders or unemployed. In 2015, there were reports of a number of confrontations in local mosques, in which AAS/ASWJ members entered wearing shoes and reportedly armed with knives, intent on challenging local Islamic practices and imams as not truly Islamic.

As early as 2014, AAS/ASWJ members had reportedly become involved with criminal smuggling syndicates operating in Northern Mozambique and Southern Tanzania. This participation seems to have been primarily as members of criminal syndicates controlling ruby, timber, and illicit drug smuggling as well as human trafficking activities in the province. These activities took members into both Tanzania and Nampula province. Many group members at this time also reportedly joined the group after being offered business loans by AAS/ASWJ. During this period, many members would accumulate significant wealth. It is also important to note that around this time, sources differ as to whether the group was AAS/ASWJ itself or was a new, more radical group made up of ex-AAS/ASWJ members.

By late 2015, the group had begun to form military cells, and it may have been around this time that the group became known locally as "al Shabaab" (AS), Arabic for "the youth"; note that there are no direct links between the Somali group of the same name. Also in 2015, the group appears to have made contact with and been further radicalized by a group of foreigners active in the same smuggling circles in Southern Tanzania and Northern Mozambique.

Radical Kenyan Cleric's Reach Beyond the Grave

Aboud Rogo was a radical Kenyan Muslim cleric who had been based in the port city of Mombasa since the late 1980s. He became radicalized after an Islamic political party he had campaigned for was banned.


Retreating completely from politics, Rogo was disillusioned with the Kenyan government which he then viewed as illegitimate. In 1998, he reportedly provided material and other forms of support to al Qaeda cells that conducted the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam embassy attacks. In 2002, he was arrested in connection with a bombing in Mombasa that left 13 dead and in 2005, established contacts with Islamist elements operating in Somalia. After 2007, Rogo was believed to have had direct links to al Shabaab (AS), the Somali hard-line Islamist militant group, and reportedly visited an AS training camp in Somalia in 2009. Rogo from his Mombasa mosque preached that true Muslims should travel to Somalia to fight for the group. Rogo fiercely

condemned Kenya's decision to join the war in Somalia against AS in 2012, and praised AS attacks in Kenya as "just retribution".

In 2012, Rogo was arrested for possession of guns, ammunition, and detonators, and faced charges of belonging to AS. That year the UN Security Council also sanctioned Rogo for providing "financial, material, logistical, or technical support" to AS. He was also believed to be the key leader of "al Hijra", the Kenyan franchise of AS. Despite these charges, Rogo was released on bail in February 2012. In televised sermons in April and July, he would go on to praise terror attacks in Kenya and called the Kenyan security services "infidels".

On 27 August 2012, Rogo was shot and killed in Mombasa. Rogo's killing is widely believed to have been conducted by Kenyan security forces who regarded Rogo as too dangerous to be allowed to live – even if in Kenyan government custody.

Despite Rogo's death, his legacy would live on. An incredibly charismatic preacher who praised al Qaeda and AS, Rogo's messages called for the rejection of the state, the importance of jihad, and a return to a more fundamentalist brand of Islam, saying that Muslims in Africa often did not understand their religion and that local Islamic practices had been corrupted. Rogo's messages in the East African lingua franca of Swahili were spread via CDs, tapes, and other propaganda his mosque began producing in the mid-2000s, and widely shared in Kenya, Tanzania, and beyond.



Rogo's Followers and Ideas Migrate South

Many of Rogo's followers in Kenya, fearing for their own lives after Rogo and other associated clerics were mysteriously assassinated, fled south into Tanzania. How many of these followers fled into Kenya, or even the identities of the leading individuals of this group remain unclear. What is clear, however, is that at least some of Rogo's followers, including some Tanzanians influenced by his readily available sermons, gathered in the Kibiti area of Rufiji district in southern Tanzania by early 2015.

Image 3: Kenya/Tanzania Group movements/key events in lead-up to Cabo Delgado insurgency

At this time in the area, a new group of preachers became active and were known as "walokole wa kiislamu", meaning Islamic revivalists or "born again" Muslims. These preachers were reportedly strongly influenced by Rogo's sermons. It is somewhat unclear if these clerics were directly connected to Rogo and his followers, or merely influenced by his teachings. Members of this new movement were reported to have built separate mosques in the area, and to have made attempts to take over existing mosques in Kibiti and nearby areas. Reports from the area at the time indicated that youths were being taught "new ideas" and given military training, with an emphasis on the need to cleanse the area of "impure religious practices".

In 2015, killings began in Kibiti in attacks targeting government and ruling party officials, as well as local authorities and civilians. A number of abductions were also reported at this time, as well as killings in which victims were mutilated or maimed. The area had experienced no similar violence prior to 2015. Sources in the area began reporting that youths began calling elders "kaffirs" and that some madrassa teachers had begun to prevent their students from attending secular schools, saying they were illegitimate and haram. These killings would not end until after a Tanzanian military operation in 2017, though Tanzania at no point would acknowledge that Islamic extremism could be a driving force behind the attacks. One of the last and most significant incidents in Tanzania occurred south of Dar es Salaam in April of 2017 in which unidentified gunmen shot and killed 8 police officers in a road ambush.

The Kibiti group was also reported to have ties to illegal poaching and charcoal smuggling in the area, becoming involved in criminal activity in Kibiti in 2015. Through these criminal networks, whose range of activity extended into northern Mozambique, the Kibiti group first appears to have made connections in 2015 with the growing AAS/ASWJ movement in Cabo Delgado.

After security operations in the Kibiti, other areas of Rufiji District, and elsewhere, Tanzanian authorities said multiple "bandits" had been killed and as many as 380 people were alleged to have "disappeared". Police officials said some of those responsible for the Kibiti and Rufiji killings had fled into Mozambique. The group in Kibiti/Rufiji comprising of followers of Rogo, as well as other local converts, appeared to have already established connections with an increasingly radical AAS/ASWJ group in Cabo Delgado. The two group's trajectories and actions in Kibiti and the Mocimboa da Praia area were already remarkably similar. This included the establishment of their own mosques, rejection of the state, attempts to force their conservative brands of Islam on more moderate communities, and connections to organized crime at roughly the same time. The primary difference between the two groups had been the Tanzanian side's violent actions, in which at least 40 people had been killed in a series of murders and small-scale attacks from 2015-2017. Violence related to these groups in Mozambique, however, would shortly eclipse anything seen previously in Tanzania.

Native Mozambican AAS/ASWJ members were now joined by some of the fundamentalists who had fled Kibiti. These were likely a mixture of Tanzanian, Ugandan, and Kenyan nationals – though some accounts have suggested a number of Somali, Congolese, and Burundian nationals had also joined the group. This new injection of radical elements set the stage for violence to begin in Mozambique. In the first half of 2017,

and possibly at an even earlier date, reports indicate that group members set up small training camps in Mocimboa da Praia, Macomia, and even Montepuez Districts. The group allegedly was able to hire former Mozambican policemen as well as border guards to provide group members with training. Sources also said the group had hired some members of the Somali AS network in Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania to provide military style training for its members.

IN PART II – THE INSURGENCY’S METEORIC 2019




Image 4: Tracked insurgency related incidents in Cabo Delgado,
01 May – 30 November 2019

In Part II, Intelyse will briefly discuss the beginnings of the insurgency in 2017-2018 before covering the group’s substantial escalation of attacks across several Cabo Delgado Districts in 2019. A relatively primitive insurgency in 2017 in which militants were primarily armed with machetes had transformed itself by the end of 2019. The group within the last year has become a well-equipped and coordinated insurgency that had inflicted multiple defeats on the Mozambican army, threatened the country’s most valuable economic project, and boasts growing ties with ISIS. Intelyse will discuss in depth the insurgency’s metamorphosis in 2019, before discussing the group’s likely future activities and impacts on the region’s security, politics, and commercial prospects in Part III.


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PART II: THE CABO DELGADO INSURGENCY: CABO DELGADO IGNITES, OCTOBER 2017 - JANUARY 2020

Executive Summary

Militants in October of 2017 began low-intensity attacks in remote areas of Cabo Delgado. This rudimentary rebellion, carried out by a small number of local insurgents armed with machetes at its inception, would by the end of January 2020 transform into an increasingly sophisticated, disruptive, and deadly insurgency active in the majority of the province and present a significant threat to oil and gas developments in Palma District.




- Militant attacks began in October 2017, remaining at a relatively low-intensity insurgency until a significant expansion in range and frequency of attacks in 2019. An inadequate security force response, fertile recruiting ground, and the establishment of safe-haven areas for insurgents all contributed to the explosion of militant activity seen in the province in 2019.
- While just 6 insurgency-related incidents were tracked by Intelyse in the province in April 2019, 36 incidents were tracked in November 2019 by contrast (see above image). The UN and Mozambican government by the end of January 2020 estimated that over 100,000 people had been displaced by the insurgency.
- Within nine months from 01 May 2019 to 31 January 2020, insurgents expanded their attacks to impact 9 of the province's 16 districts. This includes insurgent activity in late January 2020 in Quissanga District, which threatens to spill over into rural areas of Pemba District, the seat of the provincial capital Pemba.

- Ties between the insurgency and the Islamic State had been established within this period, with ISCAP claiming over 20 attacks in Cabo Delgado between 01 June 2019 – 31 January 2020.
- Insurgents by the end of 2019 and continuing into January 2020 had launched multiple successful attacks on hardened military targets – including successful raids on barracks in Mocimboa da Praia in December 2019 and January 2020. Increasingly sophisticated tactics utilized in insurgent attacks, as well as an improving insurgent arsenal, have also been noted throughout 2019 and through January 2020, and factor into the group's increasingly aggressive posture.
- Insurgent attacks from 01 May – 31 January 2020 also made travelling by road from Pemba to Palma increasingly perilous. These attacks combined with poor weather-related damage to road routes have increasingly forced O&G majors active in the Afungi Peninsula to either utilize local flights into the area or to look increasingly towards shipping equipment and personnel into the area via small local port facilities.
- 7 insurgency-related incidents were tracked by Intelyse in Palma District (the district in which O&G activity is concentrated on the Afungi Peninsula) from 01 November 2019 to 31 January 2020. While this is a relatively small number of incidents vs. Macomia, Mocimboa da Praia, and Muidumbe Districts over this period, insurgent activity continues in the area despite heavy security force deployments around Palma and the Afungi Peninsula.

A Maturing and Escalating Insurgency: July – August 2019

Following events from 2012 to 2017 that prepared the ground for an explosion of violent extremism in Cabo Delgado, by late 2017 militants in the province were ready to strike. AAS/ASWJ members had now merged with radicals from the Kibiti group fleeing Tanzania to form a new insurgent group which will now be referred to as “the insurgents” or “the insurgency”.

Key events in the early insurgency are detailed in the timeline below. Insurgents initially operated in small, loosely connected groups primarily across Mocimboa da Praia, Macomia, and Palma Districts, utilizing machetes and a limited number of small arms during this time.




By late 2018, the insurgency had escalated dangerously, building towards an even more significant escalation in mid-2019. Approximately 30 insurgent related incidents were reported from December

2018 – February 2019, compared to just 40 incidents from January – November 2018. This improvement in the insurgency’s capabilities and escalation in its activity was due to several factors:

- A favourable recruiting environment due to historical and socio-economic factors discussed in [Part I](#) of this series.
- The gradual improvement in militant weaponry and supplies due to raids on villages, isolated military posts, and purchases on the black market.
- An inadequate security response in which initially indiscriminate army operations on villages suspected to be harboring militants killed multiple civilians; military operations would quickly settle into static, defensive tactics around major towns and cities.
 - This allowed militants to move with relative freedom across Northeastern Cabo Delgado’s rural jungle areas.
 - The army’s defensive posture also allowed the establishment of jungle safe-haven camps by the militants, and the establishment of “no man’s land” areas where militants were known to be present but did not attempt to hold territory; in these areas civilians in general evacuated or were forced to provide some form of support for the militants, while Mozambican army units could expect to be attacked if they entered these areas.

This consolidation ultimately left the insurgency better equipped, with strong recruiting capabilities and established bases by the end of 2018. Adapting classic guerrilla/insurgency style techniques, the militant’s command structure also appeared to have become significantly more capable over time, adapting new and advanced tactics. **This was particularly highlighted by the 21 February 2019 incident highlighted in our timeline in which insurgents in a roadside ambush killed a contractor attached to O&G developments on the Afungi Peninsula.**



The Impact of Cyclone Kenneth and Islamic State:

01 May – 30 June 2019

From 21-29 April 2019, Cabo Delgado was hit by Cyclone Kenneth, causing widespread destruction and displacement across much of the province; some of those districts hit hardest by the cyclone lay in the northern half of Cabo Delgado, which were also the districts in which insurgents were operating, as can be seen in the above graphic. No attacks were reported from 14 April when warnings of the cyclone were initially reported to 03 May, a deceiving respite for the province that would prove to be the calm before the storm.

Amid the chaos and displacement caused by the cyclone, crops across much of the province were also destroyed, depriving both the local population and insurgent bands of food, and triggering more aggressive action. As previously discussed, insurgents had significantly improved their capabilities from Oct 2017 – Apr 2019 and now significantly increased their attacks.

Whereas only 6 different insurgent related incidents had been tracked by Intelyse in April 2019, 13 insurgent related clashes and attacks were recorded in May, beginning with a 03 May attack near Macomia town.


- This surge in incidents appeared to have been partially a result of insurgents taking advantage of vulnerabilities of a chaotic situation after the cyclone.
- Militants raided villages to replace their depleted food stocks – forcing the insurgents into a more aggressive stance at least partially by necessity. As can be seen in the above image, the areas in which attacks were reported dramatically expanded, with parts of Palma, Nangade, Mocimboa da Praia, and Macomia all impacted. In June, 9 militant related incidents were reported; this included 7 different incidents in which insurgents attacked unguarded villages in the province.
- Attacks during this period also began occurring along significant road routes, including between Palma and Mocimboa da Praia, a key route for O&G companies and their contractors travelling between the Afungi Peninsula and the provincial capital of Pemba. These road routes presented a tempting target for militants, who at this time were demonstrating their own newfound capabilities while also fully exploiting the military's limited ability to fully secure these routes. The insurgents at this time seem to have finally fully comprehended these limitations, and were increasingly prepared to directly challenge the Mozambican military.

The most significant development related to the insurgency in June was the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) in Mozambique, as the group's Central Africa Province (ISCAP) claimed an attack on 04 June in Mocimboa da Praia, saying it had killed a number of soldiers. The group likely made the choice to claim this first attack at this time as the insurgency was experiencing increasing rates of success and publicity while IS itself was in the midst of a propaganda campaign to demonstrate the group's continued capabilities worldwide despite the loss of the physical caliphate in Syria and Iraq. At the time of the writing of this report in early March 2020, 25+ attacks have been claimed by ISCAP in Mozambique since June 2019.

Brief: Islamic State in Mozambique


IS's involvement and presence in Mozambique had been suggested in several unverified reports prior to this incident, but no attack had ever been claimed by the group prior to 04 June 2019. The claiming of this and future attacks by the group's ISCAP franchise is significant, as this is the same regional franchise that claims attacks in the northeastern DRC, where ISCAP began claiming attacks just 2 months prior to the first claimed attacks in Cabo Delgado.

In the DRC, IS had been previously linked to a rebel group known as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) (see below image), a group with Ugandan origins that in recent years has transformed from a group opposed to Yoweri Museveni's Kampala government to a Salafist extremist group operating primarily in the DRC's North Kivu Province.




The depth of ties between the ADF and IS remain, though the US and Ugandan governments have both confirmed that IS has provided some funding to the ADF, and IS since April 2019 has claimed responsibility for attacks believed to be launched by ADF militants. Links between the ADF and the Cabo Delgado insurgents are not fully understood, though the Mozambican and Ugandan governments have both asserted the groups are linked, and several Ugandan nationals arrested in Cabo Delgado in 2018 and 2019 on charges of involvement in the insurgency are reportedly linked to the ADF. A UN report in January of 2020 also claimed that IS's Somalia franchise was directing operations in both the DRC and Mozambique; other reports have suggested that the ADF/ISCAP cell in North Kivu is directing ISCAP operations in Cabo Delgado.

The Insurgency Intensifies: 01 July – 31 August 2019



While insurgent attacks had surged in May and June 2019 in the aftermath of the cyclone to levels previously unseen in the province, more significant escalations would occur in July and August. Village raid and ambush-style incidents in which insurgents attacked primarily civilians significantly increased in July, with **18** such incidents tracked, while August 2019 saw only a slight drop-off with **16** such incidents tracked. **46** insurgency-related incidents were tracked during these 2 months– compared to just **21** such incidents over the previous two months.

- Emboldened insurgents during this period launched attacks in Palma, Nangade, Mocimboa da Praia, Muidumba, Macomia, and Quissanga Districts, demonstrating the group's ability to operate simultaneously in multiple locations and that a tipping point had occurred in which militants were now




fully aware and confident of the strength they had built since October 2017

- During this period, there were only a handful of reported incidents in which the insurgents clashed with troops, as the army remained largely in static positions, allowing insurgents freedom of movement and operations, thus giving the militants the definitive upper hand
- During this period, insurgents were particularly

active in Macomia District, with notable spill over into Muidumbe and Mocimboa da Praia Districts. **The highlighted area during July and August 2019 saw 28 insurgency-related violent incidents, including 22 Targeted Assault incidents, or 64% of all targeted assault incidents during this period.**

- This spike in attacks during this period was likely caused by the group's possibly unexpected successes in May and June 2019, with insurgent bands now confident in attacking isolated villages and military posts, knowing that the military response to their activities was likely to be limited.

The Government Responds: 01 September – 27 October 2019



After extremely active months in July and August, insurgent-related noticeably declined over September and October comparatively, dropping down to frequency levels comparable to May and June.

- This drop was partially due to increased security force deployments into Cabo Delgado in the leadup to the 15 October 2019 election; the Maputo government placed a high premium on countrywide stability during this time, and strongly desired to avoid a situation in which voting would be disrupted by insurgent activity. Ultimately, only a small number of polling places were unable to open due to insecurity while no major disruptions or headline-grabbing attacks occurred during this time – a significant success for the government.
- Between 01 September – 27 October 2019, just 7 insurgent raids were reported across the province, compared to 16 such attacks in just August. In October, there was a significant increase in tracked armed clashes incidents, including several reports by the government itself of operations carried out targeting insurgents in the province. The government's reporting of operations was significant,


demonstrating during this period apparent growing government confidence in launching offensives against the insurgents.

- This uptick in government offensive operations against the militants coincided with Russian private military contractors' (PMCs) appearance in Cabo Delgado providing support to Mozambican military units. This followed a deal that was struck between the Mozambican and Russian governments in August 2019. Russia has inked similar deals with other governments, such as the Syrian regime of Bashar al Assad, in which Russian PMCs provide support to the military of a country typically in return for a stake in natural resource deposits in a country. Russia also prizes the influence in a given country these agreements give to Moscow. Intelyse tracked 6 different incidents from 01-26 October in which Russian PMCs were present at clashes with insurgents. These joint operations for most of October appeared to be successful, with government reports indicating militant bases destroyed and large numbers of insurgents killed or driven out of areas of Mocimboa da Praia, Palma, Macomia, and other districts. Russian PMCs ceased to provide this direct support to the Mozambican military after the 27 October 2019 Miangalewa area ambush, detailed below.

Cabo Delgado on Fire: 27 October 2019 – 31 January 2020


Any sense of the government having gained the upper hand would be completely shattered within weeks of the relatively quiet election period. This swift deterioration of the situation in Cabo Delgado began on 27 October 2019 when a joint patrol of Mozambican troops and Russian PMCs was ambushed in the Miangalewa area; Intelyse reported the incident as follows:

27 October 2019: Reports have indicated that a convoy of Mozambican army troops and Russian private military contractors were ambushed on the afternoon of 27 October in the Namala region of the Miangalewa area in Cabo Delgado by insurgents. Insurgents allegedly erected barricades along an area of the road, and opened fire on the convoy. Sources said that 20 soldiers, along with 5 Russian military contractors, were killed in the attack; sources also said at least 3 military vehicles were set on fire by the insurgents. By the morning of 30 October, multiple sources had reported this incident though exact casualty counts and the presence of Russian personnel during the clashes remain unconfirmed. Other sources later confirmed the clashes but reported just 4 Mozambican soldiers killed, though also reporting a large number of soldiers fled from the ambush. Multiple sources, including Russian media, would later confirm at least 5 Russian PMCs killed in this incident – included 4 Russian PMCs who were reportedly beheaded.



This incident represented a true watershed moment as Russian PMCs withdrew, the Mozambican military reverted to its defensive posture, and militant attacks exploded across the province in November.


- The incident badly damaged the Russian PMC – Mozambican military relationship as Russian PMCs immediately withdrew from the field after this attack. Reports also indicated at this time that Russian PMC personnel had come to believe that elements within the Mozambican army had colluded with the insurgents, facilitating the 27 October 2019 ambush.
- Government bulletins on military operations ceased immediately after this incident and army patrols in areas where insurgents were known to operate also appear to have been halted at this time. The military, which had been doubly bolstered in September – October 2019 with additional reinforcements and Russian support, now withdrew back to major towns and bases almost immediately, allowing insurgents greatly increased freedom of operations.
- Insurgents in the weeks after 27 October redoubled their attacks across the core insurgent territories in Macomia, Mocimboa da Praia and Muidumbe District while Nangade, Quissanga, and Palma Districts also saw a flurry of incidents. November would see the highest number of



insurgency-related incidents yet recorded at 36, compared to just 27 incidents during the whole of September and October 2019.

- Insurgents also further escalated their activities in a 12 November 2019 attack, crossing the Rovuma River into Tanzania and attacking the village of Ngongo, killing at least 6 people in the first ever attack by the group in Tanzania.


In December, insurgent attacks retracted again, focused across Central Coastal Cabo Delgado, primarily in parts of Muidumbe, Macomia and Mocimboa da Praia Districts, the insurgent's key territories.



- Insurgents in December 2019 launched more attacks in Muidumbe District than in any previous month, with 9 attacks reported in the district, including 5 raids along the Xitaxi-Oasse route as part of an apparent strategy by the militants to create a larger “no man’s land” that they are able to establish secure bases in.



- Within the growing insurgent zone was a notable attack on 06 December 2019 in the Malali area, near Narere, in which insurgents killed at least 12 people, including 10 soldiers. ISCAP quickly claimed responsibility for this attack, publishing photos of captured weapons and at least one captured security force vehicle. The ISCAP claim in this case was significant as insurgents' faces were unobscured in photos from the attack, with ISIS flags also clearly visible (See image).
- Meanwhile in Palma District, outside the insurgent safe zone, only 2 incidents were recorded, though one of these attacks was very significant. Militants on 03 December 2019 ambushed vehicles in the Matapata area along the Palma – Mocimboa da Praia road, killing 2 people, and injuring at least one expatriate contractor working in the area, demonstrating the militant's continued ability to strike at this highly protected area.
- While insurgent activity declined in December compared to November, incident levels had returned to levels seen in July and August 2019.



January 2020 saw the second-highest one-month total of insurgency-related incidents since the beginning of attacks in 2017, with militants continuing to establish an area of semi-control while also expanding attacks towards Palma.

- Militants in January 2020 built on the substantial successes of November and December 2019, with 24 insurgency-related incidents tracked during this period as militants continued to operate with relative freedom even as security forces remained in a defensive posture.
- Whereas December 2019 attacks had been primarily concentrated in between Xitaxi and Oasse, other nearby areas of Muidumbe and Macomia Districts, and between Narere and Mucojo, attacks in January took place as far north as countryside north of Mocimboa da Praia town and as far south as Bilibiza in Quissanga District. By the end of January, insurgents were reported to control some isolated stretches of road in Macomia and Muidumbe. Poor weather in December and January made

several area roads impassable, and, combined with the threat of insurgents on roads in the affected districts, road travel between Pemba and Palma had become extremely difficult.

- Militants in a 23 January 2020 attack killed at least 15 soldiers in a raid on a military barracks in the Mbau area, forcing around 250 soldiers to retreat from the area. ISCAP claimed responsibility for this attack, saying 22 soldiers were killed. This attack took place within the Central Cabo Delgado Coast region where militants are believed to have several jungle bases and are most openly challenging the army for territorial control.
- Over 100kms to the south, insurgents on 29 January 2020 attacked the town of Bilibiza in Quissanga District, setting fire to large parts of the town as well as to a technical school run by the Aga Khan Foundation. Insurgents were able to successfully launch this attack despite security forces having at least 6 hours warning that insurgents were marching on Bilibiza. This attack also represented a new escalation by militants, since it occurred less than 100kms from Pemba, and in an area previously considered beyond the bounds of where insurgents could operate. The Bilibiza attack was followed up by insurgent attacks over the following days in which at least 7 people were killed in nearby villages. The Bilibiza raid was one of the insurgency's most high profile demonstrations yet to the people of Cabo Delgado that the military is unable/unwilling to stop escalating militant attacks. This incident would also serve as a recruitment tool and a way to instill fear both in the populations of Quissanga as well as Pemba District to the south.

In part III of Intelyse's reporting series on the Cabo Delgado insurgency, we will look ahead to the rest of 2020 and the insurgency's predicted trajectory, likely government and military actions to counter the militants, and the implications the future of this conflict will for NGOs, businesses, and governments operating in Cabo Delgado in particular, as well as in Mozambique at large.



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PART III: COMMERCIAL INTERESTS IN MOZAMBIQUE THREATENED BY ESCALATING SECURITY RISK

JIHADISTS CHALLENGE THE STATE FEBRUARY-APRIL 2020, AND BEYOND

Executive Summary


In 72 hours, between 23 March to 25 March, militants captured two district headquarters in Cabo Delgado. These actions are the insurgents' most significant achievement since the beginning of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado in 2017. These victories cap months of successful insurgent operations in the province, and once again demonstrate what a potent threat the group presents. Intelyse, in the final part of this series, will provide a current profile of the insurgency and will discuss 3 potential scenarios for the group's progress for the remainder of 2020.



- Throughout February and March militants continued to conduct frequent attacks in several areas of Cabo Delgado. On 23 March, they captured Mocimboa da Praia town, the most significant achievement of the insurgency to date. Two days later, militants captured Quissanga town and published just the second recorded video message issued by the group since 2017.
- The insurgents' goals include the expulsion of the state and the establishment of an Islamic emirate in territory which can be controlled. To succeed, the insurgents must address local concerns regarding control of resources, provision of services and improvement of standards of living to secure support from local communities. The insurgents view the government as the ultimate enemy and seek to expel it, and its influence, completely from areas it controls. NGOs, private companies, foreign governments and other external entities operating within Cabo Delgado are likely to be viewed by the insurgents either as partners of the government or corrupting outside influences. From this perspective, they could be considered valid targets by the group in areas impacted by the insurgency.
- The identity of the group's leadership remains unclear. The current leadership is increasingly capable and is assessed to include defected, or former, military officers. The group's cells are increasingly mobile and able to coordinate with one another; these cells are also growing in size. The insurgency is estimated to be upward of 1,000 fighters at present.
- Insurgent tactics, techniques and procedures have improved considerably over the past year, and the group is now able to capture large towns or overwhelm Mozambican military bases in sophisticated assaults. The group's weaponry and equipment has also improved significantly over the past year via raids on military targets and black-market purchases. The group also possesses several vehicles and

has substantially improved its mobility. The group has yet to launch any confirmed IED attacks, however, it is considered likely to seek the training and equipment to do so, if it has not already developed this capability.

- The insurgency has launched attacks in 10 Districts of Cabo Delgado since the beginning of the insurgency in 2017, and now exercises an early form of semi-territorial control over parts of these districts. Crucially, this control allows the group to tax and recruit from local communities, which in turn facilitates the group's growth.
- The group has long-standing links to Jihadi networks operating in East Africa, and its links to ISCAP appear to be growing stronger by the month. It is assessed that ISCAP, over time, is likely to radicalize and influence the group further.
- The Mozambican military, without major reorganization and support from outside partners, appears unable to effectively challenge the group. It remains in a defensive posture throughout much of the territory in which insurgents are active. Morale is low among military units operating in Cabo Delgado, and the risk of defection to the better-paying militants is significant.
- Intelyse considers 3 different scenarios over the coming months for Cabo Delgado:
 - 1) An unlikely, but best-case scenario: The insurgency's advance is halted by effective countermeasures
 - 2) The most likely scenario: Insurgents continue on their current trajectory of establishing semi-territorial control over large parts of North and Central Cabo Delgado
 - 3) A "worst case" scenario in which militants overrun much of Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces.




01 February - 31 March 2020

After success in January, Cabo Delgado's insurgents maintained a high frequency of attacks in February, primarily in 3 clustered areas. In late March, militants achieved 2 major victories, capturing the towns of Quissanga and Mocimboa da Praia.

In the aftermath of the Cabo Delgado insurgents' successful attack in late January on an Aga Khan sponsored school in the Bilibiza area of Quissanga District, militants in February launched at least 7 separate attacks in Quissanga District. This included a raid on the crossroads town of Mahate on 03 February, a raid which brought militants within 50 km (in a straight line) from Pemba. Over 150 km away, throughout February, militants also launched a series of attacks in Nangade Province. Intelyse also recorded seven different insurgent related incidents within 25 km of Mocimboa da Praia town. One other significant incident widely reported as associated with the

insurgency took place on 12 February in the Mecula District of Niassa in which security forces clashed with unidentified armed men near the border with Cabo Delgado.

- March meanwhile saw 25 recorded incidents; the second-highest monthly total for insurgent-related incidents to date, surpassed only by November 2019. Insurgents during the month launched attacks in Nangade, Mueda, Muidumbe, Mocimboa da Praia, Macomia, Quissanga and Melcuo Districts.
- Attacks in early March included multiple incidents along the N380 road between Imbada village and the village of Unguia, highlighted by a 10 March incident in which at least 11 soldiers of the Mozambican Defence Armed Forces (FADM) were killed in an ambush in the Nguia area.
- The insurgents' most significant attack came on 23 March, when a group of reportedly 200 insurgents attacked Mocimboa da Praia itself (pop. 30,000) in a three-pronged assault at around 0400hrs, capturing the town after defeating security forces. Militants proceeded to set fire to large numbers of government and military buildings while carrying out extensive looting, including very significant quantities of military supplies and weaponry. Before withdrawing from the town voluntarily on the night of 23 March, militants distributed food and cash (looted from several banks in the city). Several sources reported some civilians had welcomed the insurgents enthusiastically in Mocimboa da Praia (MDP) and that insurgents emphasized they were fighting against the government and not against the civilian population. The Islamic State's Central Africa Province (ISCAP) on 24 March claimed responsibility for the MDP attack. At least 23 people were killed in this assault.



On 25 March 2020, in the early morning hours, insurgents struck again over 100 km to the south, capturing Quissanga town, the second district HQ to fall in a 72-hour period. Pictures quickly surfaced online after this attack showing militants posing in front of the Quissanga District Police HQ. Militants on 26 March had published a new propaganda video. This is only the second video to have been directly credited to the insurgents since their activities in Cabo Delgado began in October 2017. In the video, a militant spokesman states that the group is calling for Shariah law in Cabo Delgado, and for new recruits to join the group. He adds that the group fights for the flag of the Islamic State (also seen in the video background), and not the “flag of FRELIMO”, the country’s ruling party. By the afternoon of 25 March, insurgents had reportedly withdrawn from Quissanga, leaving at least 6 police officers dead.



State of the Insurgency


The capture of the MDP and Quissanga, two district HQ towns that many believed to be largely secure from any direct assault by the insurgents, demonstrates the significant present capabilities and brazen posture of the militants. The insurgency, as discussed in [Part II](#) of this series, has completely transformed from a year ago, and is profiled here in its current state by Intelyse.

Motives and Goals

- The Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamma (ASWJ) movement in Cabo Delgado that preceded the insurgency called for a return to a more conservative, fundamentalist form of Sunni Islam as opposed to the more liberal and Sufi-influenced Islam practiced by many Cabo Delgado Muslims ([see Part I](#)). ASWJ saw the predominant form of Islam as practiced in Cabo Delgado as corrupted by a myriad of outside influences. ASWJ was injected with further radical Islamism via the followers and messages of the deceased Kenyan cleric Aboud Rogo and via Islamist networks operating in Tanzania.
- Ultimately the turn to radicalism by the insurgents was due to a toxic cocktail of extremist Salafi-style Islam, widespread poverty, and, crucially, the widespread loss of faith by large elements of Cabo Delgado's population in the Mozambican government to improve their quality of life. Much of Cabo Delgado's population (both Muslim and Christian) has become completely disillusioned with the government because the province has not seen any significant benefits from wealth gained from its substantial natural resources.
- The insurgents' stated goals are relatively simple; they want to create a Muslim state in Cabo Delgado (and possibly beyond) that adheres to their fundamentalist conservative brand of Islam. For those communities in Cabo Delgado sympathetic to the insurgency, the group offers a "pure" version of their religion. Ultimately, through this purity, the group's supporters believe and expect they will benefit economically, will have greater control over their own resources, will not be negatively impacted by

the corruption of the state, and in general will benefit from the “just” rule of the insurgents in ways they had expected to benefit but never did via the rule of the Maputo government.

- As the Islamic State (IS) exercises more influence over the insurgents, IS will likely further radicalize the group, significantly reducing any possibility for the foreseeable future of a negotiated peace between the group and the government. Under IS, particularly if the group continues to be as successful as it has been in recent months, the probability that the group could declare a local emirate will grow substantially. This further radicalization will significantly increase the chances that foreign nationals and foreign companies operating in Cabo Delgado will be targeted.
- The insurgents have an extremely negative view of the Mozambican government, and by extension, all of its partners, be they private companies, NGOs, or foreign governments. As ISCAP integrates itself increasingly with the insurgents, foreign nationals are likely to be increasingly targeted in Cabo Delgado. This strategy will further ingratiate the insurgents with a population deeply skeptical of foreigners operating in their areas, which will in turn serve the insurgency and ISCAP’s recruiting and propaganda goals.



Leadership

- The identity of the group’s leadership remains largely unclear, including whether or not the group has any single recognized top commander or is controlled by a committee or council of cell commanders. It is evident that different militant cells led by different field commanders operate in specific areas of Cabo Delgado, and these cells increasingly communicate and coordinate effectively with one another, which is a sign of improving and efficient cell leadership. The quality of this leadership is demonstrated by the fact that MDP and Quissanga towns, over 100 km apart, were captured within 72 hours of one another in coordinated assaults by different militant cells. There is growing evidence that a number of defected Mozambican military officers are likely among the group’s field commanders.

Cells and Estimated Strength of Insurgency

- From the beginning of the insurgency, militants have operated in cells dispersed across parts of Northern and Central Cabo Delgado, initially reported to be made up of 20-30 fighters. Any given cell in the first years of the insurgency was believed to operate in a relatively small radius, since insurgents possessed few to no vehicles and primarily moved on foot over rough terrain. Cells were and are believed to be based in semi-mobile jungle camps, with any given cell carrying out attacks in areas

located in most cases within 30 km of one of these jungle camps. Although the cells all belonged to the same group, coordination and communication between the groups until at least 2019 was believed to be loose, with most cells operating independently in each area.

- There is strong evidence that the makeup and operations of these cells are changing – in part because the insurgency has been increasingly successful and clearly growing in manpower and in territory. Cells increasingly possess vehicles captured from security forces and, as a result, are significantly more mobile. While cells will likely continue to base themselves out of remote jungle camps, they have on several occasions captured a village or town and remained in the captured location for days afterward before withdrawing. For instance, after the capture of Quissanga town on 25 March 2020, insurgents were reported to have based themselves outside a nearby village for the remainder of the week, reportedly setting ambushes in the area for security forces. This shows the increasingly confident and open manner in which the insurgency is likely to operate in the future. Cells are also larger as the group gains more recruits and are more likely to coordinate in combined operations.
- In its infancy, the number of insurgents was estimated to be no more than a few hundred. The frequency of attacks, particularly over the past 5 months, coupled with the current semi-territorial control of many areas, indicates the insurgents' fighting strength has increased considerably. The usage of 200 fighters in a single operation in the MDP attack also supports significant growth in manpower, and **Intelyse conservatively estimates that the insurgency now involves at least 1,000 fighters. This total could now be as high as 2,000.**

Tactics

- Militant tactics over the past year have shown steady improvement and increasing sophistication. The insurgency initially consisted of raids being launched on undefended villages, with many fighters armed only with machetes. Contrast this with the MDP assault, in which some militants reportedly arrived in the town via boats on the coast while other insurgent units advanced via two main roads to the north and west of the town. Over 200 militants reportedly took part in this assault, demonstrating the group can effectively carry out complex operations including large numbers of fighters.
- Roadside ambushes and attacks on military bases are now also part of the insurgents' regular modus operandi, and on multiple occasions, since late October 2019, the insurgents have killed large numbers of soldiers and forced Mozambican military units to retreat from the battlefield. Raids on remote villages also remain a tactical tool of the group; used to force communities to support the group, punish those who defy the group, and undermine the authority of the state. More conventional direct assaults on towns are likely to be utilized by the group in the near future in order to solidify their semi-territorial control of large areas across North and Central Cabo Delgado. Demonstrating their ability to capture district HQs and military bases in this territory establishes the group's dominance over wider areas, even if the insurgents do not attempt to hold towns and bases after capturing them.

Weaponry and Equipment


- The insurgents' arsenal has improved significantly over the past year. Insurgents over the past 12 months have carried out dozens of raids on military and police posts, capturing significant quantities of small arms, ammunition, other military equipment, and even military and police vehicles. In almost all reporting of attacks in the latter half of 2019 onwards, insurgents are typically described as "uniformed", wearing FADM and other uniforms captured, bought, or looted by the group. The possession of large numbers of uniforms allows the group to sometimes successfully masquerade as government troops, which in turn facilitates insurgent operations.



- The insurgents are seen to derive income from organized crime in Northern Mozambique and Southern Tanzania, likely through the extortion of criminal gangs which are permitted to carry on as long as contributions are made to the insurgents. As Islamic State gains a greater influence over the insurgency, the types of organized crime that will be permitted are likely to change to be more in line with the religious doctrine. The control of smuggling routes is a proven insurgent revenue tactic that has been used widely and to great effect elsewhere by IS. The varying groups are also imposing local taxes on the populations they control. The revenue has likely been used to make black market arms purchases from multiple sources, including from elements of the Mozambican security services themselves. The group also possesses a relatively small number of rocket propelled grenades (RPG) and launching systems for these RPGs, evidenced by pictures published by the militants displaying these weapons.
- No confirmed incident has yet indicated the insurgents possess the capacity to build and deploy improvised explosive devices (IEDs), vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), or other IED delivery methods such as suicide vests. A small number of unconfirmed reports of these methods of attack have been made. As the insurgency continues to mature, it is likely we will see IEDs form part of the modus operandi. The intellectual property on how to construct and deploy them exists widely across the Islamic State and is likely to be imported. The materials needed to construct IEDs are readily available in most market towns and the explosives required are evidenced in the insurgents' published imagery.

Territory

- Insurgents to date have launched attacks in Palma, Mocimboa da Praia, Nangade, Mueda, Macomia, Muidumbe, Meluco, Quissanga, Ancuabe and Ibo Districts of Cabo Delgado. One insurgent attack was confirmed in November 2019 in Tanzania, and a single incident was reported in February 2020 in Mecula District of neighboring Niassa



province. The accompanying map shows probable insurgent cell locations throughout Cabo Delgado as well as the location of a potential cell in Niassa province.

- Insurgents within their zone of activity in Cabo Delgado, as seen in this image, have established multiple jungle camps that are likely located within 30 km of attack clusters. In these territories, militants have effective “semi-territorial control”. This form of control is characterized by insurgents being able to establish area bases, and, via constant attacks and a durable presence, are able to disrupt government authority in much of this territory. **While militants do not completely control these districts, they are able to tax and recruit from rural communities thanks to their enduring nearby presence, and are able to prevent stable security force/government control of much of this area. The abilities to tax and recruit are key to the group’s ability to consolidate its gains and to achieve future growth.**

Outside Support

From the outset of the insurgency, it was clear that the Cabo Delgado militants had some form of support via clandestine jihadist networks via Tanzania; these same networks run through Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, the Eastern DRC, Sudan, and beyond.

Initially, no specific group was identified as supporting the insurgents, though since 2017, the militants were reported to have drawn a number of foreign fighters, most significantly Tanzanians and Ugandans, into their ranks. Many Tanzanian itinerant traders are active in Cabo Delgado, with links to both organized smuggling rings active along the border and to wider East African jihadist networks, while the presence of Ugandan jihadists was significant due to their reported links to the IS-linked Allied Democratic Forces in the DRC.

- As of April 2020, the insurgents’ links to ISCAP appeared to grow stronger by the month, and ISCAP has claimed around 30 attacks in Cabo Delgado since June 2019. ISCAP is likely providing some

financial support to the insurgents, in addition to obvious media support. ISCAP may also be providing some form of training to the group. No evidence yet shows that the Islamic State has dispatched any of its operatives from the remnants of the central Iraq/Syria caliphate to Mozambique, though the appearance of IS central caliphate agents in the midst of the group at any time would not be surprising. The appearance of these agents is one of the key triggers Intelyse is monitoring to understand the level of investment ISCAP is making and the likelihood of foreigners and foreign entities being directly targeted for attack. A recent UN report claimed that ISCAP's central command was located in Somalia, and that IS's Somalia franchise was directing and supporting operations in Mozambique and the DRC. See [Part II](#) for a discussion of links between the Cabo Delgado insurgency and IS-linked ADF militants in the Congo.

- ISCAP is likely to exercise greater control and influence over the insurgency as links between the two deepen. Local grievances and issues that make the insurgency possible will remain important factors for ISCAP to address to maintain local support, though the group will likely further radicalize and deepen its ties to ISCAP in Congo, IS in Somalia, and perhaps other IS franchises in Africa and the Middle East.

The State of the Mozambican Military in Cabo Delgado

In October and early November 2019, the Mozambican government uncharacteristically published several bulletins with details of FADM operations targeting insurgents in Cabo Delgado. However, following a successful insurgent ambush of FADM troops and Russian private military contractors on 27 October 2019 however and a flurry of militant attacks in November, all reports of FADM offensive operations ceased. The FADM since that time has adopted a defensive posture throughout insurgent impacted areas, garrisoning military bases and large towns but halting operations targeting militant camps in the bush. Insurgents in recent months have been able to attack and occupy villages, often remaining in a targeted village for up to 24 hours, with no security force response despite locals having raised the alarm. Security forces increasingly fear insurgent ambushes when responding to village raids.

In the aftermath of the late January Bilibiza attack, FADM and other security forces had withdrawn from the area prior to the militant attack, after receiving warnings that insurgents were advancing. After the Mocimboa da Praia and Quissanga attacks, videos emerged in which FADM soldiers reported that militants were better armed and better supplied than the military; in one such video soldiers called on the government to redeploy them to another part of the country. A February report meanwhile, said military units were actively avoiding combat with the insurgents to prevent casualties, and that many young recruits often deserted if deployed to Cabo Delgado. There are also unconfirmed reports indicating that the Mocimboa da Praia attack had actually been led by a former Mozambican marine who had defected to the insurgents.

These and other reports indicate that FADM units in the province are demoralized, under-supplied and under-equipped. Desertion rates appear to be high, and insurgents have long been reported to have foreknowledge of FADM operations, suggesting the group may have members embedded in the military or, at the very least,


that former security force members of the group are able to provide detailed information on the military. The insurgency is almost certainly able to offer higher pay than the military, increasing the threat of defection to the group.

Considering these facts, the FADM in its current state is not capable of mounting effective counter-insurgency operations. In February, after O&G companies expressed growing concerns about the insurgency, the army did deploy additional troops to Palma District and no insurgent attacks have yet been able to attack the Afungi L&G projects area; securing this area has been one of the army's few successes as militants have freedom of movement throughout the rest of the districts in which they currently operate.

Taking the insurgency's recent significant successes and the current state of the militant group in Cabo Delgado, Intelyse presents 3 potential scenarios in Cabo Delgado over the remainder of 2020.

Scenario 1: Countermeasures Check Insurgency

- In Intelyse's first scenario, the Mozambican government is finally jolted into a more effective response to the insurgency in the wake of the fall of MDP and Quissanga. International partners, including the US and Russia, provide additional support to the Maputo government to push back against the expanding insurgency.
- While insurgents are, for the immediate future, able to continue their attacks in areas they already operate in and threaten district headquarters, the Mozambican government undertakes a major reorganization of the military response, and additional units of FADM are deployed to Cabo Delgado, establishing military posts throughout the affected districts including in smaller villages previously vulnerable to insurgent attacks.




- In this scenario, the FADM, supported by Russian Private Military Contractors (PMCs) or other allies such as South African-based PMCs, once again attack the insurgents, targeting militant jungle camps and forcing the insurgents to defend. Learning from the negative effects of past punitive operations, the FADM makes inroads with local communities in a previously absent “hearts and minds” campaign and avoids civilian casualties. Increasing coordination and cooperation with Tanzanian security forces, the FADM better secures the border with Tanzania, cutting off insurgent supply lines. The government would also potentially initiate a strategy of creating and utilizing armed local anti-insurgent militia groups, a strategy that has been at least partially successful in checking the expansion of militant Islamist groups in Somalia and Nigeria among other conflict zones.

- Critically in this scenario, the newly created Agency for Integrated Development of the North (ADIN) is able to effectively establish itself and provide significant employment opportunities in Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Niassa, undermining the insurgents' recruitment efforts. Working with O&G companies, the government also looks to initiate several infrastructure projects that demonstrate to local communities that Maputo is committed to re-investing revenues made from Cabo Delgado's natural gas riches.
- The insurgency in this scenario is not completely defeated but its territorial advances are stalled. The group's fighters are driven back into remote bush camps, with major roadways, all major towns, and most villages secured. The insurgents, in this case, would be significantly fatigued and diminished by year's end, though still capable of carrying out raids on remote villages and smaller deployments of security forces.
- In this scenario, NGOs, private businesses, foreign governments and others operating in Cabo Delgado are able to operate across the majority of the province, though they should avoid hotspot areas. These organizations and their personnel could potentially be targeted by militants in this scenario, though incidents in which they are targeted are likely to be limited.

The key variable in this scenario is decisive Mozambican government action that incorporates more than just a military solution to the Cabo Delgado insurgency while modifying its military strategy. While this drastic turnaround is possible, Intelyse judges this scenario as very unlikely.

Scenario 2: Militants Solidify Semi-Territorial Control

- The second scenario presented by Intelyse is by far the most likely. In this scenario, insurgents continue for the remainder of 2020 on their steady trajectory demonstrated over the past 5 months. The group consolidates its semi-territorial hold throughout Nangade, Mocimboa da Praia, Macomia, Muidumbe, Quissanga, and large parts of Mueda, Ibo, and Meluco Districts (see image). This consolidation allows the group to effectively operate anywhere in these districts, and to attack any target, which includes MDP and Quissanga-style assaults in which it is able to temporarily capture district HQs and fortified military posts.
- The group in this scenario is also able to establish a more limited presence in Palma, Metuge, and Pemba Districts, though heavier security force deployments due to the importance of these areas means the group has less operational freedom than in the above named provinces (previous bullet). The group in this scenario also is likely to launch more attacks into relatively lightly impacted Ancuabe District, and via Meluco, Mueda, and Ancuabe could also expand




attacks into ruby-rich Montepuez District. In this scenario, by the end of 2020, insurgents would potentially possess the ability to attack into any district of Cabo Delgado, including even the previously unimpacted southernmost districts of Balama, Namuno, Chiure, and Mecufi.

- The insurgency in this scenario is also increasingly able and likely to launch attacks across the border into Tanzanian territory along the Rovuma River, as the group did in November 2019. The insurgents would also seek to establish new cells in Niassa Districts bordering Cabo Delgado and launch new attacks in these areas. The insurgency has established recruiting networks and organized criminal contacts in Nampula District as well, and by the end of the year, could potentially look to launch attacks in some Nampula Districts bordering Cabo Delgado.
- In this scenario, roads between Pemba and Palma will become increasingly dangerous to use as parts fall under the insurgents' control who will be able to launch regular ambushes on others. Insurgents would also likely solidify their tax regime across their areas of semi-control, taxing local businesses in the area as well as taxing smuggling syndicates moving through this territory. The group would also be able to more effectively recruit across this territory and by the end of the year would increase its ranks considerably; the majority of these recruits will be local Cabo Delgado residents though the group would likely also continue to draw on a small but likely growing number of foreign recruits.
- Increasingly confident militants in this scenario could also potentially publicly name an Emir of the growing Cabo Delgado jihadist zone. Many other IS franchises have, after achieving varying degrees of momentum, publicly declared an Emir who, in turn, usually declares loyalty to IS's central leadership.
- In this forecast, NGOs, private businesses, foreign governments and others operating in Cabo Delgado are likely unable and/or not advised to operate in most of the insurgent zone. These organizations and their personnel are increasingly likely to be targets in either armed attacks or kidnappings by the insurgents in this projection.

This scenario is the path that Intelyse considers Cabo Delgado to be on currently. The insurgents though growing in strength do not possess the ability yet to completely drive the Mozambican government out of entire districts and openly control territory but will continue to incrementally expand their territorial and tactical range of activities. An uneven government response to the insurgency will continue, with the Pemba and Palma/Afungi Peninsula areas increasingly endangered by the growing militant threat.

Scenario 3: Insurgents Overwhelm Cabo Delgado



- Scenario 3 is a “worst case scenario”. In this projection, over the remainder of 2020, insurgents substantially expand their areas of operation, not only across the vast majority of northern and central Cabo Delgado but into the eastern districts of Niassa Province as well. In this forecast, militants capitalize on the poor state of the Mozambican army, continuing attacks on military posts and large towns. Militants are able in some areas to establish borderline full territorial control, and in these core areas are able to expel the Mozambican state while setting up their own jihadist proto-state. In other areas, new cells establish a presence and mount regular attacks, challenging the state.
- The Maputo administration in this projection grapples with a countrywide humanitarian/health crisis as COVID-19 kills as many as 64,000 people (worst case scenario discussed by recent Imperial College London Study) as the country’s already strained and weakened health systems are overwhelmed. RENAMO dissident militancy in Central Mozambique also intensifies, meaning the Cabo Delgado insurgency, despite its seriousness, is not given the government and FADM’s undivided attention. This projection also assumes a worst-case scenario economically as well for Mozambique in which all LNG projects on the Afungi Peninsula and other O&G projects in the country are indefinitely postponed and the country’s tourism industry collapses due to COVID-19. Important industries like coal and gem mining largely scale down activity due to the pandemic, while supply lines to important trading partners South Africa, China, and Europe also remain strained or cut off due to the virus, creating shortages and substantial price inflation in Mozambique. Coupled with a

government-imposed state of emergency forcing many to stay at home and thus undermining other economic activities, the country enters an unexpected recession, triggering significant social unrest. Large protests in this forecast occur not only in opposition stronghold areas in Tete, Sofala, Zambezia and Nampula, but in Maputo City as well as in extremely hard-hit Cabo Delgado as well.

- This economic downturn is particularly fortuitous for the insurgents who are able to make significant progress in recruiting increasing numbers of the unemployed youth of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Niassa. The FADM, undersupplied and under-supported by the central government, completely pulls its forces out of some areas, including large parts of Macomia, Muidumbe, Mocimboa da Praia, Quissanga, and Nangade Districts. Insurgents in this scenario control outright large parts of Central and Northern Cabo Delgado, and are virtually able to attack any part of Southern Cabo Delgado, including launching raids into Pemba, though the group is still unable to take the city. Similarly, the insurgents menace Palma and the Afungi Peninsula but, even after cutting this area off from land supply routes, are unable to capture this completely. The insurgents are increasingly able to plant new cells deeper into sparsely populated Niassa Province, as well as into Southern Cabo Delgado and Northern Nampula. Clashes with Tanzanian security forces along the Rovuma River increase as well with insurgents controlling parts of the border and are now able to launch raids into Tanzanian territory.
- In this scenario, NGOs, private businesses, foreign governments and others operating in Cabo Delgado would not be able to operate in the insurgent zone, particularly as, in some large swathes of territory, insurgents would effectively be the sole authority. These organizations and their personnel would, in this case, be directly targeted in either armed attacks or kidnappings by the insurgents.

This scenario's key variable is a drastic economic decline coupled with the increased severity of other issues facing Mozambique that leave the government overwhelmed. While the challenges facing the country are many, Intelyse judges this "perfect storm" of these different challenges all escalating at the same time and inundating the Maputo government to be only a remote possibility.



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